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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Municipal Performance: Does Mayoral Quality Matter? (December 2007) 
Claudia Nancy Avellaneda Becerra, B.S., Colegio Mayor de Cundinamarca;  
 
M.A., Texas A&M University-Kingsville 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Maria Escobar-Lemmon  
 
 
 
This research addresses the question of what explains municipal performance in 
terms of delivering social services and fiscal performance. While the existing literature 
explains governmental performance with political, institutional and socio-demographic 
factors, I suggest that the greatest influence on municipal performance comes from 
having qualified managers.  
Specifically, I argue that that mayoral qualifications influence municipal 
performance. By qualifications I mean mayors’ human capital, that is, their educational 
and job-related experience. The rationale for my proposition rests on the fact that in 
developing municipalities the mayor is not just the elected leader but also the public 
manager, as s/he performs not just political but also administrative functions. Under 
certain circumstances, however, mayoral qualifications may not have the same 
influential power on municipal performance. Therefore, I also argue that in unfavorable 
municipal contexts, the potential influence of mayoral qualifications on performance 
decreases. 
I use both statistical and survey-experimental methodologies to test the 
hypotheses derived from the proposed “mayoral quality theory.” I collected six years of 
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data for the statistical analyses by doing field research across the 40 municipalities that 
comprise the Colombian Department of Norte of Santander.  For the survey-
experimental analysis, I gathered data from interviews and surveys with 120 mayors 
from 12 Latin American countries, who participated in the II Latin American Congress 
of Cities and Local Governments held in Cali, Colombia, on July 26-29, 2006.  
The statistical findings reveal that mayoral qualifications—education and job-
related experience—positively influence municipal performance with respect to 
education enrollment, tax property collection, and social program investment.  However, 
the positive impact that mayoral qualifications have on such performance indicators 
decreases under external constraints, such as the presence of illegal armed groups.  
From the survey-experimental study, findings show that issue salience (or nature 
of municipal need) moderates the impact that mayoral qualifications have on mayors’ 
decision-making. In education issues, for example, qualified mayors are more likely to 
perform better, while in infrastructure issues they are less likely to do so.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A crisis of confidence in government has encouraged the search for solutions that 
both recover citizens’ support and improve governmental performance.  Worldwide 
during the last two decades, scholars and practitioners have suggested and adopted 
decentralization as a means of achieving these twin goals. With the adoption of 
decentralization, a great deal of responsibility has shifted from central to local 
governments, which are expected to have better information on their citizens’ needs. 
Based on this local advantage, decentralization is expected to improve governmental 
efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness.  With decentralization, local governments 
also become responsible for planning, funding, and delivering social programs, making 
long-term development a function of municipal performance.    
The generalized increased in municipal responsibilities, however, does not 
guarantee a homogenous and local positive response. Municipal action indeed varies 
considerably across localities. As Lynn (1980, 98) points out, “… similar families in 
similar circumstances can receive very different treatment depending solely on their 
place of residence.”  Or as Jones et al. (1978, 339) note across localities, “social services 
are virtually never distributed equally.”  This suggests that some municipalities exceed 
others in terms of fiscal and policy performance. While some localities collect more 
taxes and report greater equity in health and education coverage, others hardly perform 
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while others fall very well behind. This variance in response leads us to question what 
determines municipal performance. 
My dissertation tries to explain why some municipalities in developing countries 
perform better than others in terms of delivering services and fiscal performance. I argue 
that mayoral qualifications significantly influence municipal performance. To perform 
well, a municipality needs to be led by an educated and experienced mayor. The greatest 
influence on municipal performance does not come from outside of the administrative 
structure of the organization, such as political, socio-economic and institutional factors. I 
argue that these are contributing factors, but not the most influential. The greatest 
municipal influence, I argue, comes from having a qualified mayor who is able to 
overcome obstacles that impede the accomplishment of objectives. If unqualified mayors 
lead municipalities, success is unlikely no matter how suitable the political, socio-
economic, and institutional climate because these mayors may not adequately exploit 
such a favorable climate. By focusing on mayors, I bring a new context to public 
administration, one that blends politics (an elected mayor as manager) with public 
management. 
I have three aims in this dissertation. The first is to assess the effect of mayoral 
qualifications on municipal performance. The second is to test the mayoral qualifications 
hypothesis against competing explanations. By doing this, I will identify what drive(s) 
municipal performance. The third goal it to identify under what circumstances the 
mayoral qualifications strongly influences municipal performance. To achieve my aims, 
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I collected a unique data set to analyze and test the range of competing explanations to 
understand municipal performance.  
My intention is not to undermine the explanatory power of other political, socio-
economic, and institutional factors.  What this dissertation does is to evaluate the impact 
of mayoral qualifications on several indicators of municipal performance to demonstrate 
how much influence the mayor can have after taking into account other factors.  I do this 
with three comparative analyses employing data from Latin American municipalities.  
Besides identifying the determinants of municipal performance, my dissertation 
also contributes to explaining the results of decentralization by looking at the 
subnational level. Moreover, by focusing on the policy implementer (the mayor), I move 
the analysis from the macro (institutional) to the micro (individual) level. Finally, in 
identifying what improves municipal performance in terms of social polices, I also 
contributes to the study of poverty alleviation.  Poverty reduction concerns almost 53% 
of the world population, attracts policy maker’s attention, and increases the chances for 
consolidating democracy.  
The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section reviews 
existing explanations for understanding municipal performance. The next section 
introduces what is missing in explaining municipal performance by summarizes the main 
argument—mayoral qualifications influence municipal performance—and the rationale 
for it. The third section brings the municipal context as moderating factor, which is 
hypothesized to condition the influence of mayoral qualifications on municipal 
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performance. The fourth section introduces the research design to test the competing 
explanations, and the final section offers an overview of the dissertation.  
Current Explanations for Municipal Performance 
 
Existing literature offers several theories to explain governmental performance. It 
is important to mention that these theories are not specific to the municipal level of 
government, and they have emerged from the Untied States context.  However, they 
should be applicable both to the municipal level and in developing settings. Given their 
potential explanatory power, I test these competing explanations against the mayoral 
qualifications thesis. Thus, this dissertation also tests the generalizability of theories 
developed in the United States for developing world. These explanations can be grouped 
into three categories: institutional, political, and demographic and socio-economic 
factors.  
Institutional Explanations  
 
One vein of scholarship suggests that governmental performance is a function of 
the institutional contexts in which the entity operates. Several explanations fit within the 
institutional category.  The first institutional explanation is the “party ideology thesis” 
which centers on left-right ideological spectrum  (Downs 1957). This debate centers on 
whether parties of the left spend more money in service delivery than parties of the right 
(Blais et al., 1993, Cameron 1978, Castle 1982, Solano 1983, and Swank 2002). Once in 
government, parties on the left are expected to spend more; consequently, leftist parties 
should perform better. However, it is arguable, as more money not always leads to better 
performance.     
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The second institutional explanation is the “party alternation thesis.” The idea is 
that the governmental performance in the current year is a function of the party in 
government’s action in the previous year because “the policies of party X ‘live on’ 
during party Y’s early years of office (Sharpe and Newton 1884, 198). Other scholars, 
however, have a different rational to the party alternation thesis. According to Calcagno 
and Escaleras (2007) and Rumi (2003), change of party in government creates instability 
and overspending, thus affecting negatively performance.  
Other scholars see governmental performance as a function of the type of 
government. Under divided—as opposed to unified—government, for example, it is 
more difficult to build consensus around the executive’s proposals, which leads to 
suboptimal outcomes (Alt and Lowry 1994, Amorim-Neto 1998, Clingermayer and 
Wood 1995). Under other types of governments—such as minimal winning coalition, 
single party minority government, and multi party minority government—it may be also 
difficult to gather consensus for the executive’s proposals, obstructing the adoption and 
implementation of policies and programs that will otherwise improve governmental 
performance (Woldendorp et al. 1993).  
Another view explains governmental performance with the “electoral 
competitiveness hypothesis” (Key 1949, Dye 1966, Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993).  
This proposition suggests that the tighter the competition, the better the performance.  
However, other scholars, such as Boyne (1998) and Sharpe and Newton (1984), suggest 
that the closeness of competition may also be a reflection of the number of parties 
involved in the contest. In this case the type of political system—multiparty, two-party, 
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or single-party—may also explain governmental performance. According to this view, 
the greater the number of veto players, the greater the transaction costs because of the 
common pool problem (Weingast et al. 1981). This, in turn, affects performance.  
The sixth institutional explanation points to the “electoral cycle.” Performance, 
according to this proposition, varies across years because during election years 
politicians adopt either expansionary or tax reduction policies to gain voters. (Buchanan 
and Tullok 1962, Nordhaus 1975). Consequently, the reduction of resources influences 
negatively performance. Finally, other scholars contend that the existence of oversight 
agencies may improve performance, as they promote accountability (Blair 2000, Van 
Waarden 1999) 
Another vein of scholarship explains performance with the “bureaucratic 
decision rule hypothesis.” While some advocate for the benign nature of bureaucracy 
(Jones et al. 1978; Nivola 1978; Mladenka 1980, 1981) others express their skepticism 
(Barton 1980, Downs 1967, Niskanen 1971, Caiden 1991), and others point at its 
discriminative performance (Lipsky 1980, Sjoberg, Brymer and Farris 1966). Because of 
the lack of reliable measurements for bureaucratic decision rule, its assessment in most 
of the cases is limited to the null hypothesis: The absence of statistical significance of 
any of the competing explanations may suggest the influence of bureaucratic decision 
rules (the excluded explanation). 
While the above literature focuses on mechanisms at the implementation phase, 
Linder and Peters (1988, 739) contend that the crucial point for performance is the 
policy/program design, that is whether it is coherent and tractable, as well as whether it 
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specifies sanctions. They assume that policy makers adopt policies/programs they think 
are more likely to be endorsed by street level bureaucrats. This suggests an endogenous 
relationship because programs in place determine the ones to be adopted. Besides the 
institutional factors, another group of explanations deals with political support.  
Political Explanations  
 
This set of explanations for governmental performance centers on the influence 
of managers’ political support on performance. The idea is that without political support, 
public managers are unlikely to perform well. In no other sector, as the public one is, 
leaders’ political support is expected to determine their power and effectiveness (Meier 
2000; Fernández 2005; Rainey 1997).  Political support, in addition, can be related to 
intergovernmental networks, which is another determinant of performance (Agranoff 
and McGuire 1998; O’Toole and Meier 2004).  In sum, leaders’ political support is 
expected to contribute positively to performance, allowing them to adopt their programs. 
Political support, however, may derive from different levels: above (high ranking 
officials), intermediate (legislative support), and below (electoral support). 
Complementing the institutional and political explanations, another view focuses on 
demographic and socio-economic factors to explain performance.   
Demographic and Socio-Economic Explanations  
 
Durant and Legge (1993), Lewis-Beck and Alford (1980), and Mazmanian and 
Sabatier 1989) offer another explanation for governmental performance. According to 
them, the success or failure of any policy/program is a function of the size and nature of 
the target.  The idea is that the smaller and more homogeneous the target group, the 
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more successful the policy implementation, and therefore, greater outputs.  Lineberry’s 
(1976) “underclass hypothesis”—in which due to class bias, governments perform better 
in upper or middle than in poor-class areas—also fits within this category.  
Besides the above factors, most of the studies on performance also include 
economic explanations such as growth rate, recessions, productivity, and budgetary 
resources. On budgeting, some scholars also focus on budgetary institutions such as 
balance restrictions, budget procedures, and tax and expenditure limitations to explain 
performance.  Despite all the variety of explanations, literature has underscored one: the 
managerial quality thesis.  
What Is Missing 
 
 While all the above explanations focus on factors external to the organizations, I 
argue that the greatest influence on municipal performance derives from a factor within 
the organization:  who manages the mayoralty—the mayor. But which of the mayor’s 
characteristics matters for performance?  I suggest that mayoral qualifications influence 
municipal performance. By qualifications I mean mayors’ human capital, that is, their 
educational and job-related experience. Qualified mayors, I argue, take advantage of the 
institutional, political, demographic and socio-economic factors of the municipality. All 
of these factors can be favorable to performance, but if the mayor is incapable of 
exploiting them, they will be just unrealized opportunities. 
The Main Argument 
 
In developing settings, the perception that government is incompetent is 
common. There most citizens are unsatisfied with the performance of public institutions, 
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and this discontent extends to local governments. This negative perception of governing 
institutions, in turn, obstructs the consolidation of democracy, as citizens may resort to 
undemocratic alternatives in search of change. However, some governmental institutions 
perform relatively well at the local level.  This considerable variance in performance 
suggests the existence of factors contributing to performance.  
 In explaining this variance, I argue that mayoral qualifications influence 
municipal performance. Educated and experienced mayors are expected to produce 
better results, thus improving municipal performance. Although governmental 
performance is a function of collective action, a great deal of it is also a function of the 
actions of individual, qualified managers (Cohen 1988, Cohen and Eimicke 1995, Haass 
1994, Lynn 1987, Meier 1991).  In the end, who the municipal manager is matters.  By 
emphasizing mayoral qualifications, I hope to show that managerial quality is likely to 
exert more influence than other external organizational factors.  
The rationale for my proposition rests on the fact that in developing 
municipalities the mayor is not just the elected leader but also the public manager, as 
s/he performs not just political but also administrative functions. Indeed in developing 
settings, the figure of the city manager is absent because of either constitutional mandate 
and/or financial constraint. This leaves the mayor with the responsibility for leading and 
directing municipal administration as well as implementing and proposing public 
policies.  With this, the elected mayor becomes the municipal manager, too. 
In the changing and complex world, public managers always face challenges. 
Although challenges increase, “most of the public managers are ill-equipped to deliver 
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quality leadership” (Cohen and Eimicke 1995, XVI). Indeed, it is assumed that anyone 
can manage and that no qualifications are needed when the opposite is true: public 
management needs qualified public managers. A qualified mayor, for example, knows 
whom to hire or to retain to improve municipal performance. Even under circumstances 
in which mayors have to work with the existing staff, they can resort to other strategies 
to improve performance. In addition, qualified mayors are more likely to command 
confidence, appropriately structure organizational subunits, and communicate both clear 
assignments and operation proceedings to achieve effectiveness.  
Although the mayoral qualifications thesis may seem obvious and simplistic, 
there have no been empirical test of it. Indeed, its simplicity makes it worthwhile to test 
in developing settings because proof of its validity will offer a simple, practical and 
achievable solution contributing to governmental performance. This solution points to 
simply electing qualified mayors—which is different to oligarchic mayors.  Indeed, 
many developing municipalities are still led by unqualified mayors who waste time, 
opportunities, human and financial resources, mistakes that local governments ought not 
to pay for.  
The Moderating Effect 
 
Under certain circumstances, however, mayoral qualifications may not have the 
same influential effect on municipal performance. That is the case when the municipal 
context impedes the mayor’s ability to maneuver to improve performance. The 
unfavorable context may range from natural disasters—earthquakes, flooding, volcanos, 
etc.—to stressful situations—terrorist acts, guerrilla actions, etc. In these contexts, 
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factors outside of the municipal administration may condition the influence that mayoral 
qualifications may have on municipal performance. Accordingly, I also argue that under 
unfavorable municipal circumstances, the influence of managerial quality on 
performance decreases.  
Research Design 
 
In this dissertation, I test the mayoral qualifications thesis against the existing 
institutional, political, demographic and socio-economic explanations. In two statistical 
analyses, I assess the impact of these competing explanations on several municipal 
indicators: education coverage, coverage in identifying the beneficiaries of social 
programs, expenditures, social investment, and tax property collection.  To do that, I 
analyze a data set comprising the 40 municipalities that constitute the Colombian 
department of Norte de Santander over a six-year period (2000-2005).  Data collection 
was the result of four-months of field research.  
I selected the Colombian municipalities because of the country’s relatively long 
experience with fiscal (since 1982), political (since 1988) and administrative 
decentralization (since 1989). Moreover, I selected the municipalities of a single 
department for the following reasons. First, they vary in terms of development, 
performance, and mayoral qualifications. Second, their average number (40) allowed me 
to undertake the project given the financial constraints. Third, by focusing on a single 
department (state), I control for variables specific to it, such as governor’s performance 
and departmental control agencies’ actions. The period under study covered from 2000 
to 2005, years in which the municipalities are expected to have adjusted to the new 
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responsibilities transferred during the earlier period. The result is a unique pool time 
series data set to test my propositions.  
This dissertation also presents a third empirical study, which is a survey-
experimental analysis. In it, I explore whether the nature (or type) of the program and the 
municipal context moderate the influence that mayoral qualifications have on municipal 
performance. Experimental analyses allow me to manipulate both the nature of the 
municipal need or problem (education or infrastructure) and the municipal context 
(stressful or distressful context). I employ data from interviews with 120 Latin American 
mayors (acting as such as of July 2006), who were participants of the 2nd  Latin 
American Congress of Cities and Local Governments held in Cali, Colombia on July 26-
29, 2006. I analyze these data using factor and logic analyses.  With this cross-cultural 
comparison, I seek to formulate more reliable generalization about the mayoral quality 
thesis.  
Overview of the Dissertation 
 
The next six chapters examine the determinants of municipal performance. 
Chapter II describes the existing theories that explain municipal performance. It also 
develops the mayoral qualifications thesis, its rationale, and derives the hypotheses to be 
tested in the dissertation. Moreover, it presents the conditioning factor, which is 
hypothesized to moderate the influence of mayoral qualifications on municipal 
performance. Since two out of the three empirical chapters test the competing 
propositions with data from the Colombian municipalities, chapter III provides a 
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description of their administrative structure, responsibilities, administrative tools, 
finances, auditing and evaluation mechanisms, and corruption practices.  
Chapter IV offers the first statistical test on the impact of the competing 
explanations on two indicators of municipal performance: education coverage and 
coverage in identifying the beneficiaries of social programs (SISBEN). As expected, 
mayoral qualifications—educational background and job-related experience—have the 
greater positive influence on education coverage. However, under unfavorable 
circumstances, such as the presence of illegal armed groups (guerrillas and paramilitary), 
the positive impact that mayoral qualifications have on education coverage decreases. 
Contrary to expectations, mayoral qualifications have no statistically significant 
influence on improving the identification of the beneficiaries of social programs 
(SISBEN). Newspapers sources, however, suggest that the nature of the SISBEN 
program makes it susceptible to corruption, as mayors employ this program to return 
political favors. 
Chapter V poses the question what are the determinants of fiscal performance?  I 
answer this by assessing the competing explanations on three municipal fiscal indicators: 
tax collection/capita, social investment/capita and expenditures/capita. Findings reveal 
that mayoral qualifications have the greatest positive influence on both tax collection per 
capita and social investment per capita, but not on expenditures per capita.  
  From chapter IV we learned that mayoral qualifications influence municipal 
education coverage, but not the SISBEN program. This suggests that the nature of the 
program may condition the influence of mayoral quality on performance. To test this, 
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Chapter VI presents a survey-experimental analysis, which was conducted using 120 
mayors from 12 Latin American countries. The experiment allows manipulating the 
nature of the program as well as the municipal context to provide an additional test of 
their conditioning effect upon mayoral qualifications.  In the survey-experiment, mayors 
were asked to choose an administrative decision—out of two alternatives—when 
exposed to two different municipal problems: one in the educational sector and the other 
in the infrastructure sector. One of the two administrative decisions is assumed to be the 
right one, as it is expected to improve performance of the specific municipal problem. 
The data, which include the qualifications of the interviewed mayors, were analyzed 
with factor and logic analyses, revealing that the nature of the program does moderate 
the influence of mayoral qualifications on performance. With educational problems—but 
not with infrastructure—better qualified mayors were more likely to adopt the assumed 
right administrative decisions. The logic analysis reveals that the nature of the program 
and the context of the municipality condition the influence that mayoral qualifications 
have on the administrative decision. 
Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the main argument and the results 
from the three empirical chapters. It also presents the implications and contributions of 
the dissertation as well as outlining future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
  
Introduction 
The literature on performance has presented political, economic, and socio-
demographic factors to explain variation in organizational performance. These factors, 
however, are external to the organization. Existing literature, for example, fails to 
consider the potential influence of one internal organizational factor: the manager. The 
goal of this chapter is to build a theory of municipal performance that focuses on the 
qualifications of the mayor, who is the political and administrative manager in 
developing settings. I argue that two mayoral qualifications—educational background 
and job-related experience—have the greatest influence on municipal performance. I 
also argue that the potential influence of mayoral qualification on performance may be 
conditioned on the external environment of the municipality.  
 The first part of the chapter lays out the links between public management and 
organizational performance. The second part outlines the expected relationship between 
managerial quality and organizational performance. Then, I derive a theory of municipal 
performance and explain why and how mayoral quality is critical to municipal 
performance.  The third part introduces the proposition that the municipal context 
moderates the influence of managerial quality on performance. Each section presents the 
applicable testable hypotheses, which will then be tested in chapters IV through VII.  
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The adoption of decentralization is expected to improve local governmental 
efficiency responsiveness, and effectiveness.  Some studies seem to support this view. 
Fiszbein (1997), for example, states: “[it] was the combination of the added 
responsibilities [administrative decentralization], more resources [fiscal decentralization] 
and political reforms [election of mayors] that created the environment conducive to the 
emergence of effective local governments” (1032).  In fact, through it, local 
governments may improve delivery of programs, municipal characteristics, and 
managerial skills. But decentralization also facilitates variation in local governments 
because it, by itself, does not guarantee effective local government.  Therefore, 
“[d]ecentralization is neither good nor bad” (Kiggundu 1989: 255) because it is only a 
means (Peterson 1997) to improve local performance. This suggests that in order to 
understand municipal performance, we need to look at other explanations.  
 Explanations for understanding organizational performance can be grouped into 
political, economic, and socio-demographic factors. Among the political influences, 
scholars refer to government ideology (Swank 2002), partisan support (Doig and 
Hargrove 1990), legislative oversight (Santiso and Belgrano 2004), divided government 
(Clingermayer and Wood 1995), citizens’ participation (Blair 2000), politicians’ 
motivation (Anderson 2003, Gibson and Lehoucq 2003), and electoral competitiveness 
(Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). As economic determinants, studies include budgets, 
inequality, gross domestic production (GDP), and level of development.  Finally, as a 
socio-demographic explanation, scholars point to the size and nature of the target 
(Durant and Legge 1993). Although all these explanations are possible influences, 
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research on local governmental performance has neglected the potential effect that 
public management may have on organizational performance.  
Public Management and Performance 
Scholars and practitioners in the public sector widely accept the principle that 
what makes the difference between the success and failure of a government program is 
public management (Boyne 2003; Lynn 1984, 1987; Meier and O’Toole 2002; O’Toole 
and Meier 1999).  Management “may be defined as the exercise of judgment or 
discretion by actors in managerial roles” (Lynn 2000: 15). Ordinarily understood, 
management theory “… ha[s] to do with the study and description of directing ongoing 
routine activities in purposeful organizations” (Frederickson and Smith 2003, 97).  
“Properly understood, public management is structure, craft, and institution: 
‘management’, ‘manager’, and ‘responsible practice’” (Lynn (2003, 2).  That is, public 
management operates under a legal structure of governance, which delegates, constrains, 
and oversees managers’ authority. 
 The core of public management is administration. By focusing on public 
management, our attention switches from bureaucratic to managerial administration 
(Bresser Pereira and Spink 1999). In other words, we switch from controlling the 
bureaucracy to managing the bureaucracy. And managing is a process based on 
performance. Therefore, unlike bureaucratic administration, which focuses on what 
should be done, managerial administration focuses on how to achieve and improve the 
results.  The switch in focus happens because bureaucratic administration protects the 
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state while managerial administration protects the user, the citizen (Bresser Pereira and 
Spink 1999).   
 With the intention of protecting customers, under managerial administration 
managers adopt economic and administrative reforms. According to Bresser Pereira and 
Spink (1999), one economic change is cutting the price of services, as managers seek to 
produce the most with the least. Administratively, managers implement process and 
assessment techniques to improve delivery and quality of services (Bresser Pereira and 
Spink 1999). To do this, managerial administration needs to be flexible to allow 
managers to try different actions to finally decide which ones improve performance.  
With this flexibility, managerial administration deviates from the rigid nature of 
bureaucratic administration.  
The switch to managerial administration is by no means confined to developed 
settings.  In fact, “[e]ffective management is becoming a universal ambition” (Jreisat 
2002, 22).  Jreisat (2002), Jaeger and Kanungo (1990), Kubr and Wallace (1984), for 
instance, recognize the increasing importance of public management in developing 
settings. Kubr and Wallace (1984, 10) note that growing interdependence in trade, 
technology, and foreign investment has promoted the development of management. This 
managerial development has been evident through eight strategic choices: the role 
assigned to public management, the role assigned to private management and 
entrepreneurship, the role of technical cooperation, the priority given to modern 
economic sectors; the interaction of public and private management, the strategy for 
localizing management (replacing foreign managerial manpower by nationals), the 
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transfer of management expertise from industrialized countries, and the building of 
professional institutions to instruct in management (Kubr and Wallace 1984, 10). 
Despite the promotion of management, in many developing countries both public 
and private organizations are targets of criticism for their low levels of productivity and 
poor management practices (Mendonca and Kanungo 1990). This is due to their 
configuration, as “[p]lanning is non-existent or based simply on precedence, 
organizational structures are very rigid, hierarchical, and status oriented, decisions are 
made on ‘non-rational’ criteria, and rewards are based not on performance but on other 
criteria” (Jaeger 1990, 143 see also Lane and DiStefano1988). Consequently, scholars 
refer to the ‘management gap,” and “[t]he term implies that Third World countries, on 
the whole, manage less effectively, even if they already have individuals and 
organizations whose performance is high by any standard” (Kubr and Wallace 1984, 4).  
In sum, the management gap has obstructed organizational effectiveness and 
performance in developing settings. 
 In any setting, management is expected to contribute to performance through the 
different functions that it involves. Jaeger and Kunungu (1990: 289) stress three of them: 
1) to ensure the carrying out of the organization’s core tasks, 2) to keep track of the 
organization’s environment to face it effectively, and 3) to protect and buffer the 
organization from environmental influence to avoid disruptions. Similarly, O’Toole and 
Meier (1999) emphasize four functions: exploitation of the environment, maintenance of 
a stable system, establishing structural forms, and buffering of the organization. Other 
scholars offer more specific functions of management. Hellriegel and Slocum (1986), for 
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example, underline leading, planning, organizing, and controlling while Gregory Streib 
(1992) centers on strategic decision-making. Streib, however, notes that to apply 
strategic decision-making, management has to integrate three of its functions: leadership, 
external support, and human resources.  
The integration of management functions also receives attention from Roberts 
(2000), who sees the organization as whole rather than separate subsystems. Similarly, 
Ingraham and Kneedler (2000, 236) propose to integrate management of capital 
finances, information, and human resources because the integration of them is what 
leads public organizations to improve performance. O’Toole and Meier (1999) also 
emphasize integration of functions when they stress motivation and coordination as 
efforts to bring together actors and resources to attain the goals. 
As it permits the attainment of goals, Ingraham and Kneedler (2000: 241) 
contend that “…management matters in the overall performance of government.” In fact, 
“…[a] multitude of prescriptions for performance enhancement in both the private and 
public sectors depend on this assumption” (Ingraham and Kneedler 2000: 241). Kettle 
and Milward (1996, 1) also share this notion by stating that “…[p]ublic management 
matters, and it matters because the quality of public management shapes the performance 
of public programs.” Kubr and Wallace (1984, 1) also stress the importance of 
management on performance, as they agree “…that the quality of management largely 
determines what is achieved.” They even note that, “…[i]mproperly managed, even 
massive injections of finance and material resources, as well as superhuman efforts, 
produce only fleeting improvements” (Kubr and Wallace 1984, 1). 
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Despite this generalized notion, “…[n]o doubt the importance of public 
management has been overlooked” (Ingraham and Kneedler (2000, 239).  For instance, 
literature on implementation—specifically principal-agent models—has ignored the 
impact of government management on policy performance (Ingraham and Kneedler 
2000, 239). In correcting this, Ingraham and Kneedler “…speculate not only that 
organizational arrangements and factors are significant but the nature of public 
management contributes powerfully to the effectiveness with which public agents are 
able to translate principal’s intents into outcomes.”  They even argue that management 
should be the “intervening variable in the policy/performance equation” (2000, 239). 
Therefore, this dissertation’s thesis is that: Management quality improves municipal 
performance. 
Since Lynn (1984), an increasing number of studies suggest that performance is a 
function of management quality (Boyne 2004; Boyne and Walker 2006; Doig and 
Hargrove 1990; Meier and O’ Toole 2002; O’Toole and Meier 1999). The ‘management-
quality’ hypothesis suggests that qualified management contributes to performance and 
program success.  Support for this proposition comes from cases studies in the USA 
(Ban 1995; Behn, 1991; Cohen and Eimicke 1995; Doing and Hargrove 1987; Hargrove 
and Glidewell 1990; and Riccucci 1995).  Systematic studies also provide empirical 
evidence for the management quality thesis (Andrews et al. 2006; Brewer and Selden 
2000; Fernández 2005; Meier and O’ Toole 2003; Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 2004; 
O’Toole and Meier 2004).   
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But what quality in management means seems to be vague because managerial 
influence works through different causal pathways (Meier and O’Toole 2002).  As the 
above studies reveal, the causal mechanisms through which management improves 
performance are complex and numerous. Hence, the lack of concreteness of the term 
might be due to “…the absence of a framework for understanding and measuring 
management effectiveness” (Ingraham and Kneedler 2000: 240). In this dissertation, 
therefore, I attempt to reduce this vagueness by proposing that from all of management’s 
potential mechanisms for influencing performance, one seems to have the greater 
impact:  the quality of the manager.  
Identifying the Workings of Public Management Quality on Performance 
As already cited, management includes many variables— resources, regulation 
(Ashworth et al. 2002, Boyne et al. 2002, Hood et al. 1998), market competition (Boyne 
1998), representation (Pitts 2005), workforce stability (O’Toole and Meier 2003), 
workforce diversity (Meier, O’Toole, and Goerdel 2006), and leadership (Fernández 
2005, and Meier and O’Toole 2002). Most of these studies explore the impact of a single 
management variable on performance. Ingraham and Kneedler (2000, 236), on the 
contrary, argue that to link management quality to overall performance, a model that 
integrates several management subsystems, such as capital management, financial 
management, human resources management, and information technology management, 
is needed. 
Although a performance model may include as many management subsystems as 
possible, what leads to overall performance is the integration of these subsystems. And 
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the key management variable for integrating them is leadership. As (Ingraham and 
Kneedler (2000, 242) posit, “… leadership contributes to each of the management 
subsystems, but it is most significant in its alignment of these systems within a coherent 
and cohesive administrative framework.”  Ingraham and Kneedler then assume that 
sound leadership has a positive influence on effective management and thus on 
performance, and this link  “…operates through formal, systematic performance-based 
activities” (2000, 242).  
Through the integration function, research on the management quality- 
performance relationship converges with scholarship on leadership.  As Meier and 
O’Toole (2002, 630) state, “[a] consideration of management’s hypothesized effect on 
program performance, for instance, must incorporate some attention to the notion of 
leadership.”   
Managerial Leadership and Performance 
For some, management is subordinated to leadership. Under this view, the 
functions of leadership include motivation, direction, setting values and goals, and 
management—such as controlling budgeting and getting things done (Rainey 1991). For 
others, leadership is subsumed by management. That is, besides planning, organizing, 
directing, staffing, coordinating, and budgeting— PODSCORB—(Gulick 1937), 
management also implies leadership—directing and encouraging people to act in ways 
that allow the achievement of goals (Rainey 1991, 157-8).1  Finally, others, such as 
                                                 
1 To see more on the functions of managerial roles and skills see in Allison (1983): The Functions of 
General Management; in Mintzberg (1972): The Executive Roles; in Cameron and Whetten (1983): 
Management Skill Topic, and in McCauley, Lombardo, and Usher (1989); The Benchmarks Scales.   
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Bennis and Nanus (1985), distinguish between leadership and management arguing that 
the former implies “doing things right” (1985, 21) while the later consists of “doing the 
right thing” (1985: 21). Despite different views, generic theories on leadership are 
applicable to private and public sectors. And although there is leadership research 
specific to public organizations (for review, see Rainey 1991), “…researchers in the 
management field have treated leadership and management in the public sector as 
essentially the same as in other settings” (Rainey (1991, 172). Accordingly, in either 
sector, private of public, management is related to leadership.  
Given the management-leadership interdependence, it seems safe to argue for the 
centrality of the individual leader/manager on performance. Indeed, although no single 
management variable explains performance (Boyne et al. 2005; Forbes and Lynn 2005; 
Lynn et al. 2000), I argue that the manager is the most important dynamic of 
management. In Boyne et al.’s (2005, 634) terms, “it is increasingly clear that managers 
can improve program effectiveness, sometimes in substantial ways.” Or, as O’Toole and 
Meier (1999, 524) state, “management is a function performed via a single actor or 
office.” 
The centrality of the manager in public management has, however, been 
questioned. Maynard-Moody and Leland (2000), for instance, raise the issue of whether 
public management researchers should focus on the street-level frontline workers rather 
than on the manager.2 I, however, contend that by focusing on the manager, we learn 
more about organizational performance because managers seek to accomplish the 
                                                 
2
 Scholars from business administration, sociology and psychology who study management and 
organizations often study frontline workers.  
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established goals by obtaining the most not only from the material, but also from the 
human resources—including the frontline workers. The manager, for example, selects 
the strategy that better fits both the activities of the agency and the capabilities of the 
workers. In the end, as Gibson and Lehoucq (2003, 35) state, “[n]o matter how well 
designed the technical aspects of [a] decentralized policy may be, local-level politicians 
will influence which policies receive attention and which ones languish.”   
In the next section, I address Brudney et al.’ (2000, 1) question, “How much of 
the performance delivered by important public programs can be attributed to the efforts 
of public managers, those who organize people and resources to get the job done?” 
The Role of the Mayor in Municipal Performance 
In responding Brudney et al.’s (2000) question, previous efforts have identified a 
single factor.  Lynn’s (1987, 103), for example, suggests, “…the activity of government 
agencies is the product of the behavior of identifiable individuals who occupy 
responsible positions.”  Along Lynn’s lines, Meier et al. (1991, 158) posit, “[i]t is at the 
higher levels of the bureaucracy and among the elected officials, for example, that 
important decisions on what services to deliver or how to deliver them are made that 
limit a street-level bureaucrat’s ability to affect service distributions.” Therefore, while 
some government outputs are the product of collective action, it is safe to say that some 
public policies are implemented, or shaped, through the actions of a single-actor.  And in 
developing municipal settings, the identifiable individual, the elected official, and the 
single actor is the mayor.  
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Some scholars clearly illustrate the role of the mayor in developing settings. 
Fiszbein (1997) does it for the Colombian case by stating that “[i]n the very small 
municipios (for example, those with a population of less than 10, 000) the mayor 
becomes an hombre orquesta (a one-man-band), being in charge of most activities that 
require a certain degree of qualification” (Fiszbein 1997, 1037). In fact, in developing 
settings, workers’ poor on-job training makes the mayor’s action more crucial.3  From 
the group of municipalities studied, Fiszbein (1997, 1034) asserts that “the effectiveness 
and capacity of local government in this group, is closely associated with that of the 
mayor.”  This is supported by “Cárdenas’ (1994d) and Villa’s (1995) studies, which 
contrast two Colombian municipal administrations—Zapatoca and Versalles, 
municipalities of similar size—associating their sharp differences with their mayors.  
Scholarship also documents support for mayoral influence on program 
performance. For instance, Gibson and Lehoucq (2003) state that the concepts of 
decentralized programs “…fail to acknowledge that the success of decentralization 
hinges on the behavior of the local politicians”(32).  The mayor, for example, can bring 
new well-qualified employees to the administration to improve results. Where it is not 
possible, mayors may resort to public bidding to delegate to a private agency the 
delivery of some services. And where none of the previous options exists, the mayor can 
opt for personally training the staff in the most needed skills. The mayor can also reduce 
administrative costs by sharing professional services with other municipalities. Through 
                                                 
3
 A World Bank’s study (1995) reports that developing municipalities with populations of less than 10, 
000 have, on average, two professionals in the administration. 
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associations of municipalities, for example, administrations can share advisors, lawyers, 
and accountants to improve their performance.  
The mayoral influence is also underlined in the Bolivian and Mexican contexts. 
After conducting a survey in eleven Bolivian and seven Mexican municipalities, 
Rowland (2001) contends that the  “…increasing variation among local governments can 
be expected to continue precisely because of the rising importance of mayors and other 
local actors in municipal life” (1384).  Indeed, in developing settings mayoral leadership 
is so important   that it transcends the organization. That is, besides encouraging 
customer-oriented performance through his/her managerial skills, the mayor also 
mobilizes community and economic support through his/her political skills (Fiszbein 
1997). 
Mayoral leadership might not be seen as significant in the United States, as it is 
in developing settings. Unlike in Latin American countries, where the most common 
governmental form features a strong elected mayor, who is overseen by an elected 
council; in the USA exits two forms of local governments (and additional variants within 
each one). The existence of two forms of local government explains why U.S. studies on 
the relationship between mayors and local performance have been confined to whether 
or not city-manager cities (reformed) are more efficient than mayor-council cities 
(unreformed) (Booms 1966; Anderson 1979; Deno and Mehay 1987; Hayes and Chang 
1990; Morgan and Watson 1995; Jung 2006). The expectation is that because mayors 
function in a politicized environment, they are prone to spend more to satisfy electoral 
coalitions (Lineberry and Fowler 1967) while council-mangers emphasize bureaucratic 
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professionalism, thus, removing interest group pressures. To search for the answer, 
studies have used as indicators labor costs, wage increases, fringe benefits and costs of 
service provision. Yet, and despite the variety of research, results are still inconclusive. 
Anderson (1979), Booms (1966), and Stumm and Corrigan (1998), for example, find 
that city-manager cities tend to have smaller annual wage increases and to reduce the 
cost of producing municipal services than mayor-council cities do. However, Ehrenberg 
(1973), Deno and Mehay (1987), Hayes and Chang (1990), Morgan and Watson (1995), 
and Jung (2006)4 find that there is no difference in the level of local expenditures 
between the two forms of local government. Finally, Ehrenberg (1973), Nunn (1996) and 
French (2004) find that reformed cities spend more than unreformed cities.  
However, in the in the USA the most used governmental structure, in cities with 
a population over 10,000, is the council-manager model.  Under this model, most of the 
powers of the city rest in a popularly elected council—and not in a mayor—which 
appoints a professional manager who is responsible to and removable by the council.  
Although the Model City Charter, 8th (2003) includes significant changes to the role of 
the mayor—specifically in the alternative mayor-council form of government—the 
charter strongly endorses the council-manager structure of municipal government.5 The 
endorsement of the council-manager model, however, comes from almost a century ago. 
                                                 
4
  Jung, however, finds that on specific functions such as the police function, per capita spending may be 
lower in the city manager form.  
5
 Since 1915, the National Municipal League (now the National Civic League) has proposed the council-
manager structure as the model form. For a fuller treatment of changes in the Model City Charter over 
time, see H. George Frederickson et al., 2001. “How American City Governments Have Changed: The 
Evolution of the Model City Charter,” National Civic Review, Vol. 90, No. 1, pp. 3–18). 
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Indeed, The Model City Charter, 6th edition (1964) stipulated that “…[t]he mayor shall 
preside at meetings of the council, shall be recognized as head of the city government for 
all ceremonial purposes and by the governor for purposes of military law but shall have 
no administrative duties” (6). 
 Due to the charter’s forceful advocacy of the council-manager plan, arguably 
scholars in the USA have portrayed a restrictive and insignificant role for the mayor. As 
Adrian and Press (1968: 204-205) note, “[t]he mayor…performs only ceremonial 
functions and presides over the council. He has no administrative powers, except in the 
case of an emergency, and no vote” (1968: 204-205). Or, as Lineberry and Sharkansky 
(1974: 110) assert, “[t]here is often… a mayor, who performs ceremonial functions as 
head of the local government. He may preside at meetings of the council, represent the 
city on public occasions and sign legal documents for the city.”  
Deviating from what the city charter dictates and from what scholars portray, 
Wikstrom (1979) argues for a more significant role of the mayor. He does so by positing 
that even under the council-manager model, the “mayor’s role in any community is the 
product of demographic, institutional or structural, political and personal factors” (1979: 
271) and not the result of what the charter stipulates. After studying the Virginia cities, 
Wikstrom (1979) finds that mayors play more than ceremonial roles, as they perform an 
active policy role. Wikstrom (1979) blames the charter’s advocacy for the council-
manager model and lack of interest for this figure as the reasons for the unrecognized 
mayoral role. He also suggests that “[a]ssertive mayoral leadership may serve to correct 
the perceived imbalance of executive-legislative relations … with the mayor serving as a 
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countervailing force to the manager in the policy processes” (1971, 275). Wikstrom’s 
view of a more active mayoral role also receives support from Boynton and Wright 
(1971) who claim that “[t]he behavior of the mayors as governmental leaders…varies 
considerably from the model and from legal prescriptions” (1971: 29), specially because 
big city mayors have different governmental structures.    
Besides the controversy on the importance of their role, mayors’ administrative 
performance also receives criticism. Rainey (1991, 178), for example, says “…that 
public managers show too little attention to long-range objectives and to internal 
development of the organization and human resources.” Lynn (1981) also notes the 
executives’ tend to emphasize political showmanship over substantive management. 
Similarly, Mintzberg (1972), and Kurke and Aldrich (1983) underscore mayors’ 
administrative performance, arguing that mayors spend more time in formally scheduled 
meetings than the private-sector managers do.  Evidence from Ammons and Newell 
(1989), however, show that when compared with private managers, mayors dedicate the 
same time to protocol meetings than private managers do.  
 After depicting their strengths and weakness, these studies do support the notion 
that mayors, as public manager, matter. Now, the question becomes, which mayoral 
characteristic(s) is/are most likely to influence organizational performance?  Some 
scholars argue that municipal performance depends on mayoral motivation and 
commitment. Anderson (2003), Gibson and Lehoucq (2003), for instance, contend that 
while municipal performance depends on the institutional capacity, it also depends on 
the local politician’s motivation. In developing settings, public officials are often 
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criticized on the grounds of dishonesty. For instance, in Krannich’s (1980) study of 
Thailand mayors-clerks relationship, clerks report that although “[m]ayors are nice and 
well-meaning officials who, in a personal level, get along with most people; they also 
interfere in the clerk’s work. And this interference arises from “mayors’ dishonesty by 
looking for personal gains, mayors’ injustice by dividing officials into competitive 
groups, and mayors’ response to constituents and assemblymen’s demands” (1980, 336).  
 The importance of public managers’ commitment to program performance 
receives also attention from Marmor and Fellman (1986). They classify public managers 
into one of four categories based on their commitment to the programs. Administrative 
survivors exhibit low commitment while program zealots show high programmatic 
commitment, but weak managerial skills. Generalist managers have high managerial 
skills, but exhibit low commitment to program goals. Finally, program loyalists are 
highly skilled managers with strong programmatic commitment (Marmor and Fellman 
1986). Without denying the potential impact that managers’ motivation and commitment 
may have on performance, I also recognize the difficulties in measuring it.  Research on 
performance, therefore, needs to identify more concrete measures of the manager’s skills 
and traits that are expected to contribute to performance.  
 The need for further research on leader’s traits, is noted by Yukl (1981, 8-9), 
“…situational research and theory has focused narrowly on the way the situation 
enhances or nullifies the effects of some leader traits…The trait research has shown little 
concern for direct measurement of either leader behavior or influence” (see also Kerr 
1984 chapter 10). Kerr (1984) and Schriesheim and Kerr (1977) also note the general 
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incomparability of results on leader traits, arguing that it is largely due to incompatible 
definitions and operationalization of the leader qualities.  These assessments suggest that 
although rich and detailed, the leadership literature is complex and inconclusive, mainly, 
because at the theoretical level, no single leadership quality has received undeniable 
confirmation.6 This calls for further research on which of the leader/manager’s qualities 
influence(s) performance. In this dissertation, I contribute to this debate by 
operationalizing leaders’ qualities with their human capital: education and job-related 
experience and by assessing their influence on organizational performance. 
Mayoral Qualifications as Managerial Quality 
 
Beyond identifying the mayor as the key local decision maker in developing 
settings, it is necessary to identify which of the mayor’s qualifications influence 
performance. Lynn (1981) mentions some of them: “[w]ith wit, skill, and insight, 
qualified men and women can perform effectively in directing and overseeing 
government organizations” (Lynn 1981, X). Lynn’s statement suggests the influence of 
managerial quality on performance.  
The performance-manager’s qualifications relationship has received some 
attention. Anderson, Newland, and Stillma’s (1983) study, for example, lists the 
manager’s skills likely to contribute to performance given the characteristics of the 
cities.  In growth communities, the need is for a chief executive with people and 
technical skills. In caretaker communities, the need is for an administrative caretaker 
with caring skills. In politically divided communities, the need is for a community leader 
                                                 
6
 For a complete review of the literature on leadership, see Rainey (1997) and Northouse (2004), and for 
critics, see Yukl (1981) and Schriesheim and Kerr (1977). 
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with arbitrating and mediating skills.  Finally, in public service consumption 
communities, the need is for an innovative administrator with technical skills.7  
The significance of managers’ skills has even been suggested to differentiate 
developed from developing societies. As Esman (1991) states,  “[w]hat most 
distinguishes advanced societies and their governments is not their ‘culture,’ nor their 
natural endowments, nor the availability of capital, nor the rationality of public policies, 
but precisely the capacities of their institutions and the skills of individuals, including 
those of management” (1991, 20, emphasis added). Similarly, Fiszben (1997) and 
Tendler (1997) find that what has the most impact on a particular municipality’ s fate—
even more than does any aspect of the policies themselves—are the personal 
characteristics of the local decision-makers. Therefore, my dissertation’s main 
proposition suggests: mayoral qualifications explain local governmental performance. 
Although the above studies recognize the relevance of the manager’s skills, there 
is not agreement on a single set of qualifications which influence performance. And, 
although demands for manager’s skills may vary across cities, certain attributes/skills 
should contribute to performance across agencies—specially when there is not much 
variation across them. This dissertation contributes to our knowledge by exploring the 
influence on municipal performance of the mayor’s human capital: specifically the 
impact of the mayor’s educational background and job-related experience. 
                                                 
7
 The latter may be the case of the Colombian municipalities—the units under study in this dissertation.  
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Mayor’s Human Capital as Proxy of Managerial Quality 
  “Good public management”—to follow Lynn (1981, X)—“is not what it is often 
thought to be: a matter of applying the latest techniques of  administration to 
government, such as Management by Objectives or Zero Base Budgeting. Good 
executive management occurs when capable executives recognize the unique 
combination of demands.” In the Nicaraguan and Bolivian contexts, Larson (2002) and 
Kaimonwit et al. (1998) also emphasize the importance of human capabilities. After 
studying twenty-one Nicaraguan municipalities, Larson (2002) finds that besides interest 
and motivation, management of natural resources is explained by local officials’ 
technical and human capabilities. Likewise, Kaimowitz et al.’s (1998) study of nine 
Bolivian municipalities also find that successful management of forests is explained by 
local capabilities such as financial resources and technical qualified human capital. 
These studies suggest the influence of human capital on organizational performance.  
According to Abowd et al.(2002),  “[t]he impact of human capital may occur in 
two ways: the specific knowledge of workers at businesses may directly increase 
business performance, or a skilled workforce may also indirectly act as a complement to 
improved technologies, business models or organizational practices” (2000, 2). That is, 
the contributions of human capital to performance can be direct and indirect (Abowd et 
al. 2002).  Directly, then, mayors’ human capital allows them to deal with the technical 
parts of both the programs to be implemented and their budget making. Indirectly, 
mayors’ human capital complements organizational practices by introducing 
  
35 
administrative and managerial arrangements that favor the attainment of programmed 
objectives.   
The contributions of human capital to performance are well-known. On reduction 
of inequality, for instance, Londoño de la Cuesta (1996) notes that although several 
factors — economic growth, structural changes of the economy, the convergence of 
regional per capita income—have contributed to lower Latin America's inequality, 
“…the slow expansion of human capital development has counteracted those factors to 
give the region a statistically stagnant level of high inequality” (1996, 1).  This suggests 
the supremacy of human capital over material resources in reducing socio-economic 
inequality. Latin American countries, therefore, should consider the improvement of 
human capita as a prescriptive policy in order to reduce high levels of inequality (The 
United Nations 2005 Development Programme Report, 270). 
The mayor’s human capital can also contribute to overcome the organizational 
deficiency in human resources. The better qualified a mayor is in terms of human 
capital, the more likely s/he will recognize the benefits of training and educating 
workers. Through these improvements, workers augment their technical and cognitive 
capabilities, making them more competent to perform their jobs. As Jaeger and Kanungu 
(1990: 290) posit, “How does one overcome the deficiency in human resources? 
Knowledge deficiencies can be overcome by education and training.” Jreisat (2002) also 
reinforces this view stating that  “[g]ood governance in developing countries is 
associated with factors such as building institutional capacities, activating citizen’s 
participation in making policies, and  improving education and training” (2002, 11). 
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Accordingly, the manager’s human capital is expected to contribute to the development 
of the organization’s human resources. 
 The development of human resources has been triggered by globalization, which 
creates demands for more competent and knowledgeable leaders. Due to globalization, 
new needs are imposed on the management of public organizations. Globalization has 
also encouraged abandoning the, previously mentioned, traditional bureaucratic 
organization—with its rigid, hierarchical, command-and-control model—to adopt a new 
managerial model that values performance (Jreisat 2002, 9). In addition, the 
concentration on the managerial model has also “refocused on the role of leadership. 
Given that today’s leaders operate in a complex and more competitive global 
environment, an emphasis on skills, attitudes and knowledge has become more apparent” 
(Jreisat 2002: 10).  Therefore—and as the report of the 15th Meeting of Experts on the 
United Nations Programme in Public Administration and Finance posits—“…the critical 
dimension in the governments’ response to globalization lies in building the capacity of 
their human resources” (UN/IASIA Initiative 2002, 2 original emphasis). 
The United Nations’ group of experts also claims interdependence between 
human capital development and institution building. Therefore, the experts prescribe 
human development of public service employees, mainly the managers because besides 
“…the lack of commitment to reform, a major cause of the weakness of the governments 
of developing countries and countries in transition is the scarcity of effective public 
managers.” (UN/IASIA Initiative 2002, 3 original emphasis).  In sum, skilled and 
knowledgeable managers are necessary for the implementation of the Millennium 
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Declaration, which calls for economic development and the eradication of poverty 
(UN/IASIA Initiative 2002).  
Grindle (1997) also emphasizes the benefits derived from human capital. For her, 
“…getting good government means, besides other things, reforming institutions, 
strengthening organizations and developing human resources” (Grindle 1997, 8). For 
governments it is important because, “[i]nitiatives to develop human resources generally 
seek to increase the capacity of individuals to carry out their professional and technical 
responsibilities” (Grindle 1997, 13). The improvement of human capital allows 
organizations altering the institutional context within which individuals function to result 
in better performance (Grindle 1997, 5). 
 Despite the recognized relevance of human capital, “the measurement of 
intangibles and human capital… has always been a difficult challenge for the statistical 
system.  Finding new measures of human capital, and quantifying them in such a manner 
that they can be introduced into a production function and produced on a scale that 
provides sufficient sample size for use in official economic statistics is a formidable 
challenge” Abowd et al (2002, 4). Although “…it is very difficult to measure human 
capital directly, the standard approach is to take advantage of the ‘usual suspects,’ for 
example, education and experience, and to build proxies for human capital using such 
measures” (Abowd et al 2002, 4).  In this dissertation, therefore, the proxy for 
managerial quality is the mayor’s human capital, which embraces his/her educational 
background and job-related expertise. This measure has strengths and weaknesses. The 
greatest strengths is its applicability to any context. Managers’ education and experience 
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should contribute to performance at the local, state, national and international level as 
well as in the private and public sector. Moreover, education and expertise is 
quantifiable and observable homogenously across contexts. Having either primary, 
secondary or university education in Colombia should mean the same in any other 
country. However, I recognize that in developing contexts, it is possible to find 
insufficient variation in education and experience for standard statistical tests. This is 
one of the weaknesses of this measure, as is the non-availability and difficulty in 
obtaining these data, too.   
On Mayors’ Educational Background 
“Cognitive resource theory assumes that more intelligent and knowledgeable 
leaders make better plans and decisions than do those with less ability and knowledge” 
(Fiedler 1986, 533). Kotter and Lawrence (1974), specifically, center on the mayor’ 
cognitive characteristics, arguing that they are the tools for mayors to extract information 
from all the contextual components of the city they manage.  
Knowledgeable leaders are expected to contribute to organizational performance in 
different ways. They, for instance, are expected to be more explicit in communicating 
plans, decisions and strategies.  In municipal settings where there is not a professional 
administrator, the mayor will dictate rules, decisions, and strategies for implementing 
programs.  In Latin American countries, for example, the mayor carries out the political 
and administrative factors of every program.  If mayors’ ability to perform is, in part, a 
function of their educational background, then we would expect, for example, that the 
more qualified—in terms of educational background—a mayor is, the more competent 
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his/her decisions will be.  Educational background may also help mayors to anticipate 
the consequences of both their actions and omissions for program performance.  As a 
result, municipal performance should be highly influenced by the mayors’ education.  
Education also generates confidence in decision-making, and this confidence is 
expected to be noticed by subalterns, who recognize their manager’s abilities.  Besides 
providing credibility among subalterns, education also gives the mayor self-confidence 
to establish effective communication with higher-level officials when looking for 
additional resources.  In fact, under circumstances of resource scarcity—the common 
pattern in developing settings—the acquisition of extra funds demands great diligence 
and influence on the part of the mayor. Education, indeed, grants the mayor with the 
autonomy and legitimacy to bargain for extra resources.  Consequently, we would expect 
the better the mayor’s educational background, the higher the municipality’s 
performance. 
Few studies, however, assess the influence of manager’s education and 
experience on performance.  One of the exceptions, Meier and O’Toole (2002) 
employ—among other factors—superintendents’ professional experience and education 
to determine their salary, which becomes the measure of managerial quality.  This 
managerial quality measurement turns out to be statistically significant in explaining 10 
out of 11 indicators of school district performance. Another exception is Gibson and 
Lehoucq’s (2003) study of Guatemalan municipalities, which finds that the  personal 
characteristics of the mayor—such as educational background—help to explain 
municipal performance on the management of forests. Specifically, they find that mayors 
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with higher educational background (completed years of education) tend to hire more 
staff to monitor forest conditions.8  Therefore,  
H1: The higher the mayor’s educational background, the higher local 
governmental performance, all other things being equal. 
 
On Mayors’ Job-related Experience 
Knowledge is, by no means, the only cognitive resource expected to influence 
leaders’ performance.  In addition to the codified, scientific, and technocratic 
knowledge, managers’ un-codified, intuitive, and artistic knowledge also influence 
performance (Lynn 1996, 112-3).  While scientific knowledge is acquired at the 
university and/or workshop level, the intuitive knowledge is learned through mentorship 
and job experience (Lynn 1996).  Thus, the mayor’s skills gained from experience and 
technical competences are expected to add to municipal performance.  
Fiedler (1987) depicts three mechanisms through which job-relevant experience 
contributes to leader/manager performance: 1) by providing managers useful and job-
related knowledge, 2) by enhancing manager’s ability to cope with stressful conditions, 
and 3) by engendering a feeling of greater self-confidence and control of the leadership 
situation (1987: 32). According to these mechanisms, experience helps mayors anticipate 
technical and administrative obstacles by allowing them to dictate the strategies to 
overcome them. In addition, experience generates self-confidence in mayors to deal with 
difficult tasks.   
                                                 
8
 However, the impact of personal characteristics on forest protection also lines up with post-materialist 
explanations for environmental policies. 
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 Unfortunately, in developing settings, training and experience in public 
management has been scarce. In fact, the training in Public Administration and 
Management—PAMT program—of middle-and upper-level personnel in government 
has been limited (Paul 1983). Different factors, such as weak training institutions, failure 
to match trainers with resources, and insignificant utilization and effectiveness, have 
hampered training of public officials (Paul 1983). 
Despite the expected positive impact of experience on performance, surprisingly, 
most of the studies conclude that there is “no consistent relationship between experience, 
or job tenure and leadership performance” (Fiedler 1987: 41).9 Even studies such as 
Gordon and Fitzgibbons (1982) that differentiated between relevant and irrelevant 
experience find that the correlation between relevant previous experience and 
performance is only 0.26 and 0.22 respectively. In a systematic study of school districts 
in Texas, Fernández (2005) also finds no support for the influence of superintendents’ 
total years of experience on performance.  O’Toole and Meier (2003) employ an 
organizational variable called managerial stability, which takes into account the 
experience of superintendents in school districts. In this case, however, O’Toole and 
Meier find that managerial stability positively influences the performance of 
disadvantaged students.10   
                                                 
9
 See Fiedler 1987, chapter 3 for a complete list of studies.  
10
 Frederickson and Smith’s (2003) proposed questions on the doctrines of public management, might 
explain the inconclusive relationship between experience and performance:  “Under what circumstances 
are neutral competence and professional expertise more important than political responsiveness? What are 
the circumstances under which political responsiveness is more important than neutral competence and 
professional expertise? (2003, 113). These are inquiries that deserve more consideration; unfortunately, 
they are beyond this desertion’s scope. 
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Qualitative studies, on the contrary, do show more support for the experience-
performance relationship. Riccucci (1995), for instance, contends that in political 
settings, leaders’ experience positively affects their effectiveness. Doing and Hargrove’s 
(1990) study of successful leaders also finds that many of them possessed extensive 
governmental experience. Accordingly,  
H2: Municipalities whose mayors have had job-related experience perform 
higher than those whose mayors have not. 
 
Municipal Performance Conditioned on Other Factors 
Although management is crucial, it also seems to be contingent on other factors 
(O’Toole and Meier 1999: 523). Studies report that the impact of any management 
variable on performance is conditioned by the following factors: organizational structure 
(O’Toole and Meier 1999), organizational culture (Khademian 2000), managerial 
strategy (Meier and O’Toole 2001, Meier, O’Toole, Boyne and Walker 2006), nature of 
the sector (Rainey 1991), organizational changes (McGregor (2000), and organizational 
context (O’Toole 2000). The conditioning of the management variables suggests that 
there may be no direct linear relationship between management and performance 
(O’Toole and Meier 1999). For that reason, we should use programs rather than agencies 
as the unit of analysis because it allows us to interact the management variable of 
interest with its specific conditioning factor. 
According to O’Toole and Meier (1999), management is conditioned on the 
organizational structure, that is, on how hierarchical or horizontal the agency is. Thus, 
O’Toole and Meier (1999) create a performance model that allows interacting 
management with the organizational structure. Their results reveal that “management is 
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more crucial in networks than in more hierarchical structures” (450). However, the 
organizational structural of municipalities—this dissertation’s focus—shows little 
variance across units. In fact, although some mayors may favor more hierarchical 
arrangements than others, the organizational structure of the municipalities tends to be 
homogenous across them.11 This leads me to discard its conditional effect on 
management quality.  
 Management quality may also be conditioned on organizational culture. This 
conditional effect is supported by Khademian’s (2000) study. In it, she focus on the 
significant impact of inward management and on the difficulty of reshaping the 
organizational culture. For the latter, Khademian claims that the ability of the manager to 
manipulate or shape organizational culture has been overestimated because although 
qualified managers try to alter the existing organizational culture, factors—such as 
organizational structure and environment—impede embracing a public management 
culture. The non-inclusion of culture, as moderator, may explain why theories developed 
in the western world are not applicable in developing settings (Jaeger and Kanungo 
1990). Therefore, the inclusion of culture should account for the differences between 
developed and developing countries. As this dissertation’s analysis focuses on 
developing settings; there is no variance in culture across the municipalities. Therefore, I 
do not test this conditional effect.  
 The impact on performance of any management variable can also be conditioned 
by the management strategies. That is, whether the mayor adopts productivity 
                                                 
11
 I recognize that some mayors may use hierarchical distribution of tasks while others not. This variation, 
however, is beyond this dissertation’s scope.  
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measurements (Hatry 1972), management by objectives, MBO, (White 1982), strategic 
management (Streib 1992, Poister and Streib 2005), total quality management, TQM, 
and/or network interactions (West et al., 1993) conditions the impact of any management 
variable on performance. In a study of school district in Texas, Meier and O’Toole 
(2001) exemplify this conditional effect. In it, they find that network interactions 
positively influence superintendents’ performance. In addition, they also find that 
network communications interact, in a non-linear way, with other factors, such as 
resources—another management variable—to generate more efficient outputs, that is 
better performance.12   
The influence of managerial quality on performance might be also contingent on 
the nature of the organizational sector: public and private. Although in my dissertation I 
only include public managers, I consider it important to mention the public-private 
debate. Political scientists have tried to demonstrate that public differs from private 
management because the political process and governmental institutions in which 
managers work make public organizations very different from business (Boyne 1998, 
2002b, Rainey 1991). While this argument has little empirical evidence, existing support 
comes from executives who served in both business and government and wrote about the 
differences (Allison 1983, Blumental 1983; Cervantes 1983; and Chase and Reveal 
1983). These executives “… agree that the constraints, controls, and processes bore 
heavily on their managerial behaviors” (Rainey 1991, 173). Among the factors that make 
the public sector different from the private, these executives cite the following: the 
                                                 
12
 As much as I would like to test this conditional effect, a lack of data availability prevents it.  
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influence of press, demands for accountability by legislatures, low influence over 
careerists due to short tenure, limitation on their authority imposed by legislative and 
interest groups, and finally, the absence of clear and accepted measures of performance 
(Rainey 1991, 173-174). As municipalities are solely in the public sector, this 
dissertation also excludes this conditional effect. 
 The literature suggests another conditional effect for the influences of 
management quality on performance: organizational changes. These changes refer to the 
“introduction of new and better ways of making decisions, organizing actions, and 
designing processes that lead to improved organizational performance” (McGregor 
2000, 133; see also Behn 1997, 7-9). McGregor (2000) lists the many faces of the “R” 
changes—reform, reinvention, restructuring, right-sizing, redesign, remaking, renewing, 
reconfiguration, realignment, reengineering, etc.13 Theoretically, change is expected to 
add value to production relative to the costs of the resource—or any other management 
variable: That is, to produce more, or better product quality, given the same inputs 
(McGregor 2000, 136).14 
 Finally, the influence of management quality on performance is also conditioned 
on the organization’s context.  O’Toole (2000), for example, addresses the impact of 
structural context on the management of public organizations, referring to managers’ 
reaction to it as outward management.  For O’Toole (2000) the organizational context 
clusters partnership, networks, and the interrelations with other public, private and non-
                                                 
13
 In the department of defense, Green et al., (2000) show how the reinvention of laboratories, with the 
National Performance Review (NPR), lowered costs, improved customer service, and enhanced 
performance. See also Romzek and Johnson (2000) for a review of the impact of contracting out on the 
performance of social service provision, such as Medicaid.  
14
 Due to data availability, I cannot test this conditional effect.  
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profit sectors. Besides recognizing the potential influence of context on public 
management, O’Toole also doubts the ability to measure, test, and predict its effects. The 
structural context of the Colombian municipalities is relatively homogenous. Therefore, 
I hold it constant to justify case selection. Thus while several elements of the 
environmental context may condition management, we need a more encompassing 
measure for the organizational context.   
Municipal Context as Moderating Factor 
Although Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (1999, 27-28) and O’Toole and Meier (1999, 
514) employ a more encompassing definition of environment, O’Toole and Meier 
include more elements to it. For Lynn et al., (1999), it refers to the environmental forces 
while for O’ Toole and Meier, it consists of clientele factor (target population) besides 
the environmental shocks. For Hammond and Knott (2000), environmental context 
refers to the constraints it imposes on managers. In fact, Hammond and Knott (2000) 
present a formal model depicting how political executives interact strategically with the 
environment—rather than with the internal organization—by applying their leadership 
despite the environmental constrains.  
A more encompassing definition of environment seems more appropriate to 
capture the varying constraints and opportunities across developed and developing 
countries. Jaeger and Kanungo’s (1990), hence, advocate for theories and techniques that 
consider environmental and cultural differences across the developed and developing 
world because “… the challenge facing the manager in a developing country is 
qualitatively very different from that facing his or her counterpart in the developed 
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world. Hence, managing organizations in a developing country requires some very 
different approaches and skills in order to be successful” (Jaeger and Kanungo 1990, 9). 
Doig and Hargrove (1987) also claim the role of context, as they argue that external 
conditions set the stage for leader’s activities.  The unpredictability in the environment, 
for example, generates “lack of trust in the system,” leaving managers with no long term 
perspective, no time management, no risk taking, and no entrepreneurship behavior 
(Jaeger and Kanungo 1990: 9). 
 Therefore, by modeling performance as function of management quality plus the 
moderating influence of the organizational context, we take into count the contextual 
barriers, such as stressful environments.  
On Stressful Environment 
Under turbulent environments, the mayor’s education and experience might not 
influence performance.  Cognitive resource theory suggests that under stressful 
situations, “…leaders’ cognitive abilities will be uncorrelated with leadership or group 
performance” (Fiedler 1986, 533).  The theory, specifically, holds that leader’s 
intelligence and competence is conditioned on three factors: the nature of the task, 
support from the group, as well as on the stress level. If the leader is free of stress, the 
task requires cognitive abilities, and the employees support the leader; leader’s 
intelligence strongly predicts performance. On the contrary, if the task and group’s 
support conditions remain the same, but the leader is under stress, “then the leader’s 
intelligence has little or no effect on performance” (Rainey 1991, 164-5). 
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Leaders’ performance declines because “[s]tress-generating conditions make it 
difficult for the leader to focus on the task and to contribute intellectually to the group’s 
performance” (Fiedler 1987, 107). Lazarus (1966) and Sarason (1980) explain that stress 
narrows an individual’s focus, as it diverts attention to concerns about one’s own 
adequacy and self-worth. In addition, under stress, leaders get distracted from the task, 
leading them to develop poor plans and strategies. Due to that, leaders let the group drift 
without providing guidance (Fiedler 1987: 107). Fiedler (1966, 1967), Fiedler et al.’s 
(1979) and Potter and Fiedler’s (1981) studies report evidence for the proposition that 
the effect of leader abilities on performance decreases under conditions of high stress.  
The proposed influence of external factors on performance (Lynn et al., 2000 and 
Forbes and Lynn 2004) should also be applicable to the local level. In municipalities, for 
example, stress-generating factors might constrain mayoral performance. Under tense 
situations, mayors’ education and experience might not add to performance because 
mayors may divert their attention from their routine activities to focus on matters 
unrelated to their tasks.  Even if the stressful situation is job-related, managers will 
spend more time and effort in overcoming the situation, time and effort that otherwise 
could have been spent in other endeavors.  Stress-generating factors, therefore, are likely 
to decrease the mayor’s performance. Therefore,  
H3: The influence of mayor’s educational background and job-related experience 
on performance will decrease under stressful situations. 
 
In this dissertation then I assess the interactive effect between quality 
management and environmental context. I propose that performance is conditioned on 
the municipality’s environmental context. Thus, an appropriate model specification of 
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local performance requires the use of an interaction term between management quality 
and environmental context because neither external environment alone, nor quality 
management itself, nor their summed impacts explain performance. That is, although 
local managerial quality is important, it is contingent on municipal context.  
In two chapters of my dissertation, I test these hypotheses by using data from the 
40 municipalities of the Colombian department (state) of Norte Santander.  In the next 
chapter, therefore, I depict their context, finances, responsibilities, governmental 
structure, means for citizens’ participation, and mayors’ legal authority and 
responsibilities.   
Conclusions 
 This chapter has laid out the logic of the mayoral qualifications theory of 
municipal performance. It argued that the qualifications of the manager are critical for 
organizational performance.  At the municipal level, this translates into saying that 
mayoral qualifications influence municipal performance. By qualifications, I mean the 
human capital of the mayor, that is, educational background and job-related experience. I 
provide two justifications for my proposition. First, in developing settings, the elected 
mayor performs not only the political but also the administrative functions. Second, the 
absence of city manager makes the mayor the political leader and the public manager. 
This dissertation, therefore, combines politics with public management.  
I also argued that the municipal context moderates the influence that mayoral 
qualifications may have on municipal performance.  This chapter also presented my 
hypotheses, which will be tested in chapters IV through VII. Two of the three empirical 
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chapters use data from 40 Colombian municipalities. The next chapter, therefore, 
presents a detailed description on the workings, structure, and contexts of the Colombian 
municipalities.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE COLOMBIAN MUNICIPALITIES 
 
Introduction 
 
 As already stated, I will test this dissertation’s main propositions in three 
empirical chapters.  Data for two of them come from the 40 municipalities that constitute 
the Colombian Department (state) of Norte de Santander. Although Latin American 
local governments have received some attention (Cannon et al. 1973; Valenzuela 1977; 
Nickson 1995), the 1,098 local Colombian governments are systematically understudied. 
I selected Colombian local governments because of their long experience with political 
and fiscal decentralization—since 1988 and 1983 respectively. This selection criterion 
guarantees that the period under study (2000-2005) lies in the post-adjustment phase of 
decentralization, in which municipalities have already learned how to deal with their 
new responsibilities. Prior to presenting the empirical tests, this chapter presents 
descriptive information about the national context in which the Colombian 
municipalities operate, their structure, responsibilities, finances, and controlling 
mechanisms, as well as, their specifics within the context of the department of Norte de 
Santander.  The goal of this chapter is to set the dissertation in its political context.  
Municipalities under Unitary Regime 
Before addressing municipal details, it is worth mentioning the general context in 
which the Colombian municipalities operated and operate. They, for example, form part 
of a unitary republic. Under this unitary regime, and prior to the 1991 Constitutional 
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reform, central institutions had ultimate political and legal authority within the 
territory.15  In this context, municipalities were subordinate to the central authority, as 
the president could overrule or override mayors’ actions (Gaviria 1989, 35). This 
permitted Colombian mayors to have administrative, but not political autonomy.  
However, within any unitary system, there are forces that call for regionalism or 
decentralization. Indeed, Colombia experienced these forces, which advocated three 
types of decentralization. That is how in 1983, Colombia undertook fiscal 
decentralization, complementing it in 1986 with political decentralization, which 
culminated in 1988 with the first popular elections of mayors.16  Later on, Colombia 
consolidated the power of its municipalities by embarking on administrative 
decentralization through several decisions. The main ones were 1) Constitutional 
Amendment (A.L. 2/1987), which granted the municipalities power to manage their own 
assets and revenues; 2) Law 9/ 1989 on urban reform; 3) Law 29/1989 on  
“municipalización” of education (Castro 1989, 54), and 4) Law 60/1993—reformed with 
Law 715/2001—on distribution of responsibilities across levels of government. The 
fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization, in turn, were consolidated with the 
1991 Constitutional reform, which gave local autonomy to the current 1,098 Colombian 
municipalities.  Consequently, with the 1991 Constitution, the municipality became the 
“living cell of democracy” (Pérez Gutiérrez 2003, I; author’s translation).  
                                                 
15
 As opposed to a federal system, which has several political and legal institutions at different levels, each 
one with defined and independent spheres of authority (Eleazar 1968, Riker 1964). 
16
 Before 1988, the governors, who were selected by the president, chose the mayors. However, during the 
Betancur administration (1986-1990) and through the Legislative Act 1/ 1986 and the Law 11/1986, 
political decentralization was adopted, stimulating local participation, as citizens directly elect their 
mayors.  
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 With decentralization, the central government sought substantial economic 
development. Support for decentralization, however, varied across political parties. 
Scholars, however, disagree on the Colombian traditional parties’ support for 
decentralization. Castro (1989, 53), for example, argues that some Liberals and 
Conservatives—the traditional political groups—lacked support and willingness, 
showing no commitment to decentralization. On the contrary, in an intracoutnry 
systematic analysis, Escobar-Lemmon (2003, 695) found that in Colombia, “the push to 
decentralize was led in part by the second largest party (large enough to be a serious 
block in congress …, but not large enough to hope to rule unilaterally).” According to 
O’Neill (2003) and Escobar-Lemmon (2003), congressmen from the Conservative 
party—and not from small parties—supported decentralization in hopes of winning 
subnational offices. O’Neill (2003) argues that the Conservative Party, indeed, benefited 
the most from decentralization because it had regional strongholds. Willis, Garman, and 
Haggard (1999) also focus on the impact of nature of party system on support for 
decentralization. Their intercountry study (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia) 
reports that congressmen from strong, state-level parties are more likely to support 
decentralization than congressmen from national-level parties.   
In Colombia, the party system is not the sole explanation for decentralization. 
Indeed, it interacts with citizens’ level of trust in government (Escobar-Lemmon 2003). 
Specifically, the less trust in government in a district, the more likely its congressmen 
will support decentralization (Escobar-Lemmon 2003). This finding is in line with 
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Grindle’s (2000) study, which reveals that the loss of government legitimacy, in the 
cases of Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela, facilitated the adoption of decentralization.  
Besides party system and citizens’ trust, other variables seem to explain adoption 
of decentralization. O’Neill, (1999, 2003), for example, focuses on parties’ future 
strategic electoral calculations while Rosenfeld (1995) centers on international factors 
such as pressure from the World Bank. Others became more specific in explaining 
support for specific types of decentralization: fiscal, political and administrative. On this, 
Faletti (2005), in a comparison of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, 
demonstrates that the support for a type of decentralization is the result of both the 
evolution—or sequence—of the governmental reforms and the type of the actors (338). 
According to Faletti, when the executive initiated the reform, the first type of 
decentralization adopted is administrative. However, when it is started by the congress, 
the first type to be adopted tends to be fiscal. Escobar-Lemmon’s study of the 
Colombian decentralizations fits within Faletti’s (2005) assumption, as Escobar-
Lemmon (2006, 245) finds that “differences across branches are more significant than 
differences across political parties.” Indeed, the Colombian executive emphasized 
administrative forms of decentralization while the legislature focused on the political 
form of decentralization.  Some have also studied the determinants of fiscal 
decentralization across Latin American countries (Escobar-Lemmon 2001, Garman et al. 
2001). On this, Escobar-Lemmon (2001) reports that presidential power, structural 
adjustment policies, level of development and country size, as well as, federalism 
determine the degree of fiscal decentralization.  
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  Despite the controversy surrounding the determinants of decentralization, there 
has been some agreement on the benefits resulting from decentralization. According to 
Ruiz (1989), the popular election of mayors, for example, diminished the tensions 
between levels of government, as the mayors gained autonomy. In fact, the mayors that 
participated in the first forum to evaluate political decentralization reported they had 
gained more political and administrative autonomy. The conclusions from the forum also 
revealed that mayors had become independent from both regional clientelistic networks 
and governors—who previously appointed them (Ruiz 1989, 59). But political 
decentralization not only gave municipalities autonomy, it also made “mayors the target 
of responsibility and criticism” (Gaviria 1989, 27). Hence, as Ruiz (1989, 59) posits 
“decentralization depends on the performance of the mayor.”   
 Given their autonomy and responsibility, the first elected mayors promoted the 
creation of a national organization to represent them. In 1989, their efforts materialized 
in the creation of the Colombian Federation of Municipalities (FCM). All the Colombian 
municipalities, districts, and municipal, regional associations belong to this association, 
which publishes the journal Municipalities, four times a year. As of June 2007, there are 
44 active, municipal-regional associations from which 14 (the greatest number) are in 
the department of Antioquia and three are in Norte de Santander—the department under 
study.17  In sum, it is under this context of a unitary system with fiscal, political, and 
administrative decentralization and strong mayoral autonomy that municipalities in 
                                                 
17
 I thank Carolina Ureña, at the Colombian Federation of Municipalities, for providing me with this 
information. 
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Colombia operate. I now turn to the structure of the Colombian municipalities in the next 
section.  
The Administrative Structure of Colombian Local Governments 
 
  Charter III of the 1991 Constitution stipulates the functions, structure, and 
finances of the municipal regime. However, in 1994, the Colombian Congress issued 
Law 136, which dictates norms to modernize the functioning and organization of the 
municipalities. According to this law, the municipality is the fundamental political-
administrative entity of the Colombian state with fiscal, political, and administrative 
autonomy whose main responsibility is the welfare and improvement of its inhabitants.  
This law also classifies municipalities into seven categories, depending on their 
population sizes and fiscal revenues (see Table 3.1). Failure to collect its mandated 
revenues causes a municipality to drop to the next inferior category while over 
performance causes it move up one category.  
 
Table 3.1 Municipal Categorization 
 
Municipal Category Population Annual Fiscal Revenues 
(Tax Collection in 
Monthly Minimum 
Salary) 
Special >500,001 >400,000 
First 100,001 - 500,000 100,000 - 400,000 
Second 50,001-100,000 50,000 - 100,000 
Third 30,001-50,000 30,000 - 50,000 
Fourth 15,001-30,000 15,000 - 30,000 
Fifth 7,001-15,000 5,000 - 15,000 
Sixth <7,000 < 5,000 
          Source: The Colombian Law 136/1994.  
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The Municipal Authorities  
The Law 136/1994 establishes that in each municipality there will be a municipal 
council, a mayor, and an ombudsman. These are the three municipal administrative 
figures as dictated by the article 91 of the Constitution. Mayors have the autonomy to 
determine the administrative structure of their mayoralty, as long as they comply with 
the legal restriction of not exceeding mandated operational costs. The municipal 
operational costs (Law 617/2000) vary with the municipal category, and their limits are 
in proportion to the municipal revenues (see Table 3.2).    
 
Table 3.2 Allowed Municipal Operational Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given mayors’ freedom to determine the municipal administrative structure, we 
see little homogeneity in the administrative structure across localities. In my personal 
visits to the 40 mayoralties of Norte de Santander, for example, I found municipalities 
with department heads for each administrative sector (education, health, public works, 
etc.), while others have only the head of the planning department. Consequently, the 
following description focuses on the three mandated municipal authorities: the municipal 
council, the mayor, and the ombudsman.   
Municipal Category 
Allowed-Operational Costs 
as Proportion of the 
Municipal Revenues 
Special 50% 
First 65% 
Second and Third 70% 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 80% 
  
58 
The Municipal Council  
 
 Article 312 of the constitution establishes that in each municipality there will be 
an administrative corporation, popularly elected for a four-year period, and called the 
Municipal Council.18  There are no education or experience requirements to be a 
councilmen, except for being Colombian citizen, eighteen years old, as well as, being 
born, or having lived at least six months prior to registration of candidacy, in the specific 
municipality. The current members can be immediately re-elected, and their number 
varies with population size, but neither fewer than seven nor greater than 21 members 
can compose the municipal council. Table 3.3 specifies the number of councilmen per 
population size. Although councilmen are considered public servants, they are not public 
employees because they receive payment for each attended session (Laws 136/1994 and 
617/2000), but not a formal salary.19  
 In special, first, and second municipal categories, the councilmen can hold a 
maximum of one session per day during six months per year. In the other municipal 
categories, they can hold one session per day during four months per year. In the rest of 
the months, however, the mayor can summon the council to extraordinary sessions to 
address specific issues.  From each session, the councilmen will issue a transcript of the 
session, which will appear in the official publication: Gaceta del Concejo (Council 
Gazette). The secretary of the municipal council is responsible for the transcript; it is 
                                                 
18
 The Legislative Act 02/ 2002 modified Constitutional article 312, increasing the administrative period 
for governors, departmental deputies, mayors, and councilmen from three to four years, but with a 
different four-year cycle from the president and congressmen.      
19
 The payment varies across municipal categories and counts neither toward social benefits nor for 
retirement. Article 66 of the Law 136/1994 stipulates a salary per session of 100% of the mayoral daily 
salary for councilmen in municipalities of special, first and second categories, decreasing to 75% in fourth 
and third categories and to 50% in the second and first categories.   
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mandatory and available to the public, as are the council sessions, too. I personally 
attended, along with other seven people, one session in the municipality of the Los 
Patios. In this particular case, the space limits attendance to 15 people (besides the 
councilmen and the secretary). 
 
Table 3.3 Number of Councilmen per Municipal Population 
 
Number of Councilmen Population Number of 
Municipalities in 
Norte de Santander20 
21 >1,000,001 0 
19 250,000 - 1,000,000 1 
17 100,001 - 250,000 1 
15 50,001 - 100,000 3 
13 20,001 - 50,000 7 
11 10,001 - 20,000 12 
9 5,0001 - 10,000 11 
7 >5,000 5 
 
Among its functions, the municipal council introduces bills, controls the 
municipal administration, and calls any local employee to render account of dealings. It 
also dictates taxes, appoints the ombudsman, approves the municipal budget, and can 
override the mayor’s decisions. Moreover, it can divide the municipality into comunas 
(precincts in the urban sector) and corregimientos (villages in the rural sector) to 
improve provision of services and local administration. Each comuna or corregimiento, 
in turn, can elect a local administrative board (JAL); they, however, have not been 
promoted, mainly because the councilmen see them as power rivals (Dugas, Ocampo 
and Ruiz 1992, 111).  
                                                 
20
 Department (state) under study in this dissertation. 
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The councilmen’s role is frequently criticized, mainly by the mayors.  In fact, 
from the First Forum of Elected Mayors, one of the conclusions revealed, “The 
municipal councils are slow and unproductive for the mayors to carry out their function” 
(Ruiz 1989, 65).  In my interviews with mayors and ex-mayors, many of them also 
expressed a negative opinion about the councilmen. Several ex-mayors, for example, 
revealed that during their administrations they saw irregularities in the process of 
appointing the ombudsman—who is chosen by the municipal council from a pool of 
nominees.21 According to the mayors’ versions, the selected nominee was the one who 
offered or committed the most cash-reward, out of his/her monthly salary, to the 
councilmen.22 It is important to mention that the mayoral allegations may just reflect 
normal legislature-executive tensions.  
To verify the above arguments, I also had the opportunity to interview 12 
councilmen, in the municipalities of Ocaña, Los Patios, Durania, and Ragonvalia.  
Surprisingly, all of them admitted a mayor- councilmen conspiracy in explaining the 
irregularities in municipal contracting, fictitious spending, and overspending.  One 
councilman, for example, described to me, step by step the process of generating private 
benefits without being caught.  He recognized that before becoming councilman, he was 
unaware about these procedures; however, once he was inside, he had to join the group; 
otherwise, he would be out of the group and have made enemies.  Not all, however, 
seem to commit irregularities. Other councilmen have adopted a tough position against 
those committing irregularities. This opposition, however, has been punished with 
                                                 
21
 See this section on ombudsmen for more details on their role and appointment. 
22
 Three ex-mayors mentioned irregularities in the selection process of the ombudsman..   
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personal threatens; some of them coming from illegal armed groups. The true link 
between illegal armed groups and municipal officers is, however, unknown. It is 
speculated that some of municipal officers employ their personal links with illegal armed 
groups (paramilitary or guerrillas) to carry out threats. For example, on June 15/2007, 
the mayor of Cúcuta, capital of the department under study, presented himself in front of 
a court hearing to respond to the accusations of having links with the United Self-
Defenses of Colombia (AUC) and having ordered through them some assassinations. 
The accusations against the mayor come from three ex-paramilitary leaders (“Alcalde de 
Cúcuta” 2007)23.  In Colombia between 2000-2006, illegal armed groups, such as the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have killed 251 councilmen. Based 
on the number of assassinated councilmen, Norte de Santander ranks eighth in the 
number of at the national level (ACNUR. n.d).  
Whatever the circumstances, the role of the councilmen is key in promoting, 
tolerating, or rejecting municipal irregularities. To dignify their key role, in 1993, one 
thousand two hundred councilmen met to create a national organization to represent their 
interests before the Congress. The result was the National Federation of Councilmen, 
FENACON. Initially, only five municipal councils joined it; as of May 2007, 632 
municipal councils, out of 1098, form FENACON, 23 of which are from the department 
of Norte de Santander.24  
                                                 
23
 In September 2007, however, the mayor of Cúcuta was arrested on charges of homicide.  
24
 FENACON issues the Journal of Municipal Councils in Contact (Revista Concejos en 
Contacto), publishing its first edition in May 2003 for a current number of 13 editions 
(FENACON, n.d.). 
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The Mayor 
 
Before 1986, the Constitution established that in all municipalities there would 
be a mayor to carry out the functions of a governor’s agent (Article 200, 1886 
Constitution). As the governor’s agent, his or her political function was to implement the 
government policies as dictated by the governor’s orders.  This mayor was also the chief 
of the municipal public administration and implementer of the council’s decisions 
(Article 200, 1986 Constitution). There were two requirements to be a mayor: being 
older than 18 years and being Colombian, either native or with adopted nationality—but 
no residency nor literacy requirements.  
The Legislative Act 1/1986 (Constitutional Amendment) introduced some 
changes in the role of the mayor.  Legislative Act 1/1986, for example, created the direct 
election of mayors.  The main modification states that the mayor is no longer the 
governor’s agent: that is the governor no longer appoints him. Instead, the mayor is 
elected directly by the citizens through majority vote in concurrent elections with the 
governors, councilmen and departmental deputies. The mayor, however, cannot run for 
immediate reelection, as s/he has to wait at least one period to rerun in the municipal 
elections (Legislative Act 1/1986).  Efforts to allow for reelection have been 
unsuccessful, leading some to judge it as an unjust disadvantage for municipalities after 
the approval in 2005 of presidential reelection (Archila Peñalosa 2005).  Initially, the 
mayor was elected for a two-year period, later increased to three-year period, and in 
2002 it was reformed to allow for a four-year term, which applied to the 2003 elections 
or the administrative period from January 2004 to January 2008 (Legislative Act 
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2/2002).25 In sum, with his/her popular election, the mayor passed from being the agent 
of the governor to being “the first defender of the citizen” (Pérez Gutiérrez 2003, I). 
The Colombian Constitution of 1991, and its subsequent modifications, also 
introduced some changes related to the mayor. For example, Article 314 of the 1991 
Constitution, modified with Legislative Act 02/2002 and Laws 136/1994 and 617/2001, 
specifically determines the qualities, functions, salary, social benefits, regime of 
inabilities and incompatibilities of the mayor. The new law defines the mayor as the 
legal representative of the municipality, superior chief of the police department, the one 
who implements all the decisions of the council, and leads and coordinates public 
administration. The mayor occupies the highest position in the municipal hierarchy, next 
to the municipal council, and like any public employee, is subject to administrative, 
fiscal, and judicial controls. The law (136/1994) also adds new requirements to be 
mayor: being literate, not having committed a crime and being a native, or having lived 
at least one year before registering his/her candidacy, or three uninterrupted years in any 
period, in the respective municipality.  
Although the law requires the mayor to be literate, it does not require a specific 
level of education, which is the reason we see variance in mayoral educational 
background: some with only a primary degree, others with a high school degree, others 
with intermediate education (technical degree), and others a with university degree. 
Unlike the U.S. city managers who are professional public administrators with extensive 
training in public policy (Fieock and Stream 1998), Colombian mayors come with 
                                                 
25
 The same four-year period and administrative cycle applies to councilmen, governors and departmental 
deputies.  
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different professional backgrounds, if any, and receive barely one-week of training in 
public administration. The central government provides a short training (a week), with 
which it seeks to complement the mayors’ educational background and experience, 
which, often, are unrelated to the mayoral job. Mayoral educational background does not 
affect his salary. On the contrary, a mayor’s salary varies depending on the category of 
the municipality (see Table 3.4).  
When a mayor has been either accused, sentenced, or imprisoned by solicitude of 
the Procuratorship General or the Comptroller General (due to disciplinary reasons, 
Article 105 of the Law 136/1994), the governor carries out his/her dismissal. Citizens 
also can revoke his/her mandate.26 The mayor, however, cannot be impeached by the 
municipal council.                                              
 
Table 3.4 Mayors’ Salary per Municipal Category 
 
Municipal Category Salary of the Mayor 
Special Between 20-25 minimum 
salaries27 
First 15-20 
Second 12-15 
Third 10-12 
Fourth 8-10 
Fifth 6-8 
Sixth 3-6 
 
 
The mayor has administrative and political functions. Politically, s/he interprets 
the national and departmental policies and implements them, obeying and following the 
                                                 
26
 See forward section on municipal planning for specifics on revocation of mandate. 
27
 The 2007 Colombian minimum salary is $484,500 (roughly $242 with an exchange rate of 2,000 pesos 
per dollar). According to the Ministry of Social Protection, the Colombian minimum salary ranks third in 
the region (Ministry of Social Protection 2006). 
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norms. The mayor also submits proposals, approves or vetoes municipal council 
proposals, summons the municipal council to extraordinary sessions, provides 
credentials to the councilmen, and is the voice and leader of the community. In addition, 
the mayor performs police functions to preserve order and welfare of the citizens. The 
police functions can be administrative (issuing licenses of constructions, street 
nomenclature, demolition orders, and maintaining public space), judicial (carrying out of 
the judicial orders, such as registration of people, issuing warrants, etc.) and civil 
(invasion of lands, trials, etc) (Restrepo and D’Antonio, 1990). To perform these 
administrative functions, the mayor must plan, organize, lead, implement, and supervise 
the administrative functions (Domínguez Giraldo 2003 and DNP, CAF, DDTS 2005). 
Given all his/her functions, the Colombian mayoral system may be equated to the 
traditional strong mayor form of local government in the United States because in the 
strong mayor form, the mayor performs the functions that the city manager does under 
the council-manager form.28  Likewise, the figure of the city manager is absent in the 
Colombian municipal context.    
The mayors must plan, create, design, and manage their organizations and are 
expected to spend certain percentages of the budget in sectors such as health, education, 
transportation, etc.  Despite their lack of autonomy in distributing the money across 
sectors, mayors do have freedom in deciding how to spend money within each sector.  
That is, mayors are told “where to spend” the money but “not how to do it.”  Although it 
gives the impression that mayors have little discretion over budgets, mayors indeed have 
                                                 
28
 Even if there is a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), he or she is appointed and removed by the mayor 
alone (National Municipal League 2003). 
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and resort to authentic strategies in order to accomplish the municipal objectives.  Here 
is where mayoral qualifications play a critical role because based on their knowledge and 
experience, some mayors become more resourceful in improving municipal 
performance. Hence, while some of the mayors spend their budget on traditional items; 
others are more innovative by taking advantage of extraresources and implementing 
extra programs. Some of these extra programs indeed demand managerial skills rather 
than monetary resources.   
A mayor is expected to know his/her municipality well in order to perform 
his/her functions. To guarantee this, the writers of the Constitution added the mayoral 
requirement of being an inhabitant, for at least one year, of the specific municipality. 
Garay Carrillo (2003), for instance, suggests that to be a good mayor, s/he needs to be a 
good candidate, and for Garay that means to know as much as the candidate can about 
the municipality. That is, knowing its rural and urban composition, its human capital in 
the administration, its culture, its budget, the number of NGOs in its jurisdiction, and 
mainly whether there is civil society, as this is the main way to achieve local 
development. Garay (2003) illustrates his argument by citing the most common response 
candidates gave when asked how many public schools there are in your municipality,  “I 
do not know exactly, but there is a need for more”(15 author’s translation). To avoid 
this, Garay adds, the mayor must interact with people because from them they learn 
about the needs of the municipality.  
The writers of the 1991 Constitution also included provisions with the end of 
moving from a bipartisan to a multipartisan system, even at the mayoral election. The 
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idea was to integrate unrepresented political forces, those different from conservatives 
and liberals.  It is safe to say that the bipartisan hegemony in the municipalities has faded 
with the entrance of new political forces (Moreno 2005).29 García Sánchez (2000), 
however, contends that the mere presence of third parties does not translate into a 
reconfiguration of the political system, mainly because these new parties are too 
incoherent and immature to become a solid alternative to the traditional parties. Garcia 
Sánchez  (2000) supports his argument with the results from five municipal elections 
(1998, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1997), pointing out that in only 18 Colombian municipalities 
(out of roughly 1,050), a third party has won the election between 2-4 times. Yet recent 
events generate more optimism for the third parties. In 2003, for example, a third party 
won the mayoralty of the Colombian capital, Bogotá.   
The Municipal Ombudsman 
 
 The municipal ombudsman promotes human rights, protects the public interest 
and oversees the municipal administration and public employees’ conduct.  According to 
article 168 of law 136/1994, the ombudsman has its own administrative and budgetary 
autonomy. The ombudsman’s tasks derive from the Procuratorship General of the 
Nation, which is his/her supreme authority.  Usually, the ombudsman and a secretary 
compose this municipal entity. The ombudsman is elected by the municipal council from 
a pool of nominees, also proposed by the councilmen, within the first 10 days of the 
administrative period. To be ombudsman, the law requires one to be a lawyer and a 
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 At the legislature level, electoral and registration reforms have led to decline of bipartidism and have led 
to the increased share of seats won by new actors (Moreno 2005). The new electoral rules, for example, 
have created a proliferation of lists, which, in turn, has generated an entrepreneurial behavioral in 
congressman, making elections more personalized (Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno 2004).  
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native Colombian. This implies that in some instances the ombudsman is better educated 
than the mayor, which may create professional tensions.  However, according to Dr. 
Marlene Cecilia Duque, ombudsman of the municipality of Cácota, in most the 
municipalities, tensions between the mayor and the ombudsman arise from the 
ombudsman’s oversight power over the mayor30. Despite their possible imbalances in 
education the ombudsman and the mayor earn the same salary, which is the case in the 
special, first and second municipal categories. In the other categories, the ombudsman’s 
salary is only 70 percent of the mayor’s. The potential disparity in terms of education 
between these two main municipal figures is another powerful reason to expect that 
when the mayor is less educated than the ombudsman, there is a greater chance that s/he 
will spend part of the administration justifying his/her actions and defending his/her 
status. That is especially true in the Colombian context whose society is highly stratified, 
and whose societal relations are based on educational and social-economic status (Kline 
and Gray 2007).  
 The role of the ombudsman is crucial in promoting citizen participation. In doing 
so, the ombudsman encourages civic, youth, charitable, communitarian, professional, 
and non-governmental associations. In addition, the ombudsman legally registers and 
promotes the creation of civic oversight agencies.31  In personal interviews with some of 
the municipal ombudsman, they complain about citizens’ lack of interest in public 
affairs. The ombudsman of the municipality of Chitagá, Dr. Gabriel M. Portillo, for 
instance, reports that despite his constant encouragement, it is quite difficult to make 
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 Interview by the author, Cácota, N. de Santander, Colombia, November 27, 2006. 
31
 See more on this, in the section on control, verification and evaluation. 
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people participate, mainly because “people associate participation with being a tattler”.32 
Among the main reasons for this apathy, Dr. Portillo cites is dread of reprisals, lack of 
time due to economic concerns, mayors’ disinterest in promoting participation, and clear 
disconnection from public affairs. Likewise, Dr. Marlene Cecilia Duque, ombudsman of 
the municipality of Cácota, notices that in the urban sector, civic participation is almost 
nill. She has resorted to the communal radio station to call for people’s attention, 
achieving some results in the rural sector. Dr. Duque thinks “ civic participation declines 
even more in municipalities with a guerrilla presence.” Finally, Dr. Elder de Jesús Jaime, 
ombudsman of the municipality of La Playa, also mentions citizens’ apathy and local 
authorities’ dislike for civic oversights agencies, as the roots of the lack of civic 
participation.33   
 In sum, the municipal council, the mayor, and the ombudsman constitute the 
basic administrative structure of the local government.  
Other Administrative Authorities  
 
Depending on its population size and mayors’ decisions, municipal 
administration will count with other authorities such as the department heads and other 
public employees.  
A. Department Heads  
 
Not all the Colombian municipalities possess the same number of department 
heads. In fact, there are municipalities with department heads for health, education, 
culture, planning, public works, etc., while others barely have a department head for 
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 Interview by the author, Chitagá, N. de Santander, Colombia, November 28, 2006. 
33
 Interview by the author, La Playa, N. de Santander, Colombia, November 8, 2006. 
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planning: this figure, indeed, is present in all the localities (Law 3/1988). The head of 
Internal Control is the other figure that is present in all the municipalities (Law 87/93). 
In 2006, according to Law 10, the figure of the head of the Family Commissary was 
included in the local administrative structure which entered in practice in June 2007. The 
variation in the number of department heads derives from the fact it is up to the mayor to 
determine what positions to create, to fuse, to maintain, or to eliminate.34 And although 
the existence or not of these department heads is also determined by the population size, 
the final decision comes from the mayor. In most of the cases, however, there is 
correlation between municipal population and the number of department heads, as bigger 
municipalities have more department heads. 
B. Public Employees  
 
The remaining local public employees fall into two categories. First, jobs of free-
appointment and removal and who carry out functions of directing, or jobs that require 
confidence. The classic example is the position of mayor’s private secretary. Second, 
jobs under administrative career (or tenure) which are selected thorough merit service or 
merit-competition (DNP, CAF, DDTS 2005). In addition to them, the mayor can also 
create temporary jobs for the following reasons: a) to perform functions that are not done 
by existing personal, b) perform projects of limited duration, c) perform needed overload 
work, d) perform institutional advising (no longer than 12 months). In creating them, the 
mayor must use the available budget to pay for their salaries and social benefits.  Finally, 
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 In creating positions, however, the mayor has to keep the operational costs within the 
limitations imposed by the law (Law 136/1994).   
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a few municipalities also have official employees who perform activities of construction 
or maintenance of public works. They are appointed through contracts, which stipulate 
the duration, activity and salary. However, they are not subject to competition nor can 
they be considered administrative career employees (DNP, CAF, DDTS 2005). 
Finally, the municipal administrative structure also includes a judicial office, 
made up of a judge and a secretary. The judicial office, however, depends on the 
ministry of justice and not the municipality.  Unlike the mayor’s police role, the judge 
legally imposes sanctions, issues citations, and judges citizens’ allegations.  Figure 3.1 
depicts one possible version of the administrative structure of the municipality. The 
figure portrays the three main three main administrative figures: mayor, ombudsman, 
and municipal council, as well as five department heads. However, recall that not all of 
the municipalities have the same number of department heads, as it varies with  
population and mayoral decision. In a single year, even, it is possible to see the mayor 
appointing a department head, for a short period, for then dismissing him/her.   
Municipal Responsibilities 
 
With fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization, the traditional view of 
the municipality as just a strip of land shifted to a new view in which the municipality is 
the free association of people. Given this shift, the state needed to focus its attention on
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Figure 3.1 Municipal Administrative Structure 
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people rather than on the land (Domínguez Giraldo 2003). This brought up the concept 
of municipal management because the public administration extended beyond managing 
financial resources to developing the human resource of the municipality. In doing that, 
“the obligation of the mayor is to design social, political, and economic programs” 
(Dominguez Giraldo 2003, 13).  These programs then became the core of the municipal 
responsibilities. Domínguez Giraldo (2003) frames all the municipal responsibilities into 
five categories: social, political, and economic development, resource management, and 
defense of citizens’ rights. See Figure 3.2 for a complete description of the municipal 
functions by sectors, their specific programs, and the local, departmental and national 
entities involved in each program.  
According to article 311 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution, and article 3 of 
Law 136/1994, the municipal functions can be summarized as:  
1. To administer the municipal matters and to provide the public services according to 
the law such as gas, sewage, electricity, telephone, and cleaning; and to develop the 
national and regional policies in the sectors of health education, tourism, public services,  
housing programs, infrastructure, transportation, sport and recreation, and attention to 
vulnerable groups. 
2. To organize the territorial development and to build infrastructure for municipal 
progress to promote civic participation, social and cultural improvement of its 
population. 
3. To plan social, economic, and environmental development of the territory, according 
to the law and in coordination with other entities. 
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Figure 3.2 Municipal Functions by Sectors 
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Figure 3.2 Continued 
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Figure 3.2 Continued 
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4. To solve the unsatisfied needs in health, education, environmental sanitation, drinking 
water, housing, public services, sports and entertainments with special emphasis on 
children, women, elderly and disable groups as defined by the law 
5. To adequately manage environmental resources, following the law. 
6. To promote the social and economic improvement of its inhabitants.  
7. To achieve all the above goals by its own means or by working in conjugation with 
other territorial entities (Gutíerrez Giraldo 2003, 14-17 and DNP, CAF, DDTS 2005, 21-
22). 
The above functions are the general responsibilities of the municipalities, which 
are to be financed with national transfers and own revenues. However, Law 715/2001—
which reformed the Law 60/1993 and, as to June 22, 2007, is scheduled for a hearing in 
the congress to reform it—details the municipal functions by sector: education, health, 
housing, environment, sport and entertainment, community development, etc. Below, I 
list some of the municipal responsibilities by sector, as stipulated by the Law 715/2001.  
In the Education Sector 
1. To pay salaries to the faculty and administrative staff of the public educative 
institutions. 
2. To pay for education infrastructure, its maintenance, and its public services.  
3. To provide education equipment. 
4. To promote evaluation and quality of the education services. 
5. To pay school transportation where geographic conditions require it. 
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6. To report annual statistics and financial details on spending by the deadlines 
established by the Ministry of Education. Failure to report this information leads 
mayors into disciplinary fault and will be subject to the sanctions dictated by the 
Unique Disciplinary Code (Código Disciplinario Único, according to Law 
734/2002, which modified Law 190/1995), which may lead to the mayor’s 
dismissal. With no annual reports, the current municipal conditions will not be 
updated; therefore, the locality losses the potential transfers that annually are 
granted based on population updates (Law 715/2001). 
In the Health Sector 
1. To formulate, implement, and evaluate health programs in line with the national 
policies. 
2. To manage and oversee the access to service delivery. 
3. To identify the poor and vulnerable population and to select the beneficiaries of 
the Subsidized Regime. 
4. To finance and co-finance the affiliation of the poor and vulnerable population to 
the Subsidized Regime and to efficiently spend the resources earmarked to it.  
5. To contract with entities for the health insurances of those in the Subsidized 
Regime and evaluate the provision of the services. 
6. To encourage the affiliation to the Contributive Regime of Social Security among 
those with the capacity to afford it to avoid evasion of fees. 
7. On public heath, to evaluate and supervise the quality, production, 
commercialization and distribution of product for the human consumption.  
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8. To determine the environmental conditions that affect the municipal population. 
9. To evaluate the quality of water for the human consumption. 
10. To formulate and implement the actions to promote, prevent and control of 
mosquitoes. 
11. To report annual statistics and financial details on spending by the deadlines 
established by the Ministry of Health. Failure to report this information leads 
mayors into disciplinary fault and will be subject to the sanctions dictated by the 
Disciplinary Regimen (Régimen Disciplinario Único), which may lead to 
mayoral dismissal. With no annual reports, the current municipal conditions will 
not be updated; therefore, the locality losses the potential transfers that annually 
are granted based on population updates (Law 715/2001 and Ríncon 2002). 
In Other Sectors 
1. Deliver directly or through other entities public services, widen their coverage, 
and improvement of their infrastructure.  
2. To sponsor social housing programs by granting subsidies based on need. 
3. To offer technical assistance in the cattle-land sector. 
4. To promote association among the small and medium producers. 
5. To construct and maintain the vial infrastructure in the rural and urban sectors, 
including maritime, land and aerial ports.  
6. To promote the institutional capability and infrastructure (Law 715/2001). 
In addition to the above functions, Law of Municipal Modernization (136/1994) 
also binds the municipality to actualize its administrative procedures to achieve efficacy, 
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efficiency, and effectiveness.  To actualize them, the municipalities have legal tools, 
described in the following section.  
How to Perform the Municipal Responsibilities 
 
 The municipal tools, oriented to achieve efficacy, efficiency and effectiveness, 
vary along the administrative phases. That is, the municipality has specific tools for the 
planning, implementation and evaluation phases.  Municipal planning “is the process 
through which we rationally determine where and how to reach a certain point” (DNP, 
CAF, DDTS 2005, 37). “By planning, the manager seeks solutions to needs and 
problems by directing actions toward the achievement of goals and objectives” (DNP, 
CAF, DDTS 2005, 37). It is considered the key phase in municipal administration 
because from it flows the implementation and evaluation phases. For planning to be 
successful, the following criteria must be taken into consideration: information, strategic 
vision, integration of all sectors, effective participation, efficient management of 
resources, association with other municipalities, adjustability and evaluation  (DNP, 
CAF, DDTS 2005, 38). The mayor with his/her respective department head of planning 
does this planning.  
 Municipal Planning 
 Within the planning phase, the municipalities have three tools. The first planning 
tool is the Plan of Territorial Arrangement, a long-term tool of nine or 10 years. This 
tool allows the municipality to physically rearrange its territory according to its potential 
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social, economic, and environmental development.35 The second tool is the government 
plan, which is designed by all the mayoral candidates when registering their candidacy.  
This plan becomes the contract that the candidate signs with the community. 36 Indeed, 
citizens can revoke his/her mandate when the mayor deviates from the plan de 
government (Wilches 2003)37. In personal interview with Fernando Enciso Herrera, 
Management Advisor for the Colombian Federation of Municipalities, he argues that 
during the last administration (2004-2008), citizens have filed roughly 50 revocations of 
mayoral mandate. However, no revocation has been successful in the referendum for the 
“yes” or “no” to the revocation.38    
The third planning tool is the development plan, which is elaborated annually by 
each municipality and submitted to the Departmental Planning Office. In it, the 
municipality defines the goals, policies, objectives, strategies, programs, and projects for 
the coming administrative year. The development plan must be specific in including the 
                                                 
35
 The deadline to submit the first Plan of Territorial Arrangement to the specific Regional Autonomous 
Corporation  (such as CORPONOR in Norte de Santander, the department under study) was 2002. 
However, given some environmental issues with some areas, 77 municipalities failed to do so (I am 
grateful to Fernando Enciso, Municipal Advisor at the Colombian Federation of Municipalities, for 
providing me this information). Each plan is to be submitted every ten years and failure to do so leads the 
mayor to incur into disciplinary faults whose sanctions are dictated by the Unique Disciplinary Code (Law 
734/2002). 
36
 In elaborating their government plan, most of the interviewed mayors reported having contracted the 
services of someone else to elaborate the plan—a person that although knowledgeable of the requirements, 
might not know details of the municipality. Indeed, one individual elaborated the government plans for 
five mayoral candidates from different localities.  
37
 However, citizens lack information of government plans. In three localities, I asked some dwellers (10 
in total) about the content of their mayor’s government plan, but they failed to respond. 
38
 One of the most recent failed revocations was against the mayor of Cali, Apolinar Salcedo. In March, 
2006, citizens of Cali collected 118,00 signatures (surpassing the needed 40% of the obtained votes in his 
election, which was 180, 736) (Alvarez 2006). In the Cali case, there was not citizen consultation because 
the Registraduría National (Register Office) verified that only 38, 000 (and not the originally collected 
118,000) were valid (“No prosperó 2006). However, in the other failed revocations, municipalities have 
indeed held citizen consultation; however, none has been successful. These attempts demonstrate that 
Colombian citizens indeed use this democratic mechanism. This is a topic that deserves more attention; 
unfortunately, it is out of this dissertation’s scope.  
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projects that will take place, the direct and indirect beneficiaries, as well as the indicators 
that permit evaluating the achievement of the goals.   
 The development plan is one of the key tools in the local administration, and 
mayors are taking it more seriously. In fact, municipal efficacy is measured in terms of 
how many of the goals outlined in the development plan were accomplished. That is why 
it is important to know the precise socioeconomic description of the population in order 
to set up the municipal goals. Indeed, municipalities possess a valuable means to acquire 
this precise information, the SISBEN Index. The SISBEN Index is an indicator to 
identify and classify the potential beneficiaries of the social programs. It reports a value 
between 0 –100 per family. A family is poorer the closer its value is to 0, and richer the 
closer its value is to 100. Employees in the municipal planning office receive training on 
how to collect this information and on the standards to classify families, from 0 to 100, 
based on their responses. An accurate assessment of the number of poor families should 
be included in the development plan in order to target social spending toward them.  
Although all levels of governments participate in it, it is the municipality, which 
implements SISBEN identification. The SISBEN Index is useful because it allows the 
municipalities to 1) identify and classify the population with less economic resources, 
then to prepare the development plan taking them into account; 2) improve the design 
and strategy of the programs and projects of social development; 3) select faster and 
more efficiently the beneficiaries of the programs; 4) have a permanent base of data, and 
5) facilitate the evaluation of targeting (DNP, CAF, DDTS 2005, 44-45). 
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 If the mayor fails to submit the Development Plan during the first four months of 
the administration, this leads to penalizing faults, and according to the Unique 
Disciplinary Code (Law 734/2002), the mayor can be sanctioned with dismissal or 
suspended for certain period of time. In addition, without a development plan, there are 
no indicators to evaluate the municipal administration—recall that it is done based on the 
goals established in the development plan. And the lack of performance indicators leads 
to loss of national transfers, which are partly dictated based on the municipal, 
administrative efficiency.   
 In sum, municipalities achieve efficacy by having good planning, which is 
achieved with three tools: territorial, government, and development plans. Besides 
efficacy, municipalities also have to achieve efficiency during the implementation phase.  
Municipal Implementation 
While efficacy is related to the planning phase, efficiency occurs in the 
implementation phase. After designing its planning phase, the locality enters into the 
implementation phase to execute what was outlined in the development plan. To 
implement its objectives, the municipality has five legal tools. Figure 3.3 depicts the 
legal tools for municipal planning and implementation. The first implementing tool is the  
action plan. With it, the department heads and/or mayoral dependencies annually detail 
the actions and projects to achieve the goals established in the development plan. 
According to Covo (2000), the action plan must derive from the exchange of ideas 
between the mayor and his/her closest collaborators to integrate everyone’s knowledge
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Figure 3.3 Legal Tools for Municipal Planning and Implementation 
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compiles all the programs, by sector, to be implemented. Failure to submit information 
on these plans to the Departmental Controller leads to disciplinary sanctions for the 
mayor, ranging from fines, suspension to dismissal (Unique Disciplinary Code Law, 
734/2002). The final implementing tool is the budgeting process. The next section, 
therefore, addresses municipal finances.  
Municipal Finances 
To accomplish the objectives outlined in the development plan, the municipality 
has to implement the action plan. In carrying out the action plan, the municipality has 
several financial resources.  First, the municipalities’ own resources derive from 
property tax, industry, and commerce tax. These taxes constitute the key source of 
municipal finances. Yet in most of the municipalities, “tax collection is so low that it 
does not justify having the infrastructure and the staff to collect it” (Betancur 1989, 63, 
author’s translation).39 Second, the municipality has resources from royalty privileges 
(regalías); certain municipalities receive this in exchange for exploiting nonrenewable-
natural resources. According to article 14 of the Law 756/2002, ninety percent of this 
money is to finance projects of health, education, drinking water, environmental 
sanitation, and electrification. Five percent is to finance operational costs generated by 
these projects, and the remaining 5% is to finance the supervision (or auditing) of these 
projects. The third municipal financial resource comes from the General System of 
Participations (SGP)40: These are the resources that according to the Law 715 of 2001 
                                                 
39
 As mentioned in the first part of this chapter, failure to collect the stipulated amount leads to 
municipality’s loss of its current category, therefore, descending in the category ranking.  
40
 The General System of Participations derives from three sources: the situado fiscal, Education 
Compensation Fund, and participation of the nation’s revenues. 
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are transferred to the municipalities, departments (states), districts, and indigenous 
territories to finance their development. These resources are stable and permanent by 
means of monthly transfers. The fourth channel of financial resources is credit, but to 
apply for credit, the municipality must have the capacity to get indebted, which depends 
on each municipality’s specific situation. Rules also changed, making municipal access 
to credit tougher. A fifth source of finance is through co-financing with national or 
departmental governments. These resources, however, are earmarked to finance specific 
projects. Finally, the municipality may also receive resources from national and/or 
international donations, which is uncommon (DNP, CAF, DDTS 2005, 48-50). 
The municipal spending goes to three areas: to pay both debt and operational 
costs and to invest (to accomplish the objectives of the development plan). In spending, 
the municipality must follow the guidelines stipulated by the General System of 
Participations (SGP). See figure 3.4 for a complete description of the municipal transfers 
and the proportions of spending assigned to all sectors. To carry out spending, 
municipalities elaborate their budget based on all the planning and implementing tools. 
The municipal administration approves the budget, then the municipal council approves 
it (or objects), and, finally, the mayor approves or rejects it. After this, the mayor may  
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Figure 3.4 Sector of Destination of the Monies Transferred from the Central to Municipal 
Governments 
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 No all the municipalities receive this 17%. Indeed this 17% derives from 20% basic to all the 
municipalities, and the remaining 80% derives from 40% according to the unsatisfied basic needs, 40% 
from urban and rural population, 10% for fiscal efficiency and 10% for administrative efficiency. 
42
 For municipalities of 4, 5, 6 category. 
43
 For municipalities of 4, 5, 6 category and 100% for the other categories (1, 2, 3, special).        
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introduce certain modifications: detailing, freezing, reducing, and transferring monies 
within each program without the municipal council’s approval. However, for additions, 
fusion of programs, and transfers across different programs, the mayor needs the 
municipal council’s approval.44   
To implement programs and to achieve efficiency, municipalities may use 
additional tools. One of them is associating with other municipalities to jointly provide 
public works, or to pay for administrative services, such as advising (Amador et al. 
2004). To create an association, the mayor requires authorization of the municipal 
council, and the municipality cannot belong to a metropolitan area (Law 136/1994). 
Amador et al. (2004) suggest that by associating, municipalities will retain their 
autonomy, instead of losing it, as the gains in efficiency increase their legitimacy.  
Public Finances in the Colombian Municipalities 
Unlike the United States, most of the Colombian municipal spending is financed 
with the transferences from central government mainly because it has the greater 
capacity to collect taxes—despite still being incompetent.45  The Colombian 
municipalities earn their financial resources from five sources: royalties, private credit, 
their own tax collection, moneys derived from the sales of their own assets and/or 
service provisions, and the transfers from the General Participation System—Sistema 
                                                 
44
 Bird and Fiszbein (1998, 187) contend that Colombian local governments now have more resources than 
they had before Law 60/1993 (modified with Law 715/2001), but this has been at the expense of freedom 
in terms of deciding how much should be spent on each sector. 
45
 Colombia should be receiving 23 billion pesos more in taxes (Charry 2006). 
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General de Participaciones (SGP).46  The SGP represents the main source of financing 
for social service provisions, and it is constituted from resources that the central 
government transfers to the territorial entities.  The transfers are based on the following 
percentages. Four percent is distributed in the form of special assignations,47 and the 
remaining ninety-six percent is distributed among all the Colombian municipalities 
(1,098), allocating 24.5 percent for health, 58.5 percent for education, and 17 percent to 
cover unsatisfied basic needs and for urban and rural infrastructures.    
Unlike the earmarked transferences, municipal monies collected from taxes, 
royalties, and service provisions can be spent in any sector.  Based on both their revenue 
collection power and their population, municipalities are classified into seven 
categories—especial, 1st, 2nd 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th—this categorization is also the base to 
for mayors’salary.  Tax collection is highly prized in Colombia due to citizens’ failure to 
pay taxes.  Mayors must resort to several incentives to promote tax payment and thus to 
gather the necessary revenues to keep their category; otherwise, they might be required 
to descend one categorical level.48  These reasons make tax collection a good indicator of 
fiscal performance.  Generally, the taxes collected from property represents the main 
source of municipal revenue.   
                                                 
46
 It is part of the Colombian Intergovernmental System of Transferences. It transfers to the territorial 
entities according to the articles 356 and 357 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution—then reformed by the 
Legislative Act 01/2001 and ruled by the Law 715/2001 (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2005). 
47
 This four percent, in turn, is distributed into school nutrition (0.55 percent); municipalities that have 
indigenous territories (0.52 percent); municipalities that are located on the riverside of the Magdalena river 
(0.08 percent); and the Fund of Territorial Pension (2.9 percent).   
48
 The 2005 Colombian report on the municipal tax collection performance reveals a considerable increase 
in the municipal revenue (Montenegro 2006). 
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A municipality covers its operational costs with monies coming from its own 
revenues, and these costs must not exceed a certain percentage of its total revenues. The 
restriction makes operational costs an inappropriate indicator of fiscal performance. On 
the contrary, municipal investment on social programs aptly assesses fiscal performance. 
Municipalities invest the GSP transfers within the earmarked sectors—health, education, 
nutrition, infrastructure, and unsatisfied basic needs (sewage and water). Although they 
are required to invest the money in these specific sectors, they may choose not to spend 
it all.  In addition, if some revenues are left after paying for the mayoral operational 
costs, municipalities might decide to invest it on any sector: health, recreation, 
education, nutrition, entertainment, etc.  
Concerning municipal deficits, Law 136/94 prohibits mayors from ending the 
year with a deficit. This ban makes deficits unsuitable as indicator of fiscal performance, 
as there is little variation across municipalities. With this law, the government sought to 
cut past serious overspending. According to the Colombian National Department of 
Planning (Montenegro 2006), the Colombian municipalities closed the 2005 fiscal year 
with a surplus of 370.000 million pesos (roughly 148 million dollars). Municipalities 
also have restraints regarding becoming indebted to private banks and/or public financial 
entities. According to article 364 of the Colombian Constitution, municipalities cannot 
exceed their capacity of debt. Hence, to become indebted, the law demands an annual 
percentage of savings greater than the payments of interest in addition to having moneys 
for investment (see also Laws 358/1997 and 795/2003).  
  
91 
Municipal Auditing, Evaluation, and Verification 
After implementing the action plan with its respective bank of projects and 
programs, the municipality undertakes the control, evolution, and verification phase. 
Within this phase, the municipality assesses its effectiveness in relation to external and 
internal customers (Domínguez Giraldo 2003, 159). In determining its effectiveness, the 
municipality has several tools: internal and external control, external evaluation, and 
citizens’ verification.  
A. Internal Control or Self-control 
 
 Article 1 of Law 87/1993 stipulates as internal control “the integrated-
organizational system and the group of plans, methods, principles, norms, procedures, 
and mechanisms of verification and evaluation adopted by an entity. They seek to ensure 
that all the activities of the entity follow the legal and constitutional norms.” According 
to the National Department of Planning, Andean Corporation of Fostering, and CAF and 
Direction of Sustainable-Territorial Development (2005) the culture of self-control plays 
a key role in the functioning of the entity and its efficiency.  Indeed, “self-control is a 
measure of the public manager to guaranteed the achievement of his/her 
objectives”(DNP, CAF, DDTS 2005, 33). Self-control cannot be performed by external 
agencies but, as its name implies, by the employees of the entity; however, it can be 
done in collaboration with a specialized external agency, but the decision must come 
from the organization, that is the mayor (DNP, CAF, DDTS 2005, 35).  This internal 
auditing is voluntary; however, lack of skilled staff impedes poor municipalities from 
carrying it out. In addition to self-control, municipalities undergo external controls.  
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B. External Controls  
 
The mayors must send monthly and annual reports on municipal accounting to 
the Departmental Comptroller. Mayors also send reports to sectoral entities. For 
instance, mayors report to the Ministry of Finance information on budgeting and 
management of the transferred monies, they also report to the Ministry of Education the 
usage of money transferred for educational purposes; etc. (Peñaranda 2005, 27-28). All 
these control entities determine whether the municipal administrators fail to comply with 
the rules and are subject to 1) fiscal responsibility (misuse of public money); 2) 
disciplinary responsibility (wrong behavior); and 3) penal responsibility (grave conduct 
or crime). These faults are not exclusionary, for example contracting with someone, who 
is not allowed, violates penal responsibility and is punished with prison. In addition, “it 
is a penalizing fault punished with dismissal, and if the contract affected the public 
money, it is a fiscal responsibility problem which is punished by returning the 
monies”(Peñaranda 2005, 29; author’s translation). Besides the internal and external 
mechanisms of control, and in the last three years municipalities have also been subject 
to evaluation.  
C. Municipal Evaluation  
 
Since 2004, the national government, through the National Department of 
Planning, implemented four indicators to assess municipal public management. Efficacy, 
for instance, measures how many of the objectives outlined in the plan of development 
the mayor carried out (this is for all the sectors, roughly 24 competencies).  Efficiency, 
the second indicator, compares the cost of what a mayor did relative to the costs of 
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performing the same task in other municipalities. In education, for example, the 
evaluators add all the square meters in physical infrastructure, the money invested in 
education, and the number of teachers per municipality. Then, evaluators generate the 
amount spent per student registered—that is, the number of registrations/square meter, 
per professor, and per invested money (Porras 2005, 25-26). 
In addition to the efficacy and efficiency indicators, the evaluators assess 
whether the mayor spent the mandated proportions of monies in the assigned sectors, 
that is were monies for education spent on education issues, and so on. From this, they 
report a value for complying with legal requirements. The fourth indicator is about 
administrative and fiscal efficiency. Fiscal efficiency means to produce the most with 
less operational costs. Administrative efficiency assesses the degree of personal stability, 
guidelines for contracting, professionalization of employees, and the degree of 
systematization. The evaluators also take into account external variables. Indeed, given 
the context, municipalities operate in, evaluators control for guerrilla and paramilitary 
presence, as well as distance from the capital, and transportation access. After 
controlling for these external factors, the evaluators aggregate all the individual values to 
construct a synthetic indicator ranging from 0 to 100: the closer to “100” the better and 
the closer to “0” the worse public management (Porras 2005, 25-26).49 The report of this 
indicator, however, is unknown by most of the municipal dwellers because there are 
mayors who are uninterested in keeping their communities informed about municipal 
                                                 
49
 The DNP also notes that in addition to the contextual factors, other variables seem to matter for public 
management. Specifically, the DNP refers to the type of relationship between the mayor and both 
councilmen and the community (DNP, CAF, DDTS 2005, 68). However, the DNP has no data on that.  
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performance (Porras 2005).  Communities, however, can legally count on several other 
mechanisms to verify municipal performance. 
D. Verification: Municipal Mechanisms for Citizens’ Participation 
 
According to Gaviria (1989, 29), “[i]n creating policies and evaluating the local 
programs, one of the most important roles of the mayor is to achieve participation from 
the communitarian and private organizations as well as from the different governmental 
sectors.” In fact, mayors can encourage citizens’ participation through several channels. 
1) The Territorial Council of Municipal Planning (CTPN): Law 152/94 stipulates 
that the CTPN participate not only in the elaboration of the development plan, 
but also in the implementation and evaluation of the plan. Although they do not 
have administrative, financial or technical autonomy, the National Department of 
Planning, through the corresponding territorial entity, will provide the 
administrative and logistic support. 
2) Boards of Local Action (JAL): these are channels of participation whose purpose 
is to analyze and solve community problems. A JAL must be comprised of a 
minimum of 60 (at the urban sector) or 25 (in the rural zone) elected members. 
Despite their potential, they have not been organized in most of the 
municipalities, mainly because they tend to overlap in functions with the 
municipal council. As mentioned earlier, Councilmen do not promote their 
creation, as they look them as power rivals.  
3) Public Service Oversight Boards: created by the national government to oversee 
the provision of public services when they are not administered by decentralized 
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entities. They report to the mayor, ombudsman, and the municipal council 
anomalies in the provision of services. 
4) Civic Oversight Entities (Veedurias Ciudadanas): oversee any project or 
program financed with public resources. Although created with Law 136/94, it 
was not until 2000 (Law 563/2000) that they become mechanisms to oversee 
public administration. They perform several functions: auditing public resources, 
participating during all the public management process, formulating policies, 
programs, and budget recommendations, overseeing the budget, assessing results, 
evaluating responsibilities, and even, promoting fiscal investigations of all 
political, administrative, and judicial entities50 (Quintero Torrado 2000). The 
veedurías can even oversee other control entities, such as Comptrollership, 
Procuratorship and Ombudsmanship. While the control agencies act after the 
facts, the veedurías act both before and after the fact. The nature of veedurías is 
collective or institutional; any two literate people are enough to create one, any 
non-profit organization can do it after filing an act of creation in the 
ombudsmanship or chamber of commerce of the respective jurisdiction (Quintero 
Torrado 2000). Through veedurías, citizens concrete their participation, no 
longer resorting to politicians to mediate between them and authorities because 
citizens can do it on their own as a “civic overseer” (Quintero Torrado 2000, 1). 
Unfortunately, and as mentioned before, citizen are often too discouraged to form 
                                                 
50
 Veedurías can also oversee private entities when they manage public resources (Law 563/2000). 
Sometimes, they have to sign off on the reports sent to the control entities or for the mayor to get the co-
participation transfer from the central government. 
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veedurias. Dr. Portillo, the ombudsman of the municipality of Chitagá, says that 
people are more inclined to form veedurias to oversee health programs, as they 
feel that this issue pertains more to them. This is a question that deserves more 
study to reveal the mechanisms leading to people’s engagement in oversight role. 
5) The Municipal Councils of Rural Development (CMDR) are the biggest group 
among the local authorities, the rural communities, and the public entities in 
terms of rural development. They prioritize studying and identify the needs, 
solutions, and projects in rural communities. They also participate in the 
formulation of the development plan, the plan of rural development, the cattle 
and land program, oversee the functioning of the Municipal Units for Technical-
Land and Cattle Assistance (UMATAs), and approve the municipal plan of 
agrarian reform. They also participate in the formulation of the plan of basic 
health attention, and the municipal plan of health. 
6) Communitarian Participation Committees, COPACO: they participate in 
programming, auditing and evaluating health services, as well as in presenting 
priorities, plans and programs to the Board of Health. 
7) The Alliances or Associations of Peasant Users: advocate better infrastructure, 
technical assistance, and oversee the distribution of resources targeted to rural 
development (DNP, CAF and DDTS 2005). 
 In sum, citizens have many channels to participate, audit, evaluate and verify 
public administrations, a topic that, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this 
  
97 
dissertation. Whether they take advantage of them is another issue, which deserves more 
study. Indeed, little is known about how their usage varies across municipalities.  
Municipal Corruption or Administrative Ignorance? 
 The Colombian municipal administration does not escape from corruption 
charges.  In the Procuratorship General, the number of complaints against subnational 
officers increased from 9,375 in 1995 to 37,870 in 2002 (see Figure 3.5 for a sequential 
increase of complains at the subnational level).  From these numbers, 51% are against 
municipal officers with mayors and councilmen ranking in first and second place. 
Indeed, the entity with greater risk is the mayoralty with 42.43% of the total complaints, 
receiving an annual average of 1, 229 penalties or sentences—considerably greater than 
76 for departmental assemblies and 167 for governorships (Peñaranda 2005, 14-17). This 
is supported by Garay Carrillo’s (2003, 42) report outlining that during the 
administration of the first elected mayors, 373 out of roughly 985 were incarcerated. By 
department, the number of complaints ranges from a maximum of 602/year in Santander 
to a minimum of 29 in Guaviare and Norte de Santander—the department under study in 
this dissertation—with an average of 159 cases. From the 159 cases, the capital, Cúcuta, 
registers an average of 31 cases per year, ranking 13 at the national level—Bucaramanga 
tops the list with 93 and Bogotá, the national capital, has 56 (Peñaranda 2005, 14-17). 
While some condemn decentralization for increasing fraud, others defend it for 
reducing corruption.   Although Dávila Ladrón (1996) is uncertain about the relation 
between political decentralization and corruption, he suggests that it may increase 
corruption for two reasons. First, the difficulty of maintaining power—due to no 
  
98 
reelection—encourages those in power to take the most they can; and second, the open 
access to other groups, such as the guerrillas, may lead to armed clientelism, which goes 
in hand with corruption.51 
Figure 3.5 Complaints, Investigations, and Sanctions Against Subnational Public 
Officers 
   
9,375 9,769
11,978
15,162
17,981
24,611
31,240
37,870
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f C
o
m
pl
ai
n
s
 
       Source: Peñaranda 2005, 14-17. 
 
Others, however, defend decentralization for reducing corruption. Rojas et al. 
(1996), for example, contend that decentralization encourages transparency through 
several mechanisms: participation, assembling, deconcentration, and greater interaction 
between public and private sectors.  Rojas et al. specifically refer to the centers of local, 
integral attention in Cali, Colombia, emphasizing their key role in deconcentrating 
                                                 
51
 According to Leal and Dávila (1991, 47), clientelism is the use of public resources for political ends 
while corruption is the illegal appropriation of public resources. Due to this, Dávila Ladrón (1996, 56) 
affirms, “it is difficult to know when the appropriation is for political ends or not.” 
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administration and involving the community. Rojas et al. (1996) also list the 
comparative advantages of the municipalities in terms of preventing corruption. The 
advantages include receiving direct demands from citizens, better quantification of costs, 
beneficiaries, and changes in their distribution, greater citizens’ identification and more 
control over new projects and municipal employees. However, given citizens’ apathy to 
participate, these benefits may vary across municipalities. Finally, in municipalities, 
mayors can easily consolidate cultural identity, integrate municipal associations and 
mobilize human and institutional resources, which is necessary for medium and long-
term sustainability of projects. Like Rojas et al. (1996), Eastman (1996) also defends 
decentralization as the necessary tool to promote social issues and nationality. According 
to him, decentralization permits targeting the state’s actions toward the poor and 
generates a sense of belonging, which is scarce in Colombia.   
 However, not all point to mayors’ corruption as the main source of the large 
number of complains and legal sanctions. The Colombian ex-president Alfonso López 
Michelsen (2000, VII), for instance, asserts that the main source of mismanagement is 
not corruption but ignorance. He argues that with “the significant number of mayors in 
prison and others under legal investigation, it is simple to point at their dishonesty. 
However, it is not so in all the cases. On the contrary, it is the result of a most common 
problem: their ignorance, as they know neither the legislation nor the elemental 
principles of accounting and budgeting” (2000, VII).52 Like López Michelsen, the 
Colombian Federation of Municipalities contends that most of the investigations derive 
                                                 
52
 See Peñaranda (2005) and Becerra Santamaria (1997) for details about mayors’ penalties, inabilities, 
incompatibilities, prohibitions, sanctions and punishments.  
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from mayors’ and councilmen’s ignorance of the legal procedures in terms of public 
resources, collections, management, and elaboration of contracts and not due to 
corruption (Peñaranda 2005, 10).53 Peñaranda (2005, 9) also suggests that the increasing 
number of legal investigations at the municipal level can be due to both corruption and 
mayoral ignorance of the legal procedures.   
 The above discussions suggest once more the need to have qualified municipal 
managers, that is, qualified mayors. By having mayors with both qualified educational 
background and job-related experience, we should expect a reduction in the number of 
legal complaints, which would result in more time for mayors to dedicate to 
administrative tasks. Moreover, knowledge and experience of the mayors would enable 
them to teach, advise, and direct other municipal officers, who are always in need of 
training. Indeed, in a survey conducted in 1996 among the 587 mayors that attended a 
conference of mayors and governors, mayors ranked their top priority needs as follow: 
100% the presence of professional and technical staff to train them and local employees, 
68.8% to have more budget resources, and 42.2% to have more co-financing (Eastman 
1996).  
Whatever the cause of complaints against mayors—corruption or ignorance—the 
national government has taken some measures to guarantee administrative transparency. 
In doing that, the Colombian Corporation of Transparency implemented the Index of 
Municipal Transparency (ITM). To create this index, the Corporation gathers 
information from several sources: 75% comes from municipal reports, and the remaining 
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 See Campillo Parra (2004) for a complete guide to how to create and implement state contracts.  
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25% derives from the departmental comptrollership, the National Department of 
Planning, the Auditorship General, the Superintendent of Public Services, and the 
Administrative Department of the Public Function. The ITM aggregates values from 
three indicators.  The institutional factor, the first indicator, measures whether the 
municipality follows the regulating norms for planning and implementation of projects. 
The second indicator, accounting and visibility factors, assesses whether the 
municipality submits clear and timely information on the local accounting to both 
citizens and auditing entities. The third indicator, citizens’ participation factors, 
evaluates mayors’ inclusion of citizens in planning, implementation, and overseeing 
projects. The index reports five values: high, medium-high, medium, low and very low.  
For the first ITM, created with the 2004 information—146 municipalities voluntarily 
participated. From the Department of Norte de Santander—the one under study—only 
one municipality did so, Los Patios. As of 2007, the Corporation has not reported the 
second version of the ITM. Of the 146 participating municipalities, the 2004 ITM report 
gave medium value to 68 municipalities, low value to 61 and very low value to 17 
municipalities (ITM 2006).54 
The descriptive information compiled above applies to all the Colombian 
municipalities; however, the next section addresses some general indicators of the 
department of Norte de Santander, given that the two out of the three statistical analysis 
employ data from its municipalities.   
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 So far, no study has been reported as  to the systematic predictors of ITM, another topic deserving more 
attention in future research.   
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Local Government in the Context of Norte de Santander 
 
The 40 municipalities that constitute the department of Norte de Santander are 
representative of the Colombian municipalities, as they exhibit the description offered 
above. In this section, however, I will provide some specifics about the department, in 
relation to the national context. To test this dissertation’s propositions, I selected these 
40 municipalities for several reasons. First, they show variance in population size and 
level of development. Second, they also offer variation in guerrilla and paramilitary 
presence, the illegal armed groups, which Colombia has had to deal with since the 1960s 
and 1980s respectively. This variation permits me to test the main proposition under 
variant, violent contexts. Third, the study of a single department permits me to control 
for variables specific to that department, such as governor’s action and other 
departmental entities’ actions. Fourth, the average number of municipalities was 
reasonable for me to personally visit them given the financial constrains. Finally, they 
offer considerable variation on my main explanatory variable: mayoral qualifications. 
See Table 3.5 for a list of indicators. 
 By right, all these municipalities belong to the Colombian Federation of 
Municipalities. Their engagement in national and/or international convocations is 
relatively low. For example, in the 2006 2nd Latin American Conference on Local 
Government held in Cali, Colombia, 12 out of its 40 mayors participated. Within this 
department, we find five municipal associations: Association of Municipalities of 1) the 
Province of Ocaña (Convención, Hacarí, La Playa, Teorama, El Carmen, San Calixto, 
Abrego, Villa Caro, Cáchira, La Esperanza and two municipalities from the Department 
  
103 
of Cesar: Rio de Oro and González); 2)Bordering Area (Pamplona, Pamplonita, 
Chinácota, Cúcuta, Villa del Rosario, Los Patios, Bochalema, El Zulia); and 3) on 
riverside of Zulia River (Salazar, Santiago, Cucutilla, Lourdes, and Gramalote). The  
 
Table 3.5 Social and Economic Indicators of Norte de Santander 
  
 Norte de  Santander National 
Population  1,228,028 42,090,502 
Urban 946,305 31,566,276 
Rural 281,723 10,524,226 
Men 608,563 20,668,157 
Women 619,456 21,422,345 
Househoulds (Families) 299,770 10,731,044 
Housings 299,925 10,537,735 
Economic Units 43,787 1,591,043 
Rural Units 49,861 1,742,429 
Househoulds with 
Computer 
9% 10.1%           
Bogotá: 31% 
                 Vaupés: 3% 
Insatisfied Basic Needs 30.3% 27.6% 
Rural 58.2 31.1% 
Urban 22.4 16.2% 
Inhabitants without School 
Assistance 
---- 3,6% 
GDP (2005) 1.72% 100% 
 GDP/Capita55 1,015,927 (º $508) 1,549,242 (º $775) 
Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadisticas, DANE (n.d.a,b).  
 
municipal disinterest—due to either lack of information or lack of mayor’s dynamism—
for international advising is also low. During the 2006 II Latin American Conference on 
Local Government, for example, the United Nation Development Program offered a 
                                                 
55
 1994 Constant prices without calculating PPP in dollars. 
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workshop in order to advise and promote its local development programs.56 Roughly 40 
mayors, from different countries, were present in this workshop, but not one from Norte 
de Santander, except for the director of the Association of Municipalities of the Province 
of Ocaña, Emiro Cañizares. 57  With greater mayoral commitment, municipalities may 
take advantage of the available alternatives.  
 This chapter offered descriptive information on the Colombian municipalities, as 
they generate the data to test this dissertation’s proposition. The following chapter 
presents the first empirical analysis on the effect of mayoral qualifications on municipal 
performance.   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56
 See P.N.U.D. (n.d.) at  www.pnud.org.com for complete information about the programs that the United 
Nations Development Program has in Colombia.  
57
 I acknowledge, however, that 40 is a low number given that the II Latin American Conference on Local 
Government gathered roughly 750 mayors. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE IN SERVICE DELIVERY: THE ROLE 
OF THE MAYOR 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the first empirical test of this dissertation’ s thesis: mayoral 
qualifications influence municipal performance. To do this, I assess the influence of 
managerial quality—operationalized with mayoral qualifications: educational 
background and job-related experience—on two municipal indicators: education 
coverage and coverage in identifying the beneficiaries of social service delivery (called 
SISBEN program). Specifically, I draw data from the forty municipalities of the 
Colombian department (state of Norte de Santander) over six years (2000-2005) to 
present the preliminary results of the effects of managerial quality on municipal 
performance in a Latin American setting.  Findings indicate that mayoral 
qualifications—educational background and job-related experience—positively 
influence municipal performance in terms of education. Yet their positive impact 
decreases under external constraints.  
Colombian Mayor Role on Municipal Performance 
The adoption of decentralization gave Colombian municipalities responsibilities, 
such as the providing of water, primary health care, basic education as well as the 
promotion of sports, culture, recreation, environmental protection, and low-income 
housing programs.  Consequently, growth, poverty alleviation, and long-term 
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development become a function of municipal performance. Transfer of the 
responsibilities, however, came without specific guidelines.  Starting from scratch, 
municipalities must now implement social programs of large scope and magnitude.    
To implement programs, mayors must plan, create, design, and manage their 
organizations and are expected to spend certain percentages of the budget in sectors such 
as health, education, transportation, etc.  As mentioned in chapter III, although mayors 
are told “in which sector to spend” the money, they have freedom on “how to do it.”  
Mayors indeed have and resort to authentic strategies in order to implement social 
programs.  Again, here is where mayoral qualifications play a critical role because based 
on their knowledge and experience, some mayors become more resourceful in improving 
municipal performance.  
For example in the education sector, while most of the mayors spend their 
education budget on building a school, adding a classroom, providing school lunches for 
rural students, and/or furnishing school supplies; others are more innovative  by taking 
advantage of extraresources.  Several actual cases exemplify how mayors use extra 
resources in order to expand the coverage of education available to the residents. Some 
mayors, for example, have recognized the need to teach not only the children but also 
their parents about the benefits of education. This need derives from the fact that most of 
the rural parents prefer to have their children at their farms working on the land rather 
than sending them to school.  To teach parents, the mayor of Toledo, Carlos Omar 
Delgado, holds psychological workshops with the goal of convincing parents of the 
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benefits of educating their children.58 Yet these professional services generate costs to 
the mayoralty. To avoid these costs, Mayor Delgado asks for support in the form of two 
or three senior students majoring in psychology at the departmental university. These 
students must attain a certain number of hours of volunteer service during their last 
semester in order to graduate, and the municipal arena offers a good opportunity for 
them to do that. In exchange, Mayor Delgado pays for their transportation and lodging, a 
good exchange when compared with the professional fees he would have to pay to a 
professional psychologist. This is a very resourceful mechanism that not all of the 
mayors employ; indeed, the educational background and experience of Mayor 
Delgado—a professional lawyer—help him to see opportunities in different arenas. 
 Another mayor reports that he has opened two rural education centers, which 
grant high school diplomas in nine rather than eleven years. This modality is highly 
preferred by a rural population. However, in order to validate and certify these rural 
education centers, the mayor has to comply with all the requirements that the 
Departmental Secretary of Education demands, such as providing the location, 
electricity, advertising, and logistics for registration. These are requisites that demand 
managerial skills rather than monetary resources.  In addition to the rural education 
centers, and through joint institutional efforts, mayors have available to them two extra 
programs designed to improve the coverage of education:  tutorial learning and tele-high 
school. The former provides high school classes only during the weekends, a perfect fit 
for those teenagers who have to work during the week. The tele-high school program is 
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 Interview by author, Cúcuta, Colombia, January 11 2006.  
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learning provided through video.  To be eligible to operate these programs, including the 
endowment of equipment and trained staff, the mayor must gather twenty-two students 
per program and provide the location, advertising, and logistics for registering the 
students. Again, these requirements demand more managerial skills than financial 
resources (Delgado 2006). 
To cite one more example, it is the mayor who decides whether or not to accept 
the free Internet service that the Colombian ministry of communications offers to the 
municipalities.  Like the previous programs, the Internet service is provided after the 
mayor satisfies certain requirements, such as location, advertising, and staff to manage 
the service. The Ministry of Communications, on the other hand, supplies the computers 
(no more than six) and trains the assigned staff.  Surprisingly, in personal conversations 
with officials of the ministry in charge of this program, they revealed to me that many 
mayors reject this service despite the enormous advantages that it provides.  Indeed, as 
recently as mid-2006, from 676 nation-wide municipal offers, 115 had not signed 
agreements to receive the free equipment, either because they did not want them or 
because they are unwilling to assume the logistical requirements that were demanded.59  
In sum, these examples clearly illustrate the key managerial role of the mayor in taking 
full advantage of the variety of resources available to municipalities in order to improve 
the coverage of education in their area. 
                                                 
59
 I thank Hernando Torres Pacheco and Eduardo Rodríguez Garzón, a judicial advisor and a 
communications consultant, respectively, of the Ministry of Communications in Colombia, who provided 
these data. Interview by author, Cali, Colombia. June 28, 2006.     
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The above discussion exemplifies the key role of the mayor in implementing 
programs, justifying once more this dissertation main proposition: Mayoral Qualification 
explain municipal performance. Recall the dissertation’s main hypotheses: 
H1: The higher the mayor’s educational background, the higher the municipal 
performance. 
 
H2: Municipalities whose mayors have had job-related experience have a higher 
performance than those whose mayors do not.  
 
H3: The influence of a mayor’s educational background and job-related 
experience on performance will decrease under certain external and stress-
generating factors. 
 
 Besides these hypotheses, and as mentioned before, scholarship on organizational 
performance offers other political, socio-economic, and demographic explanations, 
which might explain provision of education and health services. Regardless of the 
mayor’s qualifications, they might be potential influences. Therefore, I test these 
competing explanations against the managerial quality proposition.  
Political Explanations of Program Performance 
Political Support 
Leaders without political support are unlikely to perform well.  In the public 
sector, as in no other, political support determines a leader’s effectiveness and power 
(Meier 2000, Fernández 2005, Rainey 1997).  Political support also involves 
intergovernmental networks—another determinant of program performance (Agranoff 
and McGuire 1998, O’Toole and Meier 2004).  Political support, however, may derive 
from above and/or below.  
A. Support from Above: In settings where the acquisition of extra resources 
involves great diligence and negotiation at higher levels, those who enjoy political 
  
110 
 
support at higher levels are likely to be the winners.  Political support from higher-
ranking officials, therefore, may add to performance.  Riccuci (1995), for example, finds 
that successful federal executives exhibit strong support from superiors as well as from 
other key political actors. In school districts, Fernández (2005) also hypothesizes that a 
school board’s support for the superintendent influences school performance. Therefore,  
H4:  Municipalities where the mayor and governor exhibit the same party 
affiliation perform higher than municipalities whose mayor and governor differ 
in party affiliation. 
 
B. Support from Below: A community’s support for programs also adds to 
performance.  When managers lack political support from the community—no matter 
how well designed the programs are—their initiatives are unlikely to succeed.  Doig and 
Hargrove (1990) even claim that successful leadership emerges from constituents’ 
support.  Fernández (2005) and Meier and O’Toole (2002) also include community 
support in their models of performance.  In both studies, the influence of community 
support on performance is statistically significant. At the municipal level, this discussion 
translates into,  
H5: The greater the mayor’s community support, the higher the municipal 
performance. 
 
 
C. Municipal Council Support: Besides community support, the fate of a 
program also depends on partisan support for the mayor in the municipal council.  
Hence, the councilmen either approve or reject the mayor’s budgetary proposal for the 
programs.  We would expect, therefore, that the greater the council’s partisan support for 
the mayor, the more likely his or her budgetary proposals will succeed in the legislative 
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agenda.  Studies of the U.S. Congress and state legislatures confirm greater success in 
the passage of proposals among members of the majority party (Ellickson 1992; Moore 
and Thomas 1991).  At the local level, then, the council’s partisan support for the mayor 
is expected to influence program performance. Therefore, 
H6: The greater the mayor’s council support, the higher the municipal 
performance. 
 
Electoral Competitiveness 
    Other scholars (Key 1949, Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993) suggest that 
program performance, and in turn, public organizational performance is a function of 
electoral competitiveness.  The electoral competitiveness hypothesis suggests that when 
elections are tight, candidates and incumbents have incentives to provide more services 
in order to gain support from many segments of the population (Key 1949).  In other 
words, “[w]here there is little or no competition, parties in power could rest on their 
laurels” (Sharpe and Newton 1984, 180). The rationale of this explanation should even 
apply to those political units that exhibit intra-party rather than inter-party competition—
e.g. when only one party dominates the electoral arena but several factions within that 
party compete with each other.  Although the party competition hypothesis has received 
some support (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993), other quantitative studies of state politics 
in the U.S. conclude that party competition has little or no impact on the delivery of 
programs (Dye 1966).  These inconclusive results call not only for additional tests to 
determine the predictive power of the electoral competitiveness hypothesis, but also for 
tests at the municipal level. 
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H7: The greater the local electoral competitiveness, the higher the program 
performance.   
 
Party Affiliation 
 
The left-right ideological position provides another explanation for 
understanding program and organizational performance.  In 1957, Downs suggested that 
party competition takes place along a left-right ideological spectrum, suggesting that 
political parties are policy seekers, rather than just vote seekers (Strom 1990, Wittman 
1990).  Although some question the validity of this one-dimensional scale, the left-right 
continuum has been used to test several theoretical propositions.  Regarding social 
policies, for example, the debate centers on whether or not parties of the left spend more 
money than parties of the right (Blais et al.1993, Swank 2002, Solano 1983), as greater 
social spending can enhance program performance, at least in terms of widening the 
coverage.  Blais et al. (1993) and Swank (2002) found that parties make a difference 
while Solano (1983) reports no party effect at all.  On program performance and at the 
municipal level, the party affiliation hypothesis states the following: 
H8: The closer the mayor’s party affiliation to the left, the higher local program 
performance. 
 
Oversight Agencies  
 
From the political perspective, scholars offer one more explanation for 
organizational performance: the oversight hypothesis.  This proposition centers on the 
idea that oversight agencies promote accountability both from elected leaders to the 
public and from the bureaucracy to elected officials (Blair 2000).  Van Waarden (1999), 
for instance, finds that the stronger the checks on a policy/program’s activities, the 
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greater the inclination to follow the rules, and therefore the better the performance.  
Multiple oversight mechanisms—elections, the media, civil society, opinion surveys, 
public meetings, political parties, community participation, and formal grievances 
procedures (Blair 2000)—can promote accountability to different degrees.  However, 
they have a mutual objective: to protect citizens’ interests by enhancing leaders’ 
answerability.  The logic of overseeing should apply to both from-above-oversight 
agencies (from national and state level) and from-below-oversight agencies (at the 
community level).  Given that all municipalities respond to the same number of above-
oversight agencies, meaning that there is no variance, I can and will test this hypothesis 
at the community level only.    
H9: The more oversight agencies in a municipality, the higher will be local 
governmental performance. 
 
Demographic and Socioeconomic Explanations 
 
Target Size and Homogeneity: Population and Inequality 
 
A final factor bears mentioning.  Literature on program delivery—the indicator 
of performance in this research—suggests that program performance is a function of the 
program design rather than program implementation (Linder and Peters 1988).  The 
policy design hypothesis, in turn, groups other propositions, which stress coherence, 
context, allocated resources, specificity of sanctions, and the tractability of the policy 
problem. And each of these propositions can independently predict program success.  
Without denying their potential explanatory power, I do not attempt to test them, mainly 
because guidelines of program/policy adopted in local settings in developing countries 
are seldom available because they may have never been formalized.  
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 I, instead, test another proposition from the policy design explanation, the one 
related to the size and nature of the target (Durant and Legge 1993).  The proposition 
centers on the size and homogeneity of the group to be benefited by a policy/program. It 
suggests that the smaller and more homogeneous the target group, the more successful 
the policy implementation, and, thus more output.  The idea behind this thesis is that 
small and homogenous targets reduce the costs of information and classification of the 
beneficiaries increasing the chances for greater coverage of a program.  Homogeneity of 
the target group can be assessed either in terms of the distribution of the population 
(rural and urban) or in terms of the degree of inequality—a socioeconomic factor. In 
other words, if most of the population lives in rural areas, the more difficult it is for the 
local government to reach them. Similarly, high rates of inequality might lead to biases 
in the delivery of programs, favoring those who are not needy.  This description leaves 
us with the following propositions. 
H10: The smaller the municipal population, the higher the local performance. 
 
H11: The greater the percentage of people living in rural areas, the lower the 
local performance. 
 
H12: The greater the municipal inequality, the lower the local performance. 
Data Collection and Variables Operationalization 
 Data collection is the result of field research, which involved visits to the forty 
municipalities of the department of Norte de Santander, interviews with mayors and ex-
mayors, information from mayoral surveys, and copies of governmental documents.  
Data availability limited data collection to a six-year period (2000-2005). Given the 
Colombian mayoral electoral cycle—the period under study covers three mayoral 
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administrations: the last year of the 1997-2000 administration; the three years of the 
2001-2003 administration; and the first two years of the 2004-2007 administration.60  
Unless a municipality had held elections on a day different from the one nationally 
scheduled (usually in October)—due to extraordinary reasons, such as a mayor’s 
death—the mayoral inauguration is on January 1st. The beginning of the mayoral 
administration coinciding with the beginning of the calendar year permits associating the 
annual municipal indicators with a specific mayoral administration.  
Measuring Municipal Performance 
Kellough (2002) and Murphy and Cleveland (1995) note the difficulty of 
assessing performance, particularly in the public sector.  This difficulty derives from the 
fact that most of the measures of performance are perceptual, as they rely on employees’ 
assessment of managers’ performance, and calls for the adoption of objective rather than 
subjective measurements of performance in empirical testing. In addition to this, studies 
in the U.S. heavily concentrate on government spending as an indicator of managerial 
efficiency; this, in turn, also calls for diversification of indicators assessing performance.  
Indeed, Boyne (1998a, 1998b) properly cautions us about using government spending as 
the only proxy of managerial efficiency. Boyne’s notion is that “technical efficiency” 
(the input-output ratio or cost per unit of output) and “allocative efficiency” (the 
responsiveness of output to citizens’ needs and preferences) have different implications 
on efficiency measures.  
                                                 
60
 Recall that since 2004, mayors are elected for a four-year period, in contrast to the former three-year 
period.  
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Because “…no single indicator can capture the complexities of public 
organizational performance in the twenty-first century” (Boyne et al. 2005), in this 
chapter I employ two performance indicators: percentage of coverage of local public 
education and percentage of coverage in identifying the beneficiaries of social programs 
(SISBEN), such as health.61  In other words, from the total number of potential 
beneficiaries of each program, I employ the percentage of people that actually receives 
services. I treat these two programs in a single chapter because of their common nature. 
Indeed, each program delivers a service essential for the human development. These two 
performance indicators, however, are uncorrelated and exhibit different dynamics. 
Education, for instance, is provided at the group level, making this program unlikely to 
be used as an extractor of political interests.  It would require, for example, that mayors 
impose restrictions in the access to public schools, which is not a realistic tactic.  Public 
education coverage then becomes an appropriate indicator to test the effects of 
management quality on local performance, as it is less likely to be exposed to political 
manipulations. The Department Secretary of Health in Cúcuta provided Data for 
SISBEN.  
The coverage of education refers to the percentage of eligible clients who 
actually receive education. The Colombian Ministry of Education employs a standard 
methodology across all the departments (states) and municipalities to calculate the 
coverage of education, which makes the measure consistent across the units.  The 
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 After identification and classification of the beneficiaries, they start receiving health subsidies and 
nutritional supplies. SISBEN traces its origin to 1993, but in 2003 it undertook a major reform to 
guarantee precision in identification and classification. Due to this reform, its measures may not be 
consistent across time, one more reason not to use it as a performance indicator. 
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measure is the result of subtracting the number of people registered in primary and 
secondary schools from the total number of people of school age.62 The Departmental 
Secretary of Education, in Cúcuta, the capital of the department, provided the 
educational data. 
Identification of the beneficiaries of social spending, on the contrary, is a 
program with a lot of room for political manipulations. The Auditor General of 
Colombia, hence, stated that the SISBEN was been employed as a tool to benefit 
political interests (“Contraloría” 2005). Likewise, a Colombian newspaper reported that 
in the 2006 database of beneficiaries, there were 100 dead people registered, who are 
still receiving health subsidies, evidencing the usurpation of identities.  Moreover, in the 
municipal council of Cúcuta—capital of the department under study—the councilmen 
Édgar Díaz denounced the broadening of the coverage of SISBEN exactly one month 
before the congressional elections.  In regard to this, Diaz affirmed, “some have played 
out at poor people because one month before elections some visited the houses of 
potential beneficiaries demanding their vote for a specific candidate in exchange for 
having access to health subsidies” (“Denuncian” 2006, translation by the author).  In 
personal conversations with two councilmen in one of the municipalities of the province 
of Ocaña, they reported that, of the 5000 new beneficiaries expected, the mayor would 
distribute them among the councilmen to ensure the passage of his legislative proposals.  
One of them, however, was disappointed because initially he had been offered 100 
                                                 
62
 Mr. Asdrubal Mendez, officer of the Secretary of Education of Norte de Santander, informed me that the 
indicator of coverage of education does not account for the percentage of students who abandon schools. 
Although a more valid measure should account for that, data on the percentage of dropouts are not 
available for all the years covered in this study.  
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coupons but at the end got just part of them (Anonymous 2005).  Given this potential for 
political manipulations, we should not expect support for the hypothesized relationships 
under this performance indicator.  Insignificance and/or incongruence in its findings 
would reveal the clientelistic nature of its workings.  The Departmental Secretary of 
Health provided the data on the percentage of coverage of the SISBEN. 
Although the study focuses on service delivery, which is associated with the 
dimension of the quantity of output (2002a), the coverage variable is indeed a measure 
of equity.  The equity dimension is one of the sixteen dimensions of performance (Boyne 
2002a), and although it has been addressed in some U.S. studies, it remains limited in 
developing countries (Boyne 2003; Boyne at al. 2005; Forbes and Lynn 2005).  In public 
policy, according to Okun (1975), there is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. The 
competition between these two goals is clearly illustrated by issues of representation in 
the school system.63 As Meier et al. (1999, 5) note: “the U.S. education system has often 
emphasized excellence for the few at the expense of equity for others.”  
Other dimensions, such as quality performance, could also be used as indicators 
of performance. Quality in education, for example, could be operationalized with 
educational test scores.64 In future studies I plan to adopt this indicator. The coverage of 
electricity is another potential indicator, yet in the local Colombian context, this 
indicator would assess the performance of not only the managerial role of the mayor but 
also the performance of both the Departmental Electricity Company and the National 
                                                 
63
 Most of those concerned with minority education use as a starting point the theory of representative 
bureaucracy. 
64
 Although data on the test scores are available for the last three years, data on other variables related to 
education quality—such as number and quality of professors—are not.  
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Fund of Rural Electrification (FAER).65 In other words, it would be an indicator of 
intergovernmental performance rather than municipal performance.  
 Given the previous explanations for the Colombian context, the coverage of 
education seems to be the most appropriate indicator to assess municipal performance.  
Besides being an objective measure, it is consistent across time and units and varies 
across units. However, despite being susceptible to political manipulations, I also 
employ the SISBEN program as a second municipal indicator of performance.  
Measuring Mayoral Qualifications 
The field research collected data on two mayoral qualifications: educational 
background and job-related experience. Data on other mayoral skills, traits, and behavior 
styles were not collected, mainly because they would have been based on subjective 
rather than objective assessments.  In addition, in most of the municipalities, the 
assessment of the administrative staff of the mayor is linked to political affiliations.  I 
was only able to collect additional information for the current mayor (in 2006), such as 
their previous job-sector background, political aspirations, because I had personal 
contact with all of them.  
The mayor’s educational background is one of the two mayoral qualifications 
assessed in this study.66  Where available, I consulted the mayors’ vitae.  But in most of 
the cases, I had to conduct personal visits and interviews in each municipality to collect 
                                                 
65
 Initially, I controlled for electricity coverage as an indicator of municipal development. However, I 
removed it because it can be another measure of performance, which may confound the results.   
66
 Some might suggest that mayors’ educational backgrounds might be systematically biased in those 
municipalities with better access to superior education. But several cases exclude this possibility: for 
example, the current mayor of the capital of the department has only a primary education, while mayors 
from very distant municipalities have university education.  
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this information for the current and former mayors.  I coded answers into eight 
categories: incomplete primary, complete primary, some high school, high school 
diploma, technical/associate degree, some university/ college, bachelor degree, and 
master’s degree. Because the metric difference between each degree is not the same, I 
aggregated these categories into three related dummy variables.  The primary dummy 
includes all the mayors with incomplete or complete primary education. I leave this 
dummy out as the base grouping. In the sample, 10.13% of the mayors are within this 
category.  The secondary dummy includes all the answers indicating an incomplete or 
complete high school education; 36.66% of the mayors are in this category.  The post-
secondary dummy includes all the answers containing any year(s) of post-secondary 
education, including technical or associate degree, or an incomplete college response, 
complete college, and master’s degree; 53.21% of the mayors belong to this group.  
Although a continuous variable for the exact number of education years would have 
been more appropriate, I chose not to do that. As mayors’ vitas were not available, I had 
to rely on verbal talks with ex-mayors and, in most of the cases, with ex-mayors’ 
relatives because either the mayor had passed away or had moved to other city. This 
information was precise on the level of education (primary, secondary or university) but 
not on the specific number of years within each level.  For this reason, I collapsed the 
educational levels into three broad categories. However, I recognize that the educational 
qualifications of someone with only one year of post secondary education are different 
than educational qualifications of a person with a graduate degree. Nevertheless, the 
measurement error on this key explanatory variable is expected to bias its estimated 
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coefficient toward zero (Greene 2003, 85-86), reducing the potential impact of my 
proposition rather than overestimating it.  
Information on previous professional experience is a measure of a mayor’s job-
related experience.  Again, where available, I consulted the mayors’ vitae.  But in most 
of the cases I had to conduct personal visits and interviews in each municipality to 
collect this information.  Mayors, ex-mayors, and ex-mayors’ relatives were asked about 
the mayors’ previous professional experience.  I created three dummy variables that 
group the information. The local dummy received the value of “1” if the mayor had had 
any kind of administrative expertise at the local government— secretary, treasurer, 
councilmen, ex-mayor, etc.—otherwise the value of “0” was assigned (63.18%  in the 
sample). The departmental dummy was coded “1” if the mayor had had any 
administrative expertise at the departmental and/or national level, otherwise “0” (24.88% 
in the sample). The ex-mayor dummy was given “1” for those with previous experience 
as mayor, otherwise “0” (21.62% in the sample).  
Other Measurements 
The external constraint, in this case a stressful situation unrelated to the mayor’s 
job, is expected to interact with education and job-related experience.  The presence of 
both guerrilla and illegal armed groups are obstacles that Colombian mayors have to face 
during their administration.  The presence of these illegal groups represents a tense 
situation for mayors since mayors are often subject to their demands, even threats, if 
their material or financial demands are not met.  According to the United Nations 
Refugee Agency, from 1993 to 2004 Colombian illegal armed groups killed 800 
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officials, including mayors, councilmen, and mayoral candidates. On January 27, 2007, 
seven of the mayors that I interviewed were absent from their municipalities due to 
threats issued by the Front 33 guerillas of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Front of 
Colombia).67 The seven mayors even renounced their positions, but the governor 
declined to accept them on the grounds that illegal pressures motivated them rather than 
their own will (“Alcaldes” 2007).  As a response, the army commander of the region 
activated the Grandfather Plan in order to increase public forces in the municipalities. 
Nevertheless, the absence of the mayor creates interruptions in municipal routines, 
which also affects municipal performance.  
Since illegal armed groups inhabit rural areas, peasants have no option but to 
move to the closest urban municipality.  That, by itself, does not guarantee total security, 
but it does provide more protection.  The number of people displaced by violence who 
migrate to each municipality’s urban area is an indirect measure of the presence of 
illegal group influence in a municipal area.  Rather than using a dummy variable for the 
presence of illegal groups, this continuous measure quantifies the intensity of the tense 
situation.  The values are per year and per municipality, and the staff of the branch of the 
Observatory for Human Rights, located at the governor’s office in the capital of Norte de 
Santander, provided this information. Values ranged from 0 to 14, 327 people (see Table 
4.1 for summary statistics of all variables).  I log this variable to reduce the problem of 
skewed data.  After it is interacted with the mayor’s educational and job-related 
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 They were the mayors of Convención, El Carmen, El Tarra, Hacarí, La Playa, San Calixto, y Teorama.  
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experience, a negative coefficient for these interactions would provide support for the 
hypothesized effect.  
 Electoral competitiveness refers to the difference in the votes of the mayoral 
elections between the winner and the second candidate.  The expectation is that the 
smaller the difference, the better the performance.  A negative coefficient would then 
support this hypothesis.  The values are given in percentages and range from “0” (in a 
particular case, the municipality of Salazar, in which elections results were tied and a  
coin toss determined the elections) to 90%.68  The Registraduría National in Colombia 
provided this information.  The closeness of the competition may also be a reflection
                                                 
68
 In the cases in which there was just a single candidate, I utilized the difference between the winner and 
the blank votes.  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Education Coverage (%) 59.33 13.40 25.64 95.69 
SISBEN Coverage  (%) 42.83 13.71 14.73 81.77 
Primary Education (1=yes, 0= no) 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Secondary Education (1=yes, 0= no) 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Post Secondary Education (1=yes,  0= no) 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Local Experience (1=yes, 0= no) 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Ex-mayor (1=yes, 0= no) 0.21 0.41 0 1 
State/ National Experience (1=yes, 0= no) 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Electoral Competitiveness (%) 19.01 18.51 0 91 
Mayor-Governor Same Partisanship  
(1=yes, 0= no) 
0.46 0.49 0 1 
Population (Thousands) 35,503 107,472 2,768 742,689 
Rural Population (%) 62.51 25.14 2.77 88.41 
Inequality (%) 37.03 10.49 15.73 59.98 
Councilmen Support (%) 54.09 30.10 0 100 
Oversight Agencies (continuous) 62.99 54.11 8 246 
Conservative Party (1=yes, 0= no) 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Other Parties (1=yes, 0= no) 0.42 0.49 0 1 
External Constraint (continuous) 354 1,481 0 14,327 
Budget (millions of pesos) 7,649 27, 379 962 281,543 
Multi-Party System (1=yes, 0= no) 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Two-Party System (1=yes, 0= no) 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Monopoly System (1=yes, 0= no) 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Mayoral Party Alternation (1=yes, 0= no) 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Divided Government (1=yes, 0= no) 0.46 0.49 0 1 
 
of the number of parties involved in the contest. For this reason, I also control for three 
types of party systems: monopoly (the excluded category), two party and multi-party 
systems based on the number of parties involved in the mayoral elections (Boyne 1996 
and Sharpe and Newton 1984).69  
                                                 
69
 Sharpe and Newton (1984, 16) argue that the type of parties involved could also affect the closeness of 
competition because “…competition between two non-class and non-ideological parties…may reflect no 
more than a division of allegiance within an otherwise homogeneous electorate.” In the Colombian 
context, however, due to the proliferation of personalist movements, it is difficult to classify parties based 
on their ideology, and most of them have no party platforms.   
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I operationalize political support with three measures.  To measure support from 
above, I employ a dummy variable equal to “1” when the governor’s party affiliation is 
the same as the mayor’s party affiliation, otherwise “0” is assigned.  In measuring 
support from below, that is, from the community, I employ the same continuous variable 
employed for electoral competitiveness.  But in this case the expectation varies.  That is, 
the greater the difference in votes—from the winner to the second candidate—the better 
the performance.  I recognize that this is a counterhypothesis to electoral 
competitiveness, and a positive and significant coefficient would provide support for this 
hypothesis.  In measuring the councilmen’s support for the mayor, I employ the 
percentage of elected councilmen who are of the same political party as the mayor.  A 
positive and significant coefficient would provide support for the hypothesized 
relationship.  The sectional Norte Santandereana de la Registraduría in Cúcuta supplied 
these data.  
Measuring party affiliation is quite straightforward.  Historically, Colombia 
maintained a two-party system, but in the last two decades dissidents from the traditional 
parties have created many small and new parties, numbering fifty-nine in the past 
congressional elections held in March 2006.  The advent of numerous parties have 
created incentives for personal votes as opposed to party votes, resulting in clientelism 
triumphing over party ideology.  From the sample, 61 cases are Liberal, 136 
Conservative, 41 from small new parties, and 2 from ANAPO—a leftist party.  I created 
three dummy variables, one for each of the two main parties in Colombia—Liberal and 
Conservative—and the Other dummy groups all other parties—the two leftist parties and 
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the newly created parties.  Given the impossibility of classifying the small parties within 
the left-right continuum, I only added the conservative category to the model to compare 
it with the two that excluded/base category, the liberal and other parties.  The 
expectation is that assuming that conservatives spend less on social programs would lead 
to less output.  A negative and significant coefficient for the conservative category will 
then provide support this proposition.  The Registraduría Nacional in Colombia 
provided the information on mayors’ party affiliation. Relating to party ideology, I also 
control for party alternation because according to Sharpe and Newton (1884, 198), “the 
policies of party X ‘live on’ during party Y’s early years of office.”70 Although in many 
of the Colombian municipalities there is a party monopoly (Liberal or Conservative), it 
is still possible to see alternation among the several factions within the parties.   
 I employ the number of Communal Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal) 
per municipality as the measure of oversight agencies; the Secretary of Community 
Development, located at the governorship, provided the data.  Each neighborhood and 
tiny village within a municipality possesses a communal action board, which is expected 
to advocate for its respective community’s interests.  Its values range 8 to 246. In 
personal interviews with some of the municipal ombudsmen, it was found that they felt 
people were apathetic to oversight agencies unless they had personal stakes in the issue.  
In theory, ombudsmen say, every municipal construction project needs to be supervised 
by an oversight agency created for the specific task undertaken.  But, in most of the 
                                                 
70
 Sharpe and Newton (1984, 198) contend “one reason why the full impact of a party may be obscured is 
because some policies take a long time to mature and existing policies are sometimes hard to change 
quickly.” Therefore, in their study they control for four and five previous years.  I question the 
applicability of this notion in the Colombian context, as parties are neither instrumental of majority wishes 
nor inclined to apply party ideology when in the saddle.  
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cases, it is hardly possible to find one overseer; and in general this overseer opposes the 
current administration and acts as a biased blocker rather than an unbiased supervisor.  
Moreover, I excluded the state and national oversight agencies because all the 
municipalities are subject to the same number of agencies, providing no variance across 
them.71  
 The measure for municipality population is straightforward.  The population data 
per year are estimated from the 1993 Colombian census.  I logged population values to 
ease the problem of skewed data. Values range from 2,768 inhabitants in a tiny 
municipality to 742,689 in the capital.  The measure for a rural population is the share of 
the total population living in rural areas, ranging from 3 to 88 percent.  The National 
Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), in Cúcuta, provided these data.  
I draw the measure for inequality from the percentage of the municipal 
population who own any property.  Although the ideal measure would be the GINI 
coefficient, that value is not available at the local level.  My measure, however, is a 
proxy to assess the local socioeconomic disparity, as Latifundium72 —a notable pattern 
of ownership derived from the colonial era—is still present.  Its values range from 15 to 
60 percent.  The Geographic Institute Agustín Codazzi, sectional Norte de Santander, 
provided these data. 
                                                 
71
 In personal interviews with current and former mayors, most of them express discontent with the 
oversight agencies from higher levels, pointing at their intricate demands on procedures and 
documentation. Some mayors even comment on the illegal actions taken by some members of Contraloría 
and Procuduría—the main oversight agencies.  When asked for an opinion about the oversight agencies, 
one mayor responded: “they obstruct the process and favor the mayors who align with the political boss in 
turn.”  On the same issue, another mayor said, “They are just waiting for us to commit any error for them 
to call us to negotiate.”  Another mayor’s answer was “They have not tried to play out with me because 
the monkey knows which tree is the appropriate one to climb up.”  
72
 Large landowners. 
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Control Variables  
Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000) claim that effective management depends on the 
environment within which managers work.  Exogenous factors indeed shape decision-
making, thus influencing output.  The introduction of control variables recognizes the 
influence of these exogenous factors.  In fact, management is just one of the elements of 
a multilevel system to influence performance (Lynn and Forbes 2005). Therefore, I 
control for the annual budget for each municipality, including their own revenues and 
transfers to them from the national government.  Values range roughly from 962 to 
281,543 million Colombian pesos —from approximately $454,545 to $127,974,000, 
with an exchange rate of 2,200 pesos per dollar.  The Departmental Secretary of 
Planning provided these data.73 I also created a dummy variable for divided government: 
“1” for when the mayor’s party is not a majority in the council; otherwise, “0”. The 
Registraduría Nacional, in Colombia, provided the information on mayors’ party 
affiliation.  
                                                 
73
 I would like to control for the municipal level of development, and in doing so, I initially controlled for 
the coverage of electricity per year. Although the coverage of electricity has improved during the last 
decade, in the department of Norte de Santander there is no municipality with 100% coverage, the rural 
areas being the more affected. Controlling for development, however, may confound results because 
although the coverage of electricity is a function of intergovernmental performance, it also involves, 
mayoral action and, in turn, municipal performance. The correlation between coverage of electricity and 
coverage of education is only 0.24; however, I excluded electricity coverage from the model. Their 
inclusion, however, does not alter the results significantly. This measure is given in a percentage and 
ranges from 27 to 97%. The Departmental Electricity Company, in Cúcuta, provided these data. 
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 Methods of Analysis and Models 
As noted before, my data set consists of forty cross-sectional units—the forty 
municipalities of one department (state)—along a time span of six years (2000-2005), 
creating an unbalanced panel.  Given the nature of the data, I ran fixed-effects 
regressions.74  The advantage of this method over regular regressions is that I can control 
for unobserved effects (for example all those time invariant factors that distinguish one 
municipality from another and that are not captured by the independent variables 
included in the model).  The fixed-effect estimators take into account the fact that 
intercepts vary across units, in this case across the municipalities.  In fact, plots of the 
two dependent variables for each municipality over time suggest that intercepts vary 
across units (see figures 4.1 and 4.2).  
In assessing the influence of the mayor’s qualifications on program performance, 
some would argue that there is a need to include a lag of the dependent variable because 
the output of one year might be a function of those of the previous year.  Plots in figure 
1, however, show that there is no trend in the data over time, which allows me to exclude 
the lags of the dependent variables.  I also include dummies for each year to adjust for 
potentially significant year effects, obviating biased estimations. 
                                                 
74
  Another alternative for panel data is to run random effects regressions. However, the random-effects 
estimator makes the assumption that the unobserved effects of the municipalities are uncorrelated with the 
independent variables. The fixed-effects estimator, instead, allows for correlation between the unobserved 
factors of the municipalities and the independent variables.   
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Figure 4.1 Coverage in Public Education per Municipality from 2000 to 2005 
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Figure 4.2 Coverage in Identifying the Beneficiaries of Social Programs per Municipality from 1999 to 2005 
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Results 
Table 4.2 reports the fixed-effect estimates, with Huber-White standard errors, of 
the municipal influences on the coverage of public education.  The influence and 
leverage diagnostics reveal that none of the municipalities overly influences the 
estimations.  Few independent observations (12) are influential, and although they are 
isolated (not aggregated per unit), I excluded them from the analysis.75  It is important to 
mention that the levels of multicollinearity for the population and budget variables are 
slightly high.  Their inclusion, however, is necessary, as they act as control variables.  
Congruent with the expectations, the mayor’s educational background and local 
experience are predictors of municipal performance on public education.  The coefficient 
for post-secondary education, a dummy variable, is positive and significant at the 98% 
level.  Holding everything equal, it indicates that, in explaining education performance, 
the mayors with any year(s) of post secondary education perform statistically differently 
from the mayors who only have a primary education—the base category.  If we assume 
that the interaction term between post-secondary education and stressful situation equals 
0—that is, no presence of illegal armed groups—the main effect of post-secondary 
education can be interpreted directly. In these cases, mayors with any year(s) of post-
secondary education improve the municipal performance in the coverage of education by 
7.5% when compared to the mayors with only a primary education.  Although the 
coefficient on secondary education has the expected positive sign, having secondary 
education is insufficient to improve local educational performance.  
                                                 
75
 Their inclusion, however, does not alter the results significantly.  
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Table 4.2 Fixed-Effect Estimates with Huber-White Standard Errors for 
Coverage of Education 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Errors 
Secondary Education 4.48 3.36 
Post Secondary Education 7.52** 3.13 
Post Secondary* Stressful Situation (1n) 
-1.70** 0.88 
Local Experience 4.04** 1.57 
Local Exp.* Stressful Situation (1n) 
-1.98** 1.02 
Ex-mayor 
-0.64 1.58 
Ex-mayor* Stressful Situation (1n) 
-0.11 1.15 
State and National Experience 0.85 1.33 
Electoral Competitiveness 0.07** 0.03 
Mayor-Governor Same Partisanship 
-0.27 1.73 
Councilmen Support 0.05 0.03 
Oversight Agencies 0.23 0.26 
Conservative Party 
-1.51 1.99 
Population (ln) 
-40.04 38.77 
Rural Population 
-2.58 3.04 
Inequality 
-0.23 0.19 
Stressful Situation (1n) 2.20** 1.06 
Budget (1n) 4.39 2.88 
Multi-Party System 
-0.74 2.56 
Two-Party System 
-1.25 2.24 
Mayoral Party Alternation 0.24 1.71 
Divided Government 
-1.84 2.28 
2001 7.70** 2.61 
2002 9.41** 4.01 
2003 
-0.74 5.11 
2004 7.88 5.89 
2005 6.05 7.48 
Constant 546.24** 280.97 
N: 174 F(27,108): 9.1 Prob. > F .00 
R-sq within group: 63      R-sq between :.07            R-sq overall: .14 
**p<.05;  
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The findings also support the job-related experience hypothesis, although only 
for one out of the three categories.  Having previous experience at the local level, but not 
at the departmental/national or as ex-mayor, has a positive and significant impact on the 
coverage of education.  Again, if we assume that the interaction term between local 
experience and the stressful situation equals 0—that is, no presence of illegal armed 
groups, it is possible to interpret directly the effect of local experience on education 
performance. In these cases, and after holding everything constant, mayors who have 
had any kind of experience at the local level, either as councilmen, treasurer, secretary of 
planning, etc., perform 4.0% percent better than those mayors without it. Having 
previous experience at the departmental and/or national level, however, does not 
improve local performance on education.  The non-influence of departmental expertise 
suggests that the skills acquired at that level do not help performance at the municipal 
level. Finally, and contrary to expectations, the coefficient for “ex-mayors” is 
insignificant and negatively signed. 
As expected, the positive influence that post-secondary education and local 
experience have on education performance decreases under stressful situations.  Results 
reveal that the coefficients for the interaction between stressful situation – post-
secondary education and stressful situation- local experience are negative and 
significant at the 95%.  Recall that the external constraint is operationalized as the 
number of people forcefully displaced from the rural to the urban area of each 
municipality, which is a proxy for the presence of illegal armed groups. It is a logged 
transformed variable.  Therefore, for every one percent increase in the number of people 
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who forcefully migrate from rural areas to an urban area, the positive impact that post-
secondary education has on coverage of education (7.5%) also tends to decrease by 
almost 0.02% (-1.70/100).  Likewise, the positive impact that local experience has on 
coverage of education (4%) tends to decrease by roughly 0.02% (-1.98/100). Although 
the negative effect is small, it shows that under stressful situations or external constraints 
(guerrilla presence), the positive influence of the mayoral qualifications decreases. 
Results, therefore, support the external constraints (stressful situation) hypothesis. To 
illustrate the moderating impact of stressful situations on mayoral qualifications see 
Figure 4.3 and 4.4.  
As figure 4.3 shows, holding everything constant, when not a single person (0) 
migrates from the municipal rural to the urban area, the impact of mayors’ post 
secondary education on education coverage increases 7.5% relative to what mayors with 
primary education achieve. However, when 10 people migrate from the rural to the 
urban area because of violence generated by illegal armed groups’ presence, the 
education coverage tends to decrease 1% (moves from 7.5 % to roughly 6.0% in the 
figure 4.3). And when 12,413 migrate from the rural to the urban area (the maximum 
value in the sample), the education coverage tends to decrease approximately 6.5% 
(moves from 7.5 to 1%).   
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Figure 4.3 Marginal Effect of Mayoral Post Secondary Education on Education 
Coverage as the Stressful Situation Varies 
 
  
 
Likewise, Figure 4.4 shows—holding everything constant—when not a single 
person (0) migrates from the municipal rural to the urban area, the impact of mayors’ 
local experience on education coverage increases 4.0% relative to what mayors without 
local experience achieve. However, when 10 people migrate from the rural to the urban 
area because of violence generated by illegal armed presence, the education coverage 
tends to decrease 2% (moves from 4 % to roughly 2% in the figure 4.3); and when 
12,413 migrate from the rural to the urban area (the maximum value in the sample), the 
education coverage tends to decrease around 8 % (moves from 4 to roughly - 4%).   
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Figure 4.4 Marginal Effect of Mayoral Local Experience on Education Coverage as 
the Stressful Situation Varies 
 
 
Moreover, two of the institutional political variables are statistically significant. 
The estimated coefficient for electoral competitiveness is positive and statistically 
significant at the 97% level. Its positive sign, however, contradicts the electoral 
competitiveness hypothesis because what this suggests is that the greater the electoral 
difference, the better the municipal performance.  From the political support variables, 
neither partisan support from councilmen nor from the governor is statistically 
significant.  However, the estimated coefficient for community support (which is the 
same as the electoral competitiveness variable) is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that the greater the electoral support, the better the municipal performance.   
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In addition, the estimated coefficient for oversight agencies is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that they have no impact on municipal performance. Neither 
party ideology, nor the type of party system, nor party control alternation influences 
municipal performance. That is, mayors affiliated to the conservative party do not 
perform statistically different from mayors of all other parties (the baseline category).  
Moreover, municipalities with multi-party or two-party system do not perform 
statistically differently from municipalities with a single party system.  
At first glimpse, one would be surprised by the positive and significant 
coefficient for the stressful situation, as it indicates that the presence of illegal armed 
groups has an additive effect on education performance.  However, after adding all the 
interactive effects to this additive effect [(-1.70) + (-1.98) + (-0.11) + (2.20)], the 
resulting effect of external constraints on performance is negative (-1.59).  It suggests 
that for every one-percent increase in the number of people who forcefully migrate from 
rural areas to urban area, the coverage of education decreases 0.02% (2.4/100).  
Finally, the demographic variables are not systematically associated with 
program performance.  The coefficients for population (a log transformed variable) and 
rural population are insignificant. Likewise, the coefficient for the socioeconomic 
measure of inequality and budget are statistically insignificant.  Among the time 
dummies, the years 2001 and 2002 are statistically different from the year 2000—the 
baseline category.  With 165 observations, the model explains 65% of the variance of 
education performance within each municipality.  
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Table 4.3 Fixed-Effect Estimates with Huber-White Standard Errors for Coverage 
of SISBEN 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Errors 
Secondary Education 4.63** 1.32 
Post Secondary Education 2.10 1.36 
Post Secondary* Stressful Situation n) .41 .70 
Local Experience 1.22 1.07 
Local Exp.* Stressful Situation (1n) 1.77** .74 
Ex-mayor 1.17 1.03 
Ex-mayor* Stressful Situation (1n) .54 .67 
State and National Experience .27 .91 
Electoral Competitiveness 
-.01 .02 
Mayor-Governor Same Partisanship 3.81 2.33 
Councilmen Support 
-.02 .03 
Oversight Agencies 
-.35 1.90 
Conservative Party 
-.34 1.88 
Population (1n) 93.77** 32.97 
Rural Population 
-4.90** 2.51 
Inequality .03 .08 
Stressful Situation (1n) 
-1.53 .76 
Budget (1n) 
-1.33 1.66 
Multi-Party System 
-.02 2.22 
Two-Party System 4.00** 1.77 
Mayoral Party Alternation .09 .78 
Divided Government 3.68* 1.96 
2001 
-4.17** 1.70 
2002 
-3.50 2.63 
2003 
-4.44 3.47 
2004 
-1.70 4.71 
2005 3.17 5.76 
Constant 511.61** 211.89 
N: 174 F (27, 102): 27.52  Prob. >F: 0.00 
R-sq within: .78; R-sq between: .34 R-sq overall: .31 
** p < .05;   * p < .10   
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Table 4.3 presents the fixed-effect estimates, with Huber-White standard errors, 
of the municipal influences on the coverage in identifying the beneficiaries of social 
programs (called SISBEN program).  As was previously mentioned, this program has a 
lot of room for political manipulation and patronage. Therefore, other mechanisms—
besides mayoral qualifications—may influence local performance in this policy area.  
The results, in fact, provide no support for the hypothesized relationships, and the 
few statistically significant coefficients are oppositely signed.  For instance, the 
coefficient on secondary education is statistically significant at the 99% level; however, 
the coefficient on post-secondary education fails to be statistically significant. 
Specifically, in municipalities whose mayors have secondary education perform 4.63 % 
better in terms of the SISBEN program than municipalities in whose mayors have only 
primary education (the excluded category). However, after looking at all the coefficients 
on educational background, the results contradict, to a certain extent, the mayoral  
qualifications thesis, as increases in mayoral educational (for example from secondary to 
post-secondary education) background  do not improve performance of the SISBEN 
program. Moreover, the coefficient on local experience fails to reach significance and 
has the opposite expected sign.  Likewise, the coefficient on exmayor although with an 
expected positive sign also fails to reach significance.  On the contrary, the coefficient 
on the interactive term local experience-stressful situation reaches significance at the 
98% level but has the opposite expected sign. That is, instead or reducing the positive 
influence that mayoral local experience has on performance, it increases its effect. 
Again, it contradicts the expectations and the results of education performance.  
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 None of the political support hypotheses is supported, as the coefficients on 
governor-mayor same partisanship, councilmen support, and community support (which 
is the same coefficient on electoral competitiveness but with an expected positive sign) 
are insignificant.  Meanwhile, the demographic variables, total population and rural 
population, are statistically significant at the 99% and 95% level respectively.  For every 
one-percent increase in the total population, the coverage of SISBEN increases by 
almost 1% (93.77/100).  This goes against the hypothesized relation, which proposes that 
the smaller the target, the greater the coverage of the program.  On rural population, the 
results are in line with the expectations, as for every one-percent of increase in rural 
population, the coverage of SISBEN tends to drop 4.9%, suggesting the difficulty of 
reaching rural dwellers. 
Among the institutional variables, two reach significance, oversight agencies (at 
the 93% level) and two-party system (at the 97% level). Specifically, as the number of 
oversight agencies increases by one, the coverage of SISBEN program decreases by .35 
%, which is opposite from the expectations. And in municipalities with two-party 
system, the coverage of SISBEN program increased 4% when compared with 
municipalities with a single party system (the excluded category). Finally, the control 
variable—municipal budget—has no influence on program performance, which is also 
contradictory. Among the time dummies, only year 2001, is statistically different from 
year 2000—the baseline category.  With 166 observations, the model explains 78% of 
variance on coverage of SISBEN within the municipalities.  
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Discussion and Conclusions 
This study provides partial empirical support for the proposition that mayoral 
qualifications, a proxy for local managerial quality, positively influence municipal 
performance. The findings are in tune with works that assess the impact of managerial 
influence on the performance of U.S. school districts (Fernández 2005; Meier and 
O’Toole 2002).  Although my research employs two indicators of local program 
performance—education coverage and coverage in identifying the beneficiaries of social 
spending (SISBEN)—the findings provide strong evidence for the mayoral qualifications 
hypotheses for education coverage and partial support for SISBEN program. As 
mentioned before, and as public officials’ statements suggest, the nature of the SISBEN 
program makes it highly attractive to political manipulation and patronage, explaining, 
in part, the contradictory results.  
Of the two mayoral qualifications evaluated in this article—educational 
background and job-related experience—education has the greatest influence.  After 
holding everything constant, in municipalities whose mayors have any post-secondary 
education, the education coverage increased 7.5% when compared with those localities 
whose mayors only have a primary education and without presence of illegal armed 
groups. In other words, the more education the mayor has the more s/he recognizes the 
benefits that education brings by supporting, encouraging, and implementing more 
programs to increase coverage of education.  These findings are relevant to any setting in 
which implementation of education is decentralized. In the of Colombia, where the 
recent 2005 census reported that 3,546,893 Colombians can neither write nor read—8.6 
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percent of the total population—placing Colombia behind Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, 
which have been more successful in eradicating illiteracy (“El Dane” 2006)76 –findings 
suggest that with qualified mayors, we may see improvements.    
Mayoral job-related experience also influences municipal performance.  The 
positive impact of job-related experience on municipal performance is, however, 
confined to local, non-executive experience, such as having being a councilmen, 
treasurer, ombudsman, secretary of planning, head of department, etc.  Contrary to 
expectations, being an ex-mayor has no impact on municipal performance.  It may be, as 
Boyne et al. (2005) claim, that managerial influence impacts long term, but not short-
term performance. It could also be that non-immediate reelection, in addition to the 
constant change of administrative procedures, neutralizes the managerial skills learned in 
the former experience. In other words, because there is no continuity, the executive skills 
acquired in a past term may not benefit the mayor in the second term, as s/he has to go 
through an updating process, which although not as intensive as the first time, it still 
requires great assimilation of information.  In fact, when asked for what they would 
change to ease the beginning of their administration, fifteen out of the forty current 
mayors referred to “the constant changes in procedures and the excessive documentation 
that the departmental oversight agencies impose.”  Finally, experience at the 
departmental and/or national level has no influence on local program performance.  It 
suggests that the kind of expertise acquired at these levels is not relevant at the local 
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 There was a slight improvement when compared with the values of the 1993 census, in which the 
percentage of illiteracy was 9.3.  
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level.  It could also suggest that this type of experience contributes to other dimensions 
of performance, as Pitts (2005) notes, managerial quality matters for some dimensions of 
performance but not all. Despite the statistical support for mayoral qualifications, it is 
important to note that mayoral qualifications measures may tap mayors’ preferences for 
education at least as much as quality.  Additional research, including alternative 
qualifications measures, would provide some light on this.   
As expected, under external constraints, the positive influence that mayoral 
qualifications have on municipal education performance decreases.  Specifically, the 
presence of illegal armed groups, including guerrillas, reduces the positive impact that 
local experience and post-secondary education have on program performance.  These 
findings support Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill’s (2000) claim that effective management is 
contingent on the environment within which managers work.  Moreover, contrary to 
what scholarship suggests, electoral competitiveness has no impact on program 
performance. Local oversight agencies, instead, do positively influence program 
performance. Unfortunately, in the Colombian context, apathy toward creating oversight 
agencies undercuts their potential impact. In interviews with some of the municipal 
ombudsmen, one of their major complaints was the lack of people’s involvement, 
revealing that one of the fundamental mechanisms for a functional democracy is missing 
in Colombia.  When I asked some ombudsmen the reasons for this lack of involvement, 
their responses included lack of time, distrust of the government, fear of reprisals, as 
well as limited concern for political issues due to their daily struggle for survival.  
  
145 
 
Neither party ideology nor party system type (two-party or multi-party) has any 
influence on municipal performance. Among the possible explanations might be the 
absence of a clear ideology, lack of party discipline, and the advent of new parties, 
which numbered fifty-nine in the 2006 elections. Indeed, party fragmentation creates 
incentives for personal rather than ideological votes, indicating that clientelism may 
triumph over party ideology.   
Contrary to expectations, mayoral partisan support in the city council has no 
influence on program performance. This suggests two things: (a) mayors do not need 
councilmen’s support to pass and implement their proposals, and (b) whatever the 
councilmen’s party affiliation, mayors may resort to other dynamics to get their 
proposals approved. Indeed, the dynamics between some mayors and councilmen may 
be questionable because testimonies from some councilmen reveal that sometimes 
mayors offer benefits to councilmen in exchange for their support in the legislative arena 
(from an anonymous interview). Like councilmen’s support, and contrary to 
expectations, a governor’s partisan support has no influence on municipal performance, 
at least in education.  Support from the governor, for example, might be relevant for 
development of programs in the transportation sector where political influence at higher 
levels can generate extra resources. Finally, the greater the electoral support, the better 
the education performance, suggesting that mayors are responsive to the electorate. 
Demographic factors—rural and total population—have no impact on education 
coverage.  This is good news for Colombian municipalities where, on average, sixty-two 
percent of their population inhabits rural areas.  The insignificant impact of the measure 
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for inequality on municipal performance suggests that there is no unequal access to 
education at the municipal level. This news is good for Colombians, who exhibit the 
second highest level of social inequality within the region, surpassed only by Brazil (De 
Ferrati et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the nature of the program might also explain these 
findings because the provision of education is at the group level rather than at the 
individual level.  Finally, having access to large budgets increases the coverage of 
education.  
This analysis of Colombian municipalities presents the first undertaking of an 
empirical study on the impact of managerial quality on municipal performance in a 
developing country.  This project has also explored the applicability of theories 
developed in the U.S. when transferred to the Latin American context, demonstrating 
that context, indeed, matters.  In developing countries, decentralization has brought 
many responsibilities to local governments, but it has not been followed by prescriptions 
to perform well.  By identifying the mechanisms that boost program performance, 
municipalities may adopt them to accomplish the most with their scarce resources.  
Although my research provides evidence for the managerial quality thesis for only one 
performance indicator, the findings demonstrate that the mayor’s educational attainment 
and job-related experience positively influence performance.  If the Colombians learn 
that the intellectual tools of elected mayors influence their human capital through 
education, it becomes possible for voters to choose their mayors based on a candidate’s 
qualifications rather than a candidate’s offer of private goods.  That is a sparkling light 
on the horizon.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
MUNICIPAL FISCAL PERFORMANCE: DO MAYORAL QUALIFICATIONS 
MATTER? 
 
Introduction 
There exist several dimensions of municipal performance. Indeed, chapter IV 
presented the determinants of municipal performance in terms of education. This chapter 
addresses another dimension of performance, presenting the first empirical study in a 
Latin American country of the effect of managerial quality upon municipal fiscal 
performance.  Using five years of data from 40 Colombian municipalities, I assess the 
influence of managerial quality—operatilonalized with mayoral qualifications: 
educational background and job-related experience—on four municipal financial 
indicators: expenditures/per capita, social investment, operational costs, and tax property 
collection. After considering other political, economic, demographic, and external 
influences, my findings reveal that mayoral education level is positively associated 
between municipal social investment and property tax collection. There is no 
association, however, with expenditures and operational costs. These results may be 
explained on the grounds that low or high spending, by itself, tells us little about 
performance unless it is linked to service quality and/or quantity.  This study offers 
implications for countries struggling to improve their local fiscal performance, as they 
seek to achieve the most with their scarce resources. 
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In the most decentralized Latin American countries, between 40 and 50 percent 
of all government spending occurs at the sub-national level.  Through this fiscal 
decentralization, municipalities become shapers of the national fiscal balance. Indeed, 
when faced with fiscal and macroeconomic instability, central governments blame 
municipalities for their failure to adjust fiscally.  However, poor fiscal performance of 
the municipalities is, in part, due to the lack of guidelines for achieving better results, 
and the lack of direction derives from the inconclusiveness of what influences local 
fiscal performance. This suggests the need to identify the determining factors of 
municipal fiscal performance. 
Although several studies address the determinants of fiscal performance (see 
Alesina and Perotti 1995 for a survey), most of them concentrate on either cross-national 
analyses of developed countries (von Hagen 1992) or cross-sectional analyses of the US 
states (Calcagno and Escaleras 2007; Clingermayer and Wood 1995; Poterba 1994).  
Some studies have also examined the determinants of fiscal performance in developing 
countries (Alesina et al. 1999; Amorim-Neto et al. 2001; Mejía Acosta and Copeddge 
2001), yet few have explored sub-national governments. Jones et al.’s (2000) and 
Rumi’s (2003) works of the Argentine provinces are some of the exceptions. It reveals 
that although a great deal of government spending occurs at the developing local level, 
systematic studies of local fiscal performance have been neglected.   
Neglecting developing local governments is not the only gap within public 
finance scholarship—it has also ignored a potential explanation. The existing 
explanations for fiscal performance fit into three categories. Among the political 
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explanations, some scholars refer to partisan support, party alternation, divided 
government, electoral cycle, electoral laws, and type of government.77 Other scholars 
focus on budgetary institutions such as balance restrictions, budget procedures, and tax 
and expenditure limitations.  Finally, most of the studies also include economic 
explanations: growth, recessions, productivity, etc. Yet no study has explored the role of 
the manager on the organization’s fiscal performance. Specifically, the impact of 
managerial quality on fiscal performance has been neglected. To contribute to the 
research of these neglected areas, this chapter explores the impact of public managerial 
quality on fiscal performance.  This research extends the scope of the public 
management thesis beyond service delivery toward the dimension of fiscal efficiency 
and moves from developed settings to the developing municipal level.   
 Section II presents the literature that leads to both my main hypotheses and the 
competing ones. Section III depicts the public finances of the Colombian municipalities 
and introduces the indicators that assess fiscal performance.  Section IV describes the 
research design, data, and methodology.  Finally, section V presents the empirical 
analysis and discusses the results.  
Managerial Quality and Budgetary Performance 
As stated in chapter II, and to follow Gulick (1937), management implies 
planning, organizing, directing, staffing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting 
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 Single party government, minimal winning coalition, surplus coalition, single party minority 
government, multi party minority government, caretaker government (Woldendorp et al. 1993). 
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(PODSCORB). Although “[b]udgeting is a subset of management” (Schick 2003, 22), 
the influence of managerial quality on budgeting performance has been unexplored.   
Budgeting is understood as the “…process for systematically relating the expenditures of 
funds to the accomplishment of planned objectives” (Schick 1966, 244).  In 
policymaking, it specifies the goals and the means for achieving the established 
objectives, thus determining what will get accomplished. Budgeting indeed affects every 
aspect of the organization even it is considered the “single most important document of 
an organization” (Beam 2001, 105).  
Several actors participate in the budgeting process, each with different power and 
multiple motivations. Yet these actors do not negotiate “with one another in a free-for-
all” because in the end “…outcomes depend on … individual strategies” (Rubin 2000, 
33).  It is exemplified in developing local settings where despite several actors 
(councilmen) participate and authorize budgeting process; the final budget is the result 
of the mayor’s strategies.  The mayors are the ones who design and propose the budget, 
and they resort to several strategies to get their budget proposal through. Mayoral 
strategies may include looking upward for extra resources, outward for budgetary 
community support, and downward for employees’ and the council’s support.  In fact, 
under either of the views of new managerialism: “let mayors manage”—with freedom to 
act—or “make mayors manage”—accountable to the legislators—the mayor will always 
be considered responsible for the overall financial health of the municipality while the 
individual legislator is not (Bovaird and Hughes, 1995, 357; Kettl, 1997, 448).   
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Given the huge implications that municipal budgeting has for community 
development, the qualifications of the one who designs the budget should play an 
important role in determining the financial health of the municipality. A mayor’s 
qualifications, for instance, may indicate how well she or he will perform budget-
making.  Piekkola (2006), for example, contends that the total factor of productivity of 
an employee depends on his or her level of human capital. Becker (1964) and Jorgenson 
et al. (1987) have also intensively studied the contributions to productivity and 
performance derived from human capital.   
According to Abowd et al. (2002), human capital contributes to productivity and 
performance in two ways: directly and indirectly. Directly, a mayor’s human capital 
allows him to deal with the technical parts of budgeting.  The technical part of fiscal 
performance entails well-timed decisions, prevention of overspending, realistic 
assessments of the economy, conformity with balance requirements, accurate estimates 
of expenditures and revenues, and appropriate allocations to get the objectives 
accomplished (Rubin  1998, 2000).  Indirectly, a mayor’s human capital allows him to 
complement organizational fiscal practices by introducing administrative and managerial 
arrangements that favor the attainment of objectives.  The selection of arrangements, in 
turn, may be a function of the mayor’s human capital.  
The following cases exemplify some of the indirect contributions of a mayor’s 
human capital to performance. The mayor of the Colombian municipality of Toledo        
(Norte de Santander, Colombia), the lawyer Carlos Omar Delgado, encouraged citizens 
to pay their property taxes on time by having a drawing for a car among those who did 
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so.  Mayor Delgado mentioned that thanks to this strategy, municipal revenues have 
greatly increased.78   In another example, the mayor of the Colombian municipality of 
Nobsa (Cundinamarca, Colombia)—a public administrator with ten years of experience 
in the public sector who has won national first place for efficiency for two consecutive 
years—opts for offering considerable discounts for prompt tax payments. He also 
encourages employees to utilize aggressive strategies to compel people to pay, such as 
regular domicile visits, personal calls, and mail alerts (Rodriguez 2006), all of which 
have contributed to better fiscal performance. The above discussion brings up this 
dissertation’s main hypotheses, 
H1: The higher the mayor’s educational background, the higher the 
municipality’s fiscal performance. 
 
H2: Municipalities whose mayors have job-related experience have higher fiscal 
performance than those whose mayors do not. 
 
But budget outcomes also depend on the external constraints. Even  “[i]ndividual 
strategies have to be framed in a broader context than simply perceived self-interest” 
(Rubin 2000, 34). Climate, geographic, demographic, and external factors can affect 
fiscal outcomes because the bulk of a budget might be diverted to address a specific 
event (Rubin 2000).  Moreover, in some municipal contexts, external actors impose 
financial demands on a mayor, thus, undermining the municipality’s fiscal performance.  
This is exemplified in the Colombian municipal context, where an ex-mayor reported the 
following: “when I was mayor, 20 percent of my municipality’s budget had to be 
distributed between the two illegal groups (guerrilla movements and self-defense 
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 Interview with author, Cúcuta, Norte de Santander, Colombia.January 15, 2006. 
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groups) that inhabited in the rural area.  If I did not concede to their demands, I knew 
that my life was in danger” (Anonymous interview, 2005).  Therefore,  
H3: The influence of a mayor’s educational background and job-related 
experience on fiscal performance will decrease under external constraints.  
 
In the US context, scholars offer alternative explanations to fiscal performance, 
most of which refer to political institutions.  In this study, I test my main proposition—
managerial quality—against these alternative propositions to identify the explanation(s) 
for fiscal performance. The next section addresses them and derives their respective 
hypotheses.  
Political Explanations 
Electoral Cycles 
Some scholars claim that fiscal performance varies systematically across years. 
According to the Inter-American Development Bank’s 1997 report, Latin American 
countries exhibit electoral budgetary cycles because deficits tend to grow before 
elections, forcing costly adjustments in the following year.  The rationality for this 
overspending is that in election years politicians follow either expansionary or tax 
reduction polices motivated by voters ”rewards,” as citizens fail to understand that 
excessiveness in the present will be paid for by post-electoral recessions (Ames 1987). 
This proposition was originally created by the public choice school under the “fiscal 
illusion” approach (Buchanan and Tullok 1962), and then framed by Nordhaus (1975) 
into the “political business cycle” model.  
The main critique for the “electoral cycle” thesis comes from Rosemberg (1992), 
who argues that voters are neither so myopic nor irrational so as to never realize the 
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future consequences of the current overspending.  Rosemberg also disagrees with this 
thesis on the grounds that politicians do not always know the odds of being reelected, so 
they are cautious about spending in order to build a reputation that will benefit them on a 
job search in the private sector.79 Evidence for the electoral cycle thesis is inconclusive. 
While Mejia and Coppedge (2001) find no support for the electoral cycle across six 
Latin American countries, Jones et al.’s (2000) study reports that during gubernatorial 
election years there is greater spending in the Argentine provinces.  In the Colombian 
local context, mayors have little incentive to follow fiscal discipline during the electoral 
years because they cannot run for immediate reelection.80 That is, a budget deficit after 
election years would be someone else’s problem. Therefore,  
H4: Municipal expenditures per capita will be higher in mayoral election years 
than in other years. 
  
Number of Parties 
 
One of the most classic contributions to the study of fiscal performance is the 
‘common pool problem’ (Weingast et al. 1981). This proposition explains the 
relationship between the number of decision makers and the size of the government 
expenditure. The idea behind this proposition is that the larger the number of players 
participating in the budgeting process, the greater the total expenditure because the 
transaction costs increase. The more players, the more the need for redistribution and 
allocation of the fiscal resources as the involved players internalize the benefits of the 
                                                 
79
 The ‘electoral cycle’ thesis has also been neutralized by the intergenerational redistribution thesis—the 
Ricardian equivalence (Barro 1974)—that argues that because the generation of today cares about the 
generation of tomorrow, there is room for intergenerational altruism. 
80
 Yet mayors may run for re-election after being out of the executive office for one term. 
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expenditures, but they are unable to internalize the costs imposed on the whole economy 
(Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002). 
For instance, “a president with a smaller party contingent or facing many 
legislative parties would have to compromise and distribute patronage and pork among 
the opposition in order to gather a legislative majority willing to pass her budget 
proposal”(Mejia Acosta and Coppedge 2001:5; see also Amorim-Neto 1998). On the 
other hand, when the number of parties decreases, the number of players to distribute 
patronage decreases, too, which reduces expenditures (Haggard and Kaufmann 1995; 
Petrei 1998). In a study across Latin American countries, Stein et al. (1998) found that a 
greater number of parties lead to more government spending, thus confirming the 
common pool proposition. Given that in Latin America the municipal council elections 
are partisan, the following is the testable version of this thesis:  
H5: The greater the number of parties represented in the municipal council, the 
greater the municipal expenditures.  
 
Political Support 
Another explanation for fiscal performance focuses on the citizen support for 
politicians. As Rubin (2000, 33) puts it, “[p]ublic budgeting is both technical and 
political.” While the technical part includes the tasks directly related to the budgeting 
process, the political concerns include, among other things, obtaining sufficient citizen 
support to be able to spend more without being thrown out of office (Rubin 2000). When 
leaders enjoy enough support, they might feel unrestricted in their spending.  With less 
citizen support, leaders are more likely to be cautious when spending, as they are more 
likely to be scrutinized.  Some may argue the opposite by saying that with less political 
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support, leaders are more likely to spend to persuade the voters.  However, in settings 
where there is no immediate reelection, that would not be the case because once in 
office, leaders have no incentive to attract more supporters. That is,  
H6a: The greater a mayor’s citizen support, the higher a municipality’s 
expenditures. 
 
Political support from higher levels may also contribute to fiscal performance. In 
settings where the acquisition of extra financial resources involves great diligence and 
negotiation at higher levels, those who enjoy political support from higher officials are 
more likely to get a large piece of the pie. Mayors, for example, may overspend after 
receiving additional funds from a governor of their party. Therefore,   
H6b: Municipalities where the mayor and governor are from the same party will 
spend more than municipalities whose mayor and governor differ in party 
affiliation. 
 
Government Ideology  
Other veins of literature suggest that fiscal performance is a function of the 
ideology of the government in power. The “government ideology thesis” builds on the 
idea that parties are not only vote seekers but also office and policy seekers (Petry 1982). 
Liberals prefer high spending and high taxes while Conservatives prefer low spending 
and low taxes. Studies report evidence for this thesis at the state and national level. Alt 
and Lowry (1994), who studied the fiscal performance of the US states, demonstrated 
that party affiliation influenced fiscal performance. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1997) 
provided cross-national evidence for the Liberal and Conservative preferences, too. 
Therefore,  
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H7a: Municipalities headed by Conservative mayors have lower spending than 
municipalities whose mayors are not Conservative.  
 
H7b: Municipalities headed by Conservative mayors have lower property tax 
collection than municipalities whose mayors are not Conservative.  
 
H7c: Municipalities headed by Conservative mayors have lower social 
investment than municipalities whose mayors are not Conservative. 
 
Party Alternation 
Recent literature claims that fiscal performance is also a function of party 
alternation in the executive office. The “party alternation thesis” suggests that if 
executive office “changes his party frequently, it creates instability that weakens fiscal 
performance (Calcagno and Escaleras (2007, see also Rumi 2003). Instability as 
measured by the alternation of party in government, leads to increased spending. Rumi 
(2003) explores the impact of gubernatorial party alternation on fiscal performance for 
the provinces in Argentina. Rumi finds support for the party alternation hypothesis, as 
Calcagno and Escaleras (2007) do for the U.S states. Therefore,  
H8: Municipalities that exhibit government party alternation will have higher 
spending than those without government party alternation.  
 
Legislative Oversight 
Across countries, the role of the legislature in budgeting varies, as it depends on 
constitutional provisions, the institutional arrangements of the different branches, and 
the division of authority among local, state, and national governments (Dubrow 1999).  
No matter the extent of its power, legislative oversight is one of the institutions of 
horizontal accountability (O’Donnell 1998).  The oversight of the legislature in 
budgeting is expected to curb corruption, avoid overspending, strengthen government 
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accountability (OECD 2002), and counterbalance executive discretion in budgeting 
(Santiso and Belgrano 2004).  
In overseeing the budgeting process, legislatures may use several mechanisms to 
enforce different modes of accountability. For instance, they may demand pre-budget 
reports to enforce ex-ante accountability, require mid-year and monthly reports to 
enforce concurrent accountability, and/or supervise results to enforce ex-post 
accountability (Santiso and Belgrano 2004, 48).81  Yet the legislature oversight function 
may decrease when the partisan support of the executive at the legislative level increases 
because as the policy positions converge, the checks on the executive’s proposals tend to 
decrease.82 And the absence of an effective enforcement agency may encourage 
politicians to hide the true volume of public spending (Schick 2003).83 Therefore,  
H9:
 
The greater a mayor’s council support, the higher the municipal spending. 
Divided Government  
Another vein of scholarship argues that when the executive faces a polarized 
legislature, fiscal discipline becomes poorer. In other words, when the executive’s policy 
position is significantly different from that of the mean legislator, it becomes more 
                                                 
81
 Legislatures also may require user-friendly reports for those legislators without sufficient educational 
background, or ask for resources to hire advisors in budgetary issues (OECD 1998). 
82
 It may be conditioned on the executive’s party discipline, but party discipline in the Colombian party 
system is very weak (Moreno 2005).   
83
 I exclude oversight agencies from above because all the municipalities are subject to the same state and 
national agencies. Moreover, in personal interviews with current and former mayors, most of them express 
discontent with the oversight agencies from higher levels, pointing at their intricate demands on 
procedures and documentation. Some mayors even comment on the illegal actions taken by some 
members of the Contraloría and the Procuduría—the main oversight agencies.  When asked for an 
opinion about the oversight agencies, one mayor responded: “they obstruct the process and favor the 
mayors who align with the political boss in turn.”  On the same issue, another mayor said, “they are just 
waiting for you to commit any error for them to call us to negotiate.”  Another mayor’s answer was “they 
have not tried to play with me because the monkey knows which tree is the appropriate one to climb up.” 
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difficult to build consensus around the executive’s budget proposal (Amorim-Neto 
1998).  And delays in the approval of the executive’s proposals, in turn, lead to 
suboptimal outcomes. Fiscal discipline, thus, is poorer under a divided rather than a 
unified government. On this issue, evidence is ambiguous.  Clingermayer and Wood 
(1995) find no support for the relationship between divided government and debt—as a 
result of overspending—while Alt and Lowry (1994) and Poterba (1994) find that 
unified governments react faster to budget shocks than do divided governments.84 In 
divided local governments, then, mayors may face more obstacles to get the budget 
passed through the legislature, affecting fiscal performance.  
H10: Municipalities with divided government will have higher spending than 
municipalities where there is unified government.  
 
Interest Groups 
The literature presents one final political explanation for understanding fiscal 
performance.  According to Rubin (2000), interest groups play a huge role in some 
stages of the budgeting process.  The “[b]udget,” however, “would break down if 
government gave too many groups a seat at the table” (Schick 2003, 18).  As a strategy, 
then, governments may decide to slice the budget to give each group a little to come 
away with something (Schick 2003).  In the struggle for something, interest groups 
bargain to get more power over budgetary choices. From this bargaining process, budget 
makers decide what policy issues to fund, as each policy varies on budget requirements. 
                                                 
84
 The opposition may be due—as Clingermayer and Wood (1995) note—to the fact that the prior 
literature primarily studies budget shocks and adjustment as opposed to debt or deficit.  
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At the municipal level, the bargaining is between local producers’ organizations and 
other boards as they try to get their favored policy funded.  As a result: 
H11: The more municipal interest groups, the higher will be the municipal 
spending.  
 
Socio-Demographic Factors 
Besides the political explanation for fiscal performance, most of the studies point 
to the influences of socio-demographic factors. The greater the population in need for 
social security and other welfare programs, the higher the spending (Aronsson and 
Wikström 1996).  In decentralized settings, the coverage of primary education and 
attention for the elderly consumes the bulk of the budget. Although the central 
government may determine the amount of budget allotted to these sectors, municipalities 
may consume additional resources to cover the needs in these sectors.  As a result, 
spending might be associated with the percentage of the population over the age of 65 
and under 15.  
H12: The higher the percentage of population under 15 and over 65 in a 
municipality, the higher its spending.  
 
Indicators of Fiscal Performance 
Although the impact of managerial quality on fiscal performance can be assessed 
at any level of government, municipalities offer an excellent setting to test the 
hypothesized proposition. For example, at the municipal level, I control for other 
possible explanations such as budgetary laws, which may vary across nations and even 
across states, but not across the municipalities.  Municipal settings also allow controlling 
for macroeconomic changes, as all municipalities are exposed to the same national 
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economic changes.  Because “…no single indicator can capture the complexities of 
public organizational performance in the twenty-first century” (Boyne et al. 2005, 636), I 
employ four fiscal indicators: expenditures, social investment, operational costs, and 
property tax collection.  With two of these indicators, there exists a categorization 
problem, as it is difficult to classify them into one of Boyne’s (2002a) five dimensions of 
performance: outputs, efficiency, responsiveness, service outcomes, and democratic 
outcomes. While social investment and property tax collection are clearly related to 
effectiveness, expenditures and operational costs do not fit into any of the five 
performance dimensions.  As Boyne (2002a, 17) notes, there is an “…absence of 
indicators that link spending with service outcomes” because   “[h]igh or low spending 
in itself reveals nothing about service standards, or the success/failure of local authorities 
(only political zealots still believe that high or low spending is intrinsically good or 
bad).”  Although I also question the validity of spending as an indicator of performance, 
unless it is linked to the quality or delivery of services, I included them, expenditures 
and operational costs, mainly to identify what municipal factors impact them. The next 
section depicts the models for each one of the three fiscal indicators.    
A Model for Property Tax Collection 
The first measure of the dependent variable is “property tax collection” expressed 
per capita to standardize it across the municipalities. I log this variable to reduce the 
problem of skewed data.  The explanatory variables of interests are those representing 
management quality: the mayor’s qualifications; political institutions: the mayor’s party 
affiliation; and an external factor: a stressful situation, which is also interacted with each 
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of the mayor’s qualifications. The higher the mayor’s qualifications the more the 
property tax collection we would expect; however, under an external, stressful situation, 
this positive effect should decrease. On party affiliation, the expectation is that mayors 
affiliated with the Conservative party tend to collect less property taxes than those 
affiliated with other parties—the excluded category.  
In addition, the model includes the lag of the dependent variable because the 
current year’s performance on tax collection may be a function of the previous year’s 
performance. After a year of poor tax collection, for example, governments may adopt 
drastic measures to increase the municipal treasury. The model also includes three 
economic controls: number of properties per municipality, official value of all 
properties, and percentage of the local population of productive age—which acts as a 
proxy to the non-available municipality GDP and unemployment.85 There is no need to 
include dummies for each year, as the plots of the dependent variables show no 
systematic changes across time.  
A Model for Social Investment  
 The second dependent variable is “municipal investment,” expressed per capita 
to make it comparable across the municipalities. The explanatory variables of interest are 
those representing the mayor’s qualifications, the mayor’s party affiliation, and an 
external, stressful situation. The stressful situation, in turn, is considered with each of the 
mayor’s qualifications.  The higher the mayor’s qualifications the more municipal 
investment per capita is expected; however, under a stressful situation, this positive 
                                                 
85
 I recognize it is a very rough measure to proxy GDP or unemployment, but this is the only available 
alternative. I could have employed the departmental GDP, but it would not allow for variation across units.  
  
163 
 
effect should decrease. For party affiliation, the expectation is that mayors affiliated with 
the Conservative tend to spend less, therefore, investing less on social spending than 
mayors affiliated with any other party—the excluded category. The model also includes 
dummies for each year (2000-2004), as the plot for the dependent variable shows some 
systematic changes across time. I also include one economic (log of total budget) and 
one socio-demographic control (log of population).  
A Model for Mayoral Operational Costs  
The third measure of the dependent variable refers to the variation in operational 
costs as percentage of the revenues.  Although municipalities are required not to spend 
more than 80% of their revenues, in this area there is a great deal of variance, justifying 
its examination.86 The explanatory variables of interests are the mayor’s qualifications 
and their interaction with the stressful situation. The expectation is that the higher the 
mayor’s qualifications the lower the operational costs, as mayors may make better usage 
of human and material resources. The model also includes all the political institutional 
variables, as they might play an important role to explain this indicator. The model 
controls for budget (log) and population (log). Plots of the dependent variable suggest no 
need to include their lags values nor dummies for years, as there is no systematic change 
across times.  
                                                 
86
 Thirty-nine out of the 40 municipalities are either category 4th, 5th, or 6th, and for all of them 80% of 
revenues spending is the maximum amount allowed for operational costs. I exclude from the sample the 
municipality whose category is 1st because its allowed revenue spending is 60%, permitting no 
comparison.  
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A Model for Expenditures  
The fourth dependent variable is “municipal expenditures per capita.” The main 
explanatory variables are the mayor’s qualifications and their interaction with the 
external constraints. The model also includes nine political institutional variables that the 
existing literature on fiscal performance suggests as causal mechanisms for spending. 
They are the political support variables—legislature’s partisan support, citizens’ support, 
governor’s partisan support, electoral cycle, divided government, the mayor’s party 
ideology, government party alternation, number of interest groups, and number of parties 
represented in the legislature.  Except for the mayor’s Conservative ideology, all of these 
variables are expected to increase spending.  In addition, there is one socio-demographic 
variable—the percentage of the population under 15 years and over 60 years of age—
and one economic control—total budget—all of which should increase spending.  There 
are also dummies for each year (2000-2004).    
Operationalization of Variables and Methods 
The measurements of mayoral qualifications, stressful situation, inequality, the 
three types of political support, party affiliation, party alternation, and divided 
government are as already specified in chapter IV. Here, therefore, I present the 
operationalization for the new variables (see Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics). For 
example, I standardized the three dependent variables— expenditures, social investment, 
and property tax collection—per capita; therefore, their values are given in thousands of 
Colombian pesos. At the end of the fiscal year, municipalities report these values in 
millions of Colombian pesos to the Secretary of Planning of their respective department 
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(state). The Secretary of Planning of Norte de Santander in Cúcuta and the Department 
National of Planning in Bogotá provided these data.  
 I employ the number of Communal Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal) 
per municipality as the measure of interest groups.87 Each village creates and registers a 
Communal Action Board (Juntas de Acción Comunal), which is entitled to advocate for 
the interests of its respective community, such as construction of a road to have access 
from the rural to the urban area, construction of a school, etc. The more boards within a 
municipality, the more the demands, and the more of a budget’s divisions the local  
government will have to distribute. The Secretary of Community Development located 
at the governorship provided these data. 
 The measure of municipal population and groups of population (under 15 years 
of age, over 60 years, and the productive population: between 15 and 60 years old) is 
simple.  The values of yearly population are estimates from the Colombian 1993 census.  
I logged population values to avoid skewed data from cases with larger population.  
Values range from 2, 768 inhabitants in a tiny municipality to 742, 689 in the capital. 
The National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), in Cúcuta, provided part 
of these data, and the Secretary of Education in Cúcuta provided the software to 
calculate specific populations per group. See Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics of all 
variables. 
                                                 
87
 Each municipality has two other interest groups: Asociación de Campesinos (Peasants Association) and 
the one that groups the owners of the local economy’s main activity.  
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Tax Property Collection/Capita  6,741 6,272 527 38,836 
Social Investment/Capita 207 108 35 666 
Municipal Expenditures/Capita 353 125 58.76 805.16 
Primary Education (1= yes, 0= no) 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Secondary Education (1= yes, 0= no) .30 .46 0 1 
Post Secondary Education (1= yes, 0= no) .63 .48 0 1 
Local Experience (1= yes, 0= no) .63 .48 0 1 
Ex-mayor (1= yes, 0= no) .21 .41 0 1 
State/National Experience (1= yes, 0= no) 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Conservative Party (1= yes, 0= no) .57 .49 0 1 
Other Party (1= yes, 0= no) 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Population Under 15 and Over 60 51.38 4.53 42.43 66.55 
Population (1= yes, 0= no) 35,503 107,472 2768 742,689 
External Constraints (continuous) 354 1481 0 14,327 
Interest Groups (continuous) 62.99 54.11 8 246 
Electoral Cycle (1= yes, 0= no) .35 .48 0 1 
Party Alternation (1= yes, 0= no) .16 .36 0 1 
Divided Government (1= yes, 0= no) .46 .49 0 1 
Citizens’ Support (%) 19.01 18.51 0 90 
Council’s Support (%) 54.09 30.10 0 100 
Number of Parties in the Council 
(continuous) 
3.36 1.57 1 9 
Mayor-Governor Same Party (1= yes, 0= 
no) 
0.16 0.36 0 1 
Budget (millions of pesos)  7649.26 37,379 962 281, 543 
Inequality 37.03 10.49 15.73 59.98 
 
 
Methods of Analysis  
My data set consists of 40 cross-sectional units—the 40 municipalities of one 
department (state)—along a time span of five years (2000-2004)—and six years for 
when the dependent variable is property tax collection per capita—creating an 
unbalanced panel.  According to Beck and Katz (1995), and Harrinvirta and Mattila 
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(2001), the use of cross-municipality pooled time series data holds the potential for three 
methodological problems. First, the error terms may differ from municipality to 
municipality, generating panel heteroskedasticity in the data. Secondly, the error terms 
might be contemporaneously correlated: errors at a year in one municipality might be 
correlated with another municipality in the same year.  Finally, there may be 
autocorrelation within the municipalities, as there is in any time series, mainly when the 
models include a lag of the dependent variable.  
As no single solution is perfect, I report four different estimations.  First, I 
estimated panel corrected standard errors by running STATA’s XTPCSE command with 
the “hetonly” option88 to correct for heteroskedasticity across the units, in this case, he 
municipalities.  Second, I estimate fixed-effect coefficients with Huber-White standard 
errors to correct for within units heteroskedasticity.  Third, because panel autocorrelation 
might be an issue in the models that include a lag of the dependent variable, I report 
Arellano-Bond estimates—for when variables are 1st differences—for the tax property 
collection model.  I do it so only for this model because tax property collection is more 
likely to be a function of the amount collected in the prior year. Finally, I also report 
simple OLS estimates with Huber-White standard errors.  In all the models the levels of 
multicollinearity for the interaction terms of postsecondary education and stressful 
situation are slightly high. Their inclusion in the model, however, is necessary  
                                                 
88
 The “hetonly” option assumes that there is autocorrelation only across panels and not within a panel and 
adds an additional correction for omitted fixed determinants.   
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Results 
On Municipal Property Tax Collection 
Table 5.2 shows the estimates with panel corrected standard errors of the 
municipal influences on property tax collection per capita, which is logged to reduce the 
problem of skewed data. The influence and leverage diagnostics reveal that one case, 
Cúcuta (the departmental capital), overly influence the estimations; therefore, it is 
excluded.  As expected, and after holding everything else constant, the four estimations 
reveal that the educational level of the mayors has a robust and positive impact on 
property tax collection. The impact is indeed quite large. In municipalities where the 
mayor has any university education, the annual property tax collection per capita tends 
to increase between 30 to 51 percent when compared to municipalities whose mayor 
only has primary education (the excluded category).   
However, and as expected, the positive impact of mayor’s education decreases in 
settings where the mayor is exposed to external constraints. The coefficient for the 
interaction term between stressful situation constraints*post-secondary education is 
negative and statistically significant.  It is a logged transformed variable, too.  Thus, for 
every one-percent increase in the number of people who forcefully migrate from rural 
areas to an urban area, the positive impact that mayor’s education has on the fiscal 
balance per capita (30-51 percent) tends to go down between 15 and 16 percent.  
It shows that under stressful situations (or external constraints), the positive influence of 
  
169 
 
Table 5.2 Explaining Municipal Property Tax Collection (logged) 
 
 
Variable 
Fixed-
Effect 
Huber-
White SE 
Arellano-
Bond 
Estimates 
PCSE 
Huber-
White SE 
OLS with 
Huber-White 
SE 
Secondary Education .05 
(.10) 
.01 
(.05) 
.06 
(.07) 
.06 
(.07) 
Post Secondary Education .43** 
(.18) 
   .51** 
(.08) 
.39** 
(.12) 
.30** 
(.12) 
Post Secondary* Stressful 
Situation (ln)  
-.15* 
(.09) 
 -.16** 
(.04) 
-.16** 
(.07) 
-.16** 
(.06) 
Local Experience -.13 
(.19) 
.21 
(.10) 
.27* 
(.14) 
.27* 
(.15) 
Local Exp.* Stressful Situation 
(ln)  
.19 
(.14) 
- .01 
(.07) 
-.11 
(.11) 
-.11 
(.10) 
Ex-mayor .19 
(.18) 
.37 
(.10) 
.11 
(.15) 
.11 
(.15) 
Ex-mayor* Stressful Situation 
(ln) 
.14 
(.11) 
-.24 
(.05) 
-.08 
(.09) 
-.08 
(.09) 
State and National Experience .03 
(.08) 
-.03 
(.07) 
.09 
(.06) 
.09 
(.06) 
Conservative Party .06 
(.08) 
-.03 
(.07) 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.31 
(.05) 
Number of Properties .00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
4.59e-07 
(1.65e-06) 
4.59e-07 
(1.65e-06) 
Value of Total Properties (ln) .09 
(.07) 
.03 
(.07) 
.05 
(.03) 
.05 
(.03) 
Productive Population .10 
(.10) 
.00 
(.07) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
External Constraints (ln) -.08 
(.12) 
.20 
(.6) 
.13 
(.11) 
.13 
(.11) 
Lag Property Tax Collection 
(ln) 
.33 
(.13) 
-.17 
(.19) 
.84** 
(.04) 
.84** 
(.04) 
Constant    -.48 
.61 
-.48 
(.67) 
Observations 150 115 150 150 
 F (14, 99) 
6.18 
Chi2 (14) 
117.29 
Chi 2 (14) 
2555.69 
F (14, 135) 
195.01 
Prob .00  .00 .00 
R-sq within group .31  R-sq: .90 R-sq: .90 
R-sq between group  .62    
R-sq overall groups .58    
** Significant at <.05.  * Significant at  <.10. (one-tailed tests). 
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the mayors’ qualifications decreases, thus providing evidence for the stressful situation 
hypothesis. Figure 5.1 illustrates more concretely this negative interactive effect.  
 
Figure 5.1 Marginal Effect of Mayoral Post Secondary Education on Municipal 
Property Tax Collection as the Stressful Situation Varies  
 
 
 
As figure 5.1 shows, after holding everything constant, when no single person (0) 
migrates from the municipal rural to the urban area, the impact of mayors’ post 
secondary education on property tax collection increases 4.30 Colombian pesos/capita 
relative to what mayors with only primary education collect. However, when 10 people 
migrate from the rural to the urban area because of violence generated by illegal armed 
presence, the property tax collection tends to decrease 1.3 pesos/capita  (moves from 
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4.30 to roughly 3 pesos/capita); and when 250 migrate from the rural to the urban area, 
that value decreases roughly 2.3 pesos/capita (moves from 4.30 to roughly 2 
pesos/capita).  
The OLS and PCSE estimator for the mayor’s local experience shows 
significance; however, the Arellano-Bond and Fixed-effect estimator fail to show 
significance, The coefficients for departmental-national, and ex-mayor experience are 
insignificant, suggesting that the mayor’s job-related expertise does not add to municipal 
property tax collection.    
 The findings provide no support for the “government ideology” hypothesis, as 
mayor affiliated with the Conservative Party do not differ from the mayors with another 
party affiliation in collection of property taxes. From the three controls: number of 
properties per municipality, official value of all properties, and percentage of the local  
population in the productive age group (a non-perfect proxy to the local GDP), only the 
OLS and PCSE estimator for land value is significant and positively related to property 
tax collection—as expected.   
On Municipal Social Investment  
Table 5.3 reports the estimates with panel corrected standard errors of the 
municipal influences on investment per capita. The influence and leverage diagnostics 
reveal that no single observation overly influences the estimations.  It is important to 
mention that the levels of multicollinearity for the budget and population variables are  
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Table 5.3 Explaining Municipal Social Investments 
Variable Fixed-effect 
Huber-White SE 
PCSE Huber-
White SE 
OLS with 
Huber-White SE 
Secondary Education 39.40** 
(19.10) 
33.48* 
(17.87) 
33.48** 
(13.55) 
Post Secondary Education 57.19** 
(23.33) 
56.50** 
(17.87) 
56.50** 
(19.01) 
Post Secondary* Stressful 
Situation (ln)  
-22.72** 
(12.20) 
-13.60 
(10.06) 
-13.60 
(10.82) 
Local Experience -12.71 
(30.41) 
-5.87 
(17.94) 
-5.87 
(22.92) 
Local Exp.* Stressful Situation (ln)  -1.98 
(15.52) 
-12.82 
(10.14) 
-12.82 
(12.84) 
Ex-mayor -36.81 
(24.09) 
-40.08** 
(18.51) 
-40.08* 
(20.94) 
Ex-mayor* Stressful Situation 
(ln) 
22.74 
(15.58) 
16.78 
(11.47) 
16.78 
(13.30) 
State and National Experience -13.75 
(15.02) 
-13.54 
(11.15) 
-13.54 
(12.28) 
Conservative Party 5.56 
(8.33) 
- 10.43 
(8.30) 
-10.43 
(8.41) 
Budget (ln) 161.41** 
(36.13) 
231.40** 
(15.75) 
231.40** 
(19.64) 
Population (ln) -776.19** 
(314.23) 
- 223.74** 
(13.44) 
-223.74** 
(16.00) 
External Constraints (ln) -5.95 
(21.63) 
-1.47 
(12.23) 
-1.47 
(14.59) 
2001 -8.70 
(11.79) 
17.61 
(11.96) 
17.61 
(10.19) 
2002 37.95 
(16.10) 
-5.16** 
(13.02) 
-5.16** 
(14.16) 
2003 
 
2004 
 
Constant 
40.61 
(14.00) 
35.16 
(16.35) 
-.80 
(12.70) 
-17.15 
(12.90) 
484.00** 
(49.13) 
-.80 
(12.95) 
-12.45 
(12.90) 
484.00** 
(51.08) 
Observations 166 
F (16, 112) 
10.30 
166 
Chi 2 (16) 
608.77 
166 
Chi 2 (16, 149) 
35.18 
Prob   0.00 0.00            0.00 
R-sq within group   0.63  0.82           0.82 
R-sq between group    0.50   
R-sq overall groups            0.37       
** Significant at <.05.  * Significant at  <.10. (one-tailed tests). 
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slightly high (VIF: 4.96). Their inclusion as control variables, however, is necessary in 
the model. Congruent with the expectations, and after holding everything else constant, 
results reveal that the mayor’s education adds to municipal social investment per capita. 
Hence, the fixed-effect estimates for secondary and postsecondary education are positive 
and statistically significant at the 95% level.  Specifically—and assuming that the 
coefficient on the interaction between post-secondary and stressful situation equals 0—
when compared with mayors who have only primary education (the base category), the 
investment per capita in municipalities headed by mayors with any year(s) of secondary 
education increases by 39, 400 pesos (roughly 15 dollars), and it almost doubles to 57, 
190 pesos in municipalities whose mayors have any years of postsecondary education  
However, and as expected, the positive impact of a mayor’s education on per 
capita social investment decreases in settings where the mayor is exposed to external 
constraints such as the presence of illegal armed groups. In fact, the coefficient for the 
interaction term between external constraints – postsecondary is negative and 
statistically significant at the 95% level.  This means that for every 1 percent increase in 
the number of people who forcefully migrate from rural areas to an urban area, the 
positive impact that the mayor’s education has on the fiscal balance per capita (57, 190 
pesos) tends to go down by roughly 227 pesos (-22.72/100).  Although the negative 
effect is small, it shows that under stressful situation (or external constraints), the 
positive influence of mayoral education decreases, supporting the ‘external constraints’ 
hypothesis. Figure 5.2 illustrates this negative interactive effect.   
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Figure 5.2 Marginal Effect of Mayoral Post Secondary Education on Municipal 
Social Investment as the Stressful Situation Varies 
 
          
 
As figure 5.2 shows, after holding everything constant, when no single person (0) 
migrates from the municipal rural to the urban area, the impact of mayors’ post 
secondary education on social investment tends to increase 57.19 Colombian 
pesos/capita relative to what mayors with only primary education spend. However, when 
10 people migrate from the rural to the urban area because of violence generated by 
illegal armed presence, the property tax collection tends to decrease 10.3 pesos/capita  
(moves from 57.19 to roughly 40 pesos/capita); and when 12413 (the maximum values 
in the sample) people migrate from the rural to the urban area, that value decreases 
roughly 97 pesos/capita (moves from 57.19 to roughly -40 pesos/capita).  
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As with the previous model, the indicators for job-related expertise—local and 
departmental-national—are insignificant. However, the findings report an unexpected 
negative and significant coefficient for the ex-mayor variable.  It suggests that 
municipalities headed by reelected mayors tend to spend between 40, 000 and 36, 800 
pesos per capita (around 14 dollars/ per capita) less on social investment than 
municipalities whose mayors are local executives for the first time. One explanation for 
this points to the fact that as these reelected mayors are less likely to run for a third term, 
they have little incentive to invest in social programs because there is no need to claim it 
as theirs, or they may divert money to other uses. A mayor’s party ideology has no  
influence on municipal investment. Budget, one of the control variables, is positive—as 
expected—and significant at the 95% level. The coefficient for population also is 
significant but with an unexpected negative sign. This might be explained on the 
grounds of economies of scale.   
On Municipal Operational Costs 
Table 5.4 reports the three sets of estimates of the effect of municipal influences  
the operational costs as a percentage of municipal revenues. The influence and leverage 
diagnostics reveal that some of the municipalities overly influence the estimations; 
therefore, they are excluded from the analysis.  In this model the levels of 
multicollinearity for the interactive terms post-secondary education*stressful situation 
and local experience*stressful situation are slightly high. Their inclusion is necessary 
because they are main hypothesized effects in the model. 
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Table 5.4 Explaining Mayoralty Operational Costs  
 
Variable Fixed-effect 
Huber-White SE 
PCSE  Huber-
White SE 
OLS with Huber-
White SE 
Secondary Education -3.29 
(7.32) 
0.76 
(5.02) 
0.76 
(5.33) 
Post Secondary Education 11.71 
(12.03) 
-5.69 
(8.66) 
-5.69 
(8.53) 
Post Secondary*Stressful Situation 
(ln)  
1.90 
(7.63) 
1.77 
(6.36) 
1.77 
(5.31) 
Local Experience -0.89 
(12.07) 
-3.45 
(8.10) 
-3.45 
(7.20) 
Local Exp.* Stressful Situation (ln)  3.38 
(9.53) 
2.55 
(6.36) 
2.55 
(4.74) 
Ex-mayor 0.49 
(9.92) 
-8.86 
(7.62) 
-8.86 
(8.32) 
Ex-mayor*Stressful Situation (ln) -0.90 
(7.07) 
8.50 
(5.58) 
8.50 
(5.58) 
State and National Experience 3.67 
(5.50) 
2.77 
(3.96) 
2.77 
(4.41) 
Conservative Party 4.80 
(6.46) 
-2.56 
(2.77) 
-2.56 
(3.10) 
Citizens Support 0.09 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
Municipal Council Support 0.05 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
Government Party Alternation -1.25 
(4.28) 
2.06 
(3.67) 
2.06 
(3.86) 
Number of Parties in the Council -0.68 
(3.09) 
1.30 
(1.56) 
1.30 
(1.57) 
Electoral Cycle 2.30 
(3.13) 
3.58 
(2.79) 
3.58 
(3.11) 
Budget (ln) 
 
Population (ln) 
 
Stressful Situation 
 
Constant 
 
-25.67** 
(9.95) 
149.33 
(146.10) 
-0.10 
(6.62) 
-19.07** 
(4.98) 
10.21** 
(3.59) 
1.71 
(5.95) 
107.18** 
(24.86) 
-19.07** 
(5.91) 
10.21** 
(4.13) 
1.71 
(5.34) 
107.18** 
(27.85) 
Observations 134  134 134 
 F (17, 83) 
1.59 
Chi 2 (17) 
37.35 
F (17, 116) 
2.08 
Probability 0.00 0.00        0.01 
R-sq within group 0.23 R-sq: 0.23 R-sq: 0.23 
R-sq between group  0.05   
R-sq overall groups 0.01   
** Significant at <.05.  * Significant at  <.10. (one-tailed tests). 
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According to the findings, neither mayor’s qualifications, nor political 
institutions explain variation of operational costs. The fixed-effect coefficient for budget 
is statistically significant, but has an unexpected negative direction. The PCSE 
coefficient for population is positive and statistically significant, as expected.  Based on 
these results, other mechanisms seem to matter for explaining variation in operational 
costs. In fact, this is an indicator that may reveal the payment of political favors.   
On Municipal Expenditures 
 
 Although Table 5.5 reports the fixed-effect, PCSE, and OLS estimates, I 
concentrate on the coefficients of the fixed-effect estimation, as it seems to be more 
conservative for unbalanced panel data.  The dependent variable, municipal expenditure 
per capita is logged to correct for skewed data. The influence and leverage diagnostics 
reveal that 12 observations overly influence the estimations; therefore, they are excluded 
from the analysis.   
From the indicators of mayoral qualifications, only the coefficient for 
departmental-national experience is negative and statistically significant at the low level 
of 90%. This suggests that those mayors who have had experience outside of the local 
level tend to spend 11 percent less per capita than those mayors who lack that 
experience, opposite to expected. Opposite to what the “government party ideology” 
hypothesis suggests, mayors affiliated with the Conservative party tend to spend 13 
percent more than the mayors affiliated with any other party—the excluded category.  
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                 Table 5.5 Explaining Municipal Expenditures 
 
 Variables Fixed-effect 
Huber-White SE 
PCSE  
Huber-White SE 
OLS with Huber-
White SE 
Secondary Education .08 
(.07) 
-.22** 
(.07) 
-.22** 
(.07) 
Post Secondary Education .08 
(.11) 
-.20* 
(.11) 
-.20 
(.13) 
Post Secondary* Stressful 
Situation (ln)  
.03 
(.08) 
.13 
(.09) 
.13 
(.09) 
Local Experience -.01 
(.11) 
.13 
(.11) 
.13 
(.14) 
Local Exp.* Stressful Situation (ln)  -.05 
(.08) 
-.20** 
(.07) 
-.20** 
(.08) 
Ex-mayor -.17 
(.10) 
-.15 
(.13) 
-.15 
(.15) 
Ex-mayor* Stressful Situation (ln) .13 
(.09) 
.02** 
(.09) 
.02** 
(.10) 
State and National Experience -.11* 
(.05) 
-.20** 
(.05) 
-.20** 
(.06) 
Conservative Party .13* 
(.07) 
.07 
(.07) 
.07 
(.07) 
Population Under 15 and Over 60 .07 
(.08) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
External Constraints (ln) -.06 
(.06) 
-.01 
(.09) 
-.01 
(.09) 
Interest Groups 
 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
Electoral Cycle 
 
-.03 
(.07) 
-.13 
(.09) 
-.13 
(.11) 
Party Alternation 
 
-.03 
(.05) 
-.09* 
(.05) 
-.09* 
(.07) 
Divided Government 
 
.07 
(.07) 
.11 
(.09) 
.11 
(.09) 
Citizens’ Support 
 
.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
Council’s Support 
 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
Number of Parties in the Council 
 
-.05** 
(.02) 
-.17** 
(.02) 
-.17** 
(.02) 
Mayor-Governor Same Party -.04 
(.07) 
.10 
(.08) 
.10 
(.08) 
Budget (ln) .49** 
(.17) 
.05 
(.06) 
.05 
(.07) 
Constant  6.15** 
(.56) 
6.15** 
(.58) 
R-square            between  .05 
Year dummies are not included.    
      within     .23 
** Sign. at<.05.        
. 23 
* Sig. at <.01 
        .23 
N: 134 
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Contrary to what the literature suggests, the number of parties represented in the 
municipal council has a reductive impact on the municipal expenditures per capita. For 
each additional party represented at the municipal council, the municipal expenditures 
per capita tend to go down 5 percent (0.05/100). It could mean that parties serve as a 
check on each other, thus obstructing the division of the pie. Finally, budget is also a 
predictor of expenditures: each additional million pesos in budget increases 
expenditures/capita in 49 cents.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This research has explored the determinants of municipal fiscal performance by 
employing five years worth of data (2000-2004) across forty Colombian municipalities.  
Fiscal performance is measured using four indicators: expenditures, social investment, 
and property tax collection. I argue that public finance scholarship has neglected the 
potential influence of managerial quality on fiscal performance. In addition, I also argue 
that the positive impact of management quality on fiscal performance decreases under 
external constraints.  Managerial quality is operationalized with the mayor’s 
qualifications—educational background and job-related experience and operationalized 
external constraints with the presence of illegal armed groups.  Besides testing the 
managerial quality hypothesis, this study also tests alternative political, economic, and 
external influences.  
 As hypothesized, I find a robust positive relationship between managerial quality 
and local fiscal performance.  In fact, the mayor’s educational level is associated with 
more social investment and increased property tax collection.  External constraints, 
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however, undermine the positive influence that the mayor’s educational background has 
on fiscal performance. These findings bring theoretical and practical implications for 
public management and public finance literature. Hence, the results suggest that 
managerial quality influence not only outputs but also organizational efficiency. The 
results also reveal that besides considering political and budgetary institutions, attention 
must be given to the qualifications of the budget makers.  
 None of the political variables assessed in this study seems to be consistently 
related to social investment and property tax collection. This might suggest two things: 
1) context matters, as propositions developed in the US are not applicable in developing 
settings, and/or 2) patronage triumphs over ideology. Finally, municipal budget is a 
strong predictor of social investment. 
In explaining variation in the operational costs, neither the mayor’s qualifications 
nor the political institutional variables have any influence. It might suggest that dark 
forces, such as political favors, are behind the scenes, given that public appointments are 
often employed for clientelism.  When mayors have greater partisan support at the 
municipal council, mayoral operational costs tend to increase, as the mayor’s proposals 
easily pass the legislature.    
This research also explores the determinants of municipal expenditures. I, 
however, emphasize that unless expenditures are associated with service standards, they 
tell us little about fiscal performance. Results suggest that, contrary to what literature in 
the US indicates, mayors affiliated with the Conservative Party tend to spend more than 
mayors affiliated with any other party.  Moreover, the number of parties represented in 
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the municipal council has a negative impact on expenditures. The difficulty of getting 
consensus to approve expenditures might explain this finding. 
 Finally, this analysis of Colombian municipalities presents the first empirical 
undertaking in assessing the impact of managerial quality on fiscal performance in a 
Latin American setting. This research reveals that the qualifications of those who make 
and implement budgets matter. This project has also explored the applicability of 
theories developed in the US when transferred to the Latin American context, 
demonstrating that context matters. In developing countries, fiscal decentralization has 
given local governments full responsibility for their public finances without providing 
them the prescriptions to perform well. By identifying the factors that boost public 
finance, municipalities will know under which circumstances they will achieve the most.  
The results presented here suggest that managerial quality is positively associated with 
municipal social investment and property tax collections. Yet external constraints 
moderate the managerial quality’s impact on fiscal performance.  This research 
generates hopes and lessons for the Colombians. Hope derive from learning that by 
choosing qualified candidates, local public finances improve. The lesson is that the 
presence of illegal armed groups undermines the potential benefits provided by their 
qualified leaders.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
EVALUATING MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE IN A SURVEY- 
 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS  
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide a different approach to address the dissertation’s main 
question: what explains municipal performance? Results from previous chapters reveal 
that management quality positively influences municipal education coverage and public 
finance, the latter through increased social investment and tax property collection.  
Management quality, on the contrary, has no impact on the municipal identification of 
the beneficiaries of social services (SISBEN program).  In sum, although the preceding 
statistical analyses provide support for the management quality thesis, the evidence is 
partial.   
In explaining this partial support, I suggest the following argument. Some 
programs might be more suitable to political manipulation than others, thus, 
downgrading the potential impact of management quality.  In fact, newspapers report 
governmental officials’ testimonies in which they suggest that the SISBEN program is 
used to obtain political benefits for mayors, councilmen, or other politicians 
(“Denuncian” 2006). If that were the case, politicians’ interests, instead of management 
quality, would explain the workings of some municipal programs.  Thus, there exists the 
possibility that the positive influence of management quality on performance is 
conditioned upon the nature of the program, adding to some programs, but not to others.  
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For instance, management quality may add to educational but not infrastructural 
programs: either because the former is a more salient issue or because the latter is more 
suitable to political manipulations.  By manipulating, or controlling for, the nature of the 
issue, I will be able to assess its impact on performance: something that was not 
addressed in my previous analysis. 
Like program nature or issue salience, some contexts might facilitate 
performance while others might not (Fiedler 1967).   Results from the previous chapters, 
for example, provide weak support for a negative impact of stressful situations—when 
interacted with management quality—on municipal performance.  By manipulating 
contexts, alternatively, I will assess its specific impact on performance.   
In undertaking this alternative approach, I run a survey -experimental analysis to 
manipulate both the nature of the program (or issue salience) and environmental context 
when I look at an important aspect of mayoral performance. Then I explore how 
management quality—mayoral qualifications—interacts with these variables to affect 
performance.  The experiment employs as subjects 120 current mayors from 12 Latin 
American countries.  To my knowledge, it is one of the first experimental analyses in the 
field of comparative public management, and the first employing real elected politicians.  
Experimental Analysis 
The experiment’s main goal is to assess the impact of mayoral qualifications on 
performance after interacting them with two manipulated variables: the nature of the 
program (education or infrastructure) and the context (presence or absence of guerrillas). 
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 The survey-experiment was conducted during the II Latin American Summit of 
Local Governments, held in Cali, Colombia, from July 26- 29, 2006.  This summit drew 
roughly 585 mayors from all the Latin American countries.  Depending on their 
accessibility, I randomly selected one hundred twenty mayors for the experiment. The 
sampling included mayors from 12 countries.  Not surprisingly, given the summit’s 
location, Colombian mayors were overrepresented.  Figure 6.1 depicts the country 
distribution of the randomly-selected mayors.  I approached the mayors asking for their 
cooperation and explaining the nature of the study.  After agreeing to participate, s/he 
received both a survey of 45 questions and one of the eight experimental scenarios.  
 
Figure 6.1 Nationality of Participating Mayors 
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Experimental Design    
The experiment is a between group-factorial design of a 2 x 2 x 2 matrix whose 
experimental factors are: a) environmental stress (presence—absence); b) nature of the 
municipal problem (education or infrastructure); c) compatibility of the private agency’s 
core activity with the municipal problem (yes – no). The dependent variable is the 
mayor’s decision to transfer or not responsibility to an external agency for it to address a 
hypothetical municipal problem. Under certain circumstances, I assume that the 
transference of responsibility to an external agency results in better performance. In 
addition to these variables, I collected data on the mayors’ educational and experience 
background—variables that cannot be manipulated.  The subjects, 120 mayors, were 
randomly assigned to one of the eight possible scenarios (resulting from the 2 x 2 x2 
matrix), placing fifteen mayors in each scenario.                                                        
Introduction of the Issue: Nature of the Municipal Problem 
After being randomly assigned to a scenario, I introduced the mayors to a 
scenery of a municipality with a substantial problem. The problem could be either in the 
educational or the infrastructural sector (sewage, electricity, running water, etc.).  With 
this, I manipulated the nature of the local problem (education or infrastructure).  The 
scenario also asked the mayor to assume that s/he was the executive of that municipality.  
Figure 6.2 presents the texts of both scenarios.  
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Introduction of the Environmental Context: Stressful Situation 
Besides presenting mayors a municipality with a substantial problem, some 
scenarios also introduced a “stressful situation.” In this experiment, I manipulated 
stressful situation with the presence or absence of guerrillas in the assigned municipality.   
 
FIGURE 6.2 Issue Introduction 
 
 
 
EDUCATION SECTOR INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR 
 
Mr./Mrs. Mayor, accept my sincere thanks for 
cooperating with this study.  
 
For the purpose of this project, assume you are 
the mayor of a municipality, which possesses the 
following characteristics. Fifty percent of the 
population lives in rural and the other 50 % lives 
in urban areas.  From the total population, 60% 
has no access to education.  Although the 
municipality has other needs, it is obvious that 
greater access to education is the most important 
priority.   
 
Mr./Mrs. Mayor, accept my sincere thanks for 
cooperating with this study.  
 
For the purpose of this project, assume you are 
the mayor of a municipality, which possesses 
the following characteristics. Fifty percent of the 
population lives in rural and the other 50 percent 
lives in urban areas.  From the total population, 
60% has access to neither electricity, sewage, 
nor running water. Although the municipality 
has other needs, it is obvious that improvement 
of its infrastructure is the most important 
priority.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the complete text of the manipulation of stressful situation. The 
combination of the nature of the problem  (education or infrastructure) with stressful 
situation (yes – no) generates four possible scenarios: a municipality with an educational 
problem under guerrilla presence; a municipality with an educational problem without 
guerrilla presence; a municipality with an infrastructural problem under guerrilla 
presence; and a municipality with an infrastructural problem without guerrilla presence.  
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FIGURE 6.3 Manipulating Stressful Situation 
 
 
 
Presence of Stressful Situation Absence of Stressful Situation 
Your municipality is also characterized as 
having a considerable presence of illegal 
armed groups, which frequently demand 
financial support, reducing considerably the 
budget of your municipality. 
 
 
 
 
Compatibility of the External Solution 
 
After introducing the municipality with its hypothetical problem, under either 
absence or presence of stressful situation, mayors were presented with two different 
budget distributions from which they were asked to choose the one they considered the 
best to deal with the hypothetical municipal problem. One of the solutions offered to 
mayors was to stay with the existing budget in which they have freedom to allocate 50 
percent of the entire budget to the sector(s) they wish. The remaining 50 percent of the 
budget is to be proportionately allocated, by law, to the sectors of health (16.3%), 
education (16.3%), and infrastructure (16.3%). The alternative solution offers mayors a 
modified version of the current budget in which the budget’s fraction assigned for free 
allocation is reduced from 50% to 20%.  The discounted 30% is given to a private, 
independent-efficient agency. The agency will invest this 30% within the municipality.  
However, in half of the scenarios, the private agency will invest the given 30% in the 
municipal main problem, meaning that the private agency’s activity is compatible with 
the local problem.  In the other half of the scenarios, the private agency will invest the 
30% in a sector different from the municipality’s main problem, meaning that the 
agency’s core activity is incompatible with the local problem. After combining the two 
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solutions with the previous conditions (nature of the problem and stressful situation), a 2 
x 2 x 2 matrix results, which is illustrated in Figure 6.4.   
 
Figure 6.4 Experimental Design 
 
                               Municipal Education Problem 
 
Private agency will invest in education:  
Compatible private agency                          
  
Private agency will invest in infrastructure:   
Incompatible private agency 
                                               Guerrilla            No Guerrilla 
                                                                N = 60 
 
    
   Municipal Infrastructure Problem 
                                          
Private agency will invest in infrastructure: 
Compatible private agency 
 
Private agency will invest in education:  
Incompatible private agency 
                                               Guerrilla            No Guerrilla 
                                                                N = 60 
 
In addition to the written presentation of the solutions, the scenario also provided tables 
illustrating them: to facilitate their understanding.  Figure 6.5 presents the proposed 
budgets for when the external agency will invest in education: Recall, however, that in 
other scenarios the agency will invest in infrastructure.  The experiment ended when the 
mayor chose either to stay with the current budget or to adopt the alternative modified 
budget.  In some cases, mayors explained the reason for their choice, as was suggested, 
but not required.89 
                                                 
89While performing the experiment, some of the mayors asked for additional clarifications, which I 
addressed. One of their most consistent concerns was to make sure about the reliability and efficiency of 
the private agency. 
   n= 15 n=15 
n=15 n=15 
n = 15 n=15 
n=15 n=15 
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                         FIGURE 6.5 Assessing Performance 
 
Current Budget Reformed Budget 
 
Your current budget is annually organized and 
from it, 50% must be assigned to health, 
education, and infrastructure, meaning that 16.3 
% goes to each sector. The remaining 50 percent 
is spent at your discretion, meaning that you can 
add it to any of the former categories or assign it 
to any other sector such as nutrition, 
entertainment, etc.   
 
 
 
Current Budget Allocations 
16.3% Health 
16.3% Education 
16.3% Infrastructure 
 
50% To invest in whatever you want 
 
 
 
The central government has proposed to 
modify the proportion of the municipal 
budget that is discretionary.  Specifically, it 
proposes to reduce the discretionary budget 
from 50% to 20%, moving the 30% that is cut 
to an independent and efficient agency, which 
will invest it on education [or infrastructure— 
varies across scenarios]. This agency has 
demonstrated very practical solutions to 
improve local education 
 
Proposed Budget Allocations 
16.3% Health 
16.3% Education 
16.3% Infrastructure 
20% To invest it on whatever you want 
30% Given to a private, efficient agency to 
invest in education. 
 
 
Your task, today, is to decide whether your municipality would benefit from this change in 
allocation of spending or would be better off with the current budgetary distribution, which gives 
you discretion of 50 percent of the entire budget.  
Then, taking into consideration the characteristics of your municipality decide which option you 
think is better for your municipality:  
1)  To keep the budget as it is  
2)  To accept the changes proposed by the national government. 
 
Assessing Municipal Performance: The Dependent Variable 
The critical part in this experiment is the definition of the dependent variable. 
Since I am aware of the difficulty of assessing performance in an experiment, I 
incorporate certain working assumptions in order to demonstrate the appropriateness of 
the selected dependent variable. Said this, this experiment’s dependent variable is 
whether mayors choose an efficient, private agency to address the hypothetical 
  
190 
 
municipal problem or not.  I recognize that this decision has also to deal with mayoral 
willingness to relinquish some budgetary power, and not only with performance.90  
However, the following working assumptions should help to illustrate the 
suitability of the decision as an indicator of performance. First, it is assumed that if the 
mayors consider themselves very good managers, they would like to maintain control of 
the entire budget to deal directly with the local problem. However, and second, if a 
mayor is experienced and knowledgeable and wants better results, s/he could rely on an 
efficient agency to deal with the local need, especially when its activity is compatible 
with the local need and when the municipal context is difficult. Then, the mayor just 
waits for the successful results to claim them on his/her own while saving time to 
address other municipal concerns. Four, some mayors may feel more comfortable 
addressing and solving some municipal problems than others. It suggests that the 
transference of responsibility to a private agency is conditioned on the nature of the 
problem. For example, some mayors may transfer responsibility to an external agency to 
address the local need if the need is education but not if the need is infrastructure. After 
adopting these assumptions, I derive the following hypotheses: 
 
 
                                                 
90
 For example, the decision may also have to deal with each country’s experience with private agencies’ 
delivery of services. That is, if in general the country’s experience has been bad, mayors will be less likely 
to relinquish part of the budget, or viceversa. This, of course, would affect mayors’ evaluation on 
performance.  Indeed, across Latin American countries privatization of service delivery has been 
promoted, as part of the structural adjustment policies demanded by the lending institutions (Williamson 
1990).  As a result, privatization of service delivery has been seen as detrimental in terms of job creation, 
but efficient in terms of service delivery. This view, therefore, helps to reinforce my argument because in 
the experiment I want to convey the idea that the private agency, as alternative solution, is indeed reliable 
and efficient.     
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H1: Mayors are more likely to transfer responsibility to a private agency when 
the agency’s main activity is compatible with the local need. 
 
H2: Mayors are more likely to transfer responsibility to a private agency when 
this agency activity is compatible with the local need and when the 
environmental context is difficult. 
 
H3: Mayors’ transference of responsibility to a private, compatible agency is 
conditioned on the nature of the municipal problem.  
 
The above propositions should operate regardless of mayoral qualifications.  
However, as this dissertation’s main proposition suggests that management quality 
(assessed with mayoral qualifications) positively influences municipal performance, its 
testable hypotheses are as follow:  
H4: The more qualified a mayor is, the more likely s/he will transfer some of the 
budgetary power to an external and efficient agency when: 
 
a) The municipal context is more difficult (guerrilla presence). 
b) The external agency’s activity is compatible with the municipal need. 
H5: The more qualified a mayor is, the more likely s/he will allocate resources to 
an external, efficient agency for it to deal with the local need under two 
conditions:  
 
a) When the agency’s activity is compatible with the municipal need and  
b) Depending on the nature of the problem (whether education or 
infrastructure).    
 
Under these conditions, then, I assume the municipal problem will be better 
addressed by transferring responsibility and resources to an external-efficient agency. 
The logic for the propositions is as follow.  Under difficult municipal contexts, the 
external agency might not have direct exposure to guerrillas, providing it with more 
chances to successfully address the municipal problem. As mayors work and live within 
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the municipal perimeter, guerrillas’ access to them is easier. This access facilitates 
guerrillas making threatens against mayors when demanding something. In some cases, 
mayors abandon their municipalities to avoid being harassed.  An article in a Colombian 
newspaper perfectly portrays this scenario. It states that seven mayors abandoned and 
quit their jobs due to threats from the front 33 of the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia—Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) (“Alcaldes 
amenazados” 2007).  By granting responsibility to an external agency, mayors then may 
liberate from the pressures from the illegal armed forces.  
Moreover, by transferring responsibility to an external agency, the mayor may 
ignore clientelistic demands, contributing, thus, to better performance.91 In small 
municipalities, it is very difficult for mayors to evade friends and supporters. Therefore, 
mayors are constantly subject to the return of favors and friendship, which can be more 
likely to be materialized in infrastructure rather than education programs.  Although also 
exposed to some demands, for a private manager it may be easier to evade them. 
On the other hand, when the external agency’s activity is incompatible with the 
municipal need, the problem has a greater chance of being addressed with the current 
budget because the mayor may invest, part, or all of the 50%, of the budget’s portion of 
free allocation in the needed sector.  Additionally, for the scenarios in which there is no 
guerrilla presence and the agency’s activity is incompatible with the local need, I assume 
the municipality’s problem will be better addressed with the current budget, presuming, 
of course, that the mayor will invest, part, or all of the 50%, of the budget’s fraction of 
                                                 
91
 I do not assume that all qualified mayors want to avoid clientelism. What I suggests is that by 
transferring to an external agency, mayors may get rid of political commitments. 
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free allocation to cover the municipal need. There is, however, doubt on how to assess 
performance for those scenarios in which there is no guerrilla presence and the 
independent agency’s activity is compatible to the local problem.  Many mayors 
responded that they would prefer to manage the local problem with the current budget 
because by having access to the budget’s fraction of free allocation, they could invest it 
on the need, largely because they relied on their own capabilities to succeed.  Although 
assessing performance under this scenario is dubious, its inclusion was necessary 
because it allowed me to manipulate one of the key concepts: presence and absence of a 
stressful situation.   
In sum, the mayors’ approval to transfer a budget’s fraction to an external-
efficient agency, rather than adhering to the current budget, when there is presence of 
guerillas and the agency’s activity is compatible with the municipal problem is 
associated with better municipal performance.  This might be, however, conditioned on 
the nature of the problem: which needs to be tested too.  
Given the straightforward understanding of the manipulated variables: municipal 
problem—education and infrastructure—and presence or absence of guerrilla, I leave out 
manipulation checks—procedures that guarantee internal validity in an experiment.  I, 
however, looked at the survey for two answers, as they allow me to see if the mayor 
matches the municipal needs with the sectors that call for priority investment.92  Figure 
6.6 shows that 79.16 percent of the mayors match the municipal needs with the sector(s) 
                                                 
92
 Specifically, the survey asked the mayor for the main problem(s) of his or her municipality. Then 
another question asked them what would be the priority sectors to invest in if he or she received a 
budgetary addition of 20 percent. 
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requiring priority investment.  It means that in the experimental analysis they should be 
able to identify the main need and to associate it with the solution that allows them to 
better deal with it.  
 
Figure 6.6 Mayors' Match between Local Need and Investment Priority 
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ANOVA Results 
 
First, I present the ANOVA tests on the effects of stressful situation, nature of 
the problem, and agency’s compatibility on mayoral approval for an external agency. 
Then, I present the interactive effects of the previous variables on mayors’ choice.  
Effect of the Agency’s Compatibility on Mayor’s Choice 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that mayors are more likely to allocate responsibility to an 
external agency when its main activity is compatible with the local need, and ANOVA 
  
195 
 
test supports it.  The findings for between-groups ANOVA indicate that the mean 
differences are statistically significant [F (1, 112) = 4.29, p = 0.04].  Figure 6.7 shows 
the mean of mayoral approval for an external, efficient agency depending on the 
agency’s compatibility with the municipal problem.  More of the mayors (mean of 
0.433) agreed to transfer responsibility to an external-efficient agency when its activity 
is compatible to the municipal problem than when its activity is incompatible (mean of 
0.2). This finding demonstrates that mayors, indeed, link the problem with solution.  
  
Figure 6.7 Mayors' Approval of External Agency       
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Effect of Municipal Context on Mayor’s Choice 
Hypothesis 2 states that mayors are more likely to allocate responsibility to an 
external agency when it is compatible with  the local need and under more difficult 
contexts. Before testing this interactive effect, I report the ANOVA test for the effect of 
municipal context (guerrilla presence or absence) on mayoral approval for an external 
solution. The between-groups ANOVA found a significant effect for guerrilla presence 
[F (1, 112) = 8.41, p < .004].  However, the results are opposite to expectations.  As 
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Figure 6.8 shows, with guerrilla presence fewer mayors opted to grant responsibility to 
an external agency (M = 0.233) than do mayors whose municipality has no guerrilla 
presence (M = 0.4).  
 
Figure 6.8 Mayors' Approval of External Agency 
as Context Varies 
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This finding suggests that when faced with guerrillas’ presence, mayors prefer to 
handle the municipal problem directly. In other words, under presence of guerrillas, 
mayors prefer to have control of the entire budget, rather than yielding 30% of it to an 
external agency. A question, then, emerges: why, under this condition, do mayors prefer 
to have more budget discretion?  One explanation might point to the mayors’ need of 
having more resources to satisfy the guerrilla’s demands, thus guaranteeing their 
survival. Indeed, in personal conversations with an ex-mayor, and now current secretary 
of government, he told me that during his administration he had to supply almost 20% of 
the budget to guerrillas and an equivalent 20% to the rightist self-defense groups in order 
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to guarantee his survival.93  Another explanation, could be, that regardless the stressful 
condition, mayors only care about controlling their entire budget, as they may see the 
transfer of budget as a loss of municipal autonomy. In fact, among the justifications 
given, the fear of losing autonomy was the main reason for mayors’ decision to not grant 
part of their current budget to the external agency.  As one of the mayors stated, “I do 
not want to lose freedom to invest on the priority needs”, another said, “The 
municipality—and not a private agency—should have the control of its own money.”  
Most of the Ecuadorian mayors justified their rejection of the alternative private 
agency, on the grounds that the municipal budget should be participative rather than 
dictated. This willingness to adopt participative budgets deserves closer examination, as 
mayors from other countries do not express this incentive.  
Interactive Effect between External Agency’s Compatibility and Municipal Context on 
Mayor’s Choice 
The between-groups ANOVA test for the interactive effect between agency’s 
compatibility and municipal context (guerrilla) is statistically insignificant, [F (1, 112) = 
.172, p = .679].  It means that decisions of mayors who face guerrilla presence and have 
as alternative solution a compatible private agency are not statistically different from the 
decisions of mayors who have no guerrilla presence and have as alternative solution an 
incompatible private agency.  Therefore, Hypothesis 2 receives no support.  Although 
the means of mayors’ approval for an external solution vary across the interactions, they 
fail to achieve significance [M (compatible*guerrilla) = .333; M (compatible*no 
                                                 
93
 Anonymous Interview by author, a municipality in the province of Ocaña, Norte de Santander, 
November 13, 2005. 
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guerrilla) = .533; M (non-compatible*guerrilla) = .133; M (non-compatible*no guerilla) 
= .267]. In sum, hypothesis 2 receives no support. 
Effect of the Nature of the Municipal Problem on Mayor’s Choice  
Recall that the findings from chapter IV reveal that management quality has an 
impact on municipal education but not on identifying the beneficiaries of social services 
(SISBEN). This may suggest that management quality affects some programs but not 
others, which can be tested by manipulating the nature of the issue.  That is, does 
mayoral approval for an external agency to address the local need vary depending on the 
nature of the problem? ANOVA tests find no significant effect for the nature of the 
problem.  Although the proportion of mayors who chose an external agency when the 
municipal problem is education is different (M = 0.433) from the proportion of mayors 
who chose the agency when the problem is infrastructure (M = 0.200), these means, 
however, are not statistically different.  
Interactive Effect between Nature of the Problem and Agency’s Compatibility on 
Mayor’s Choice  
The next step is to examine whether mayors’ approval for a compatible agency 
varies depending on the nature of the local problem.  Figure 6.9 shows a significant 
difference across educational and infrastructural issues.  The between-groups ANOVA 
test reveals a large difference in mayoral approval for an external solution across the two 
municipal problems, [F (1, 112) = 4.29, p = 0.04].  Therefore, H3 receives support.  
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Figure 6.9 Interactive Effect between Agency's Compatibility and Nature of the 
Problem 
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 Specifically, when the local problem is education, the mean of mayoral approval 
to transfer responsibility to a compatible external agency is statistically greater (M = 
0.567) than the mean of mayoral approval for when the agency is non-compatible (M 
0.167).  On the contrary, when the local problem is infrastructure, the mayoral approval 
for an external agency does not differ statistically across compatible (M = 0.3) and non-
compatible agencies (M = 0.233).  These findings raise a question: why mayors are more 
willing to transfer part of their budgets to an external agency under educational, but not 
under infrastructural, need?  I suggest two arguments.  First, mayors may feel more 
capable to deal with infrastructure than with educational issues. Second, mayors may 
obtain more benefits—either material or political—by directly handling infrastructure 
rather than educational needs.  In sum, the nature of the problem (or sector) alone has no 
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impact on performance, but when interacted with agency’s compatibility; its impact on 
mayoral decision is significant. 
In addition to the above test, I also examine the effect on mayor’s choice after 
interacting the nature of the local problem—education or infrastructure—and municipal 
context.  The between-groups ANOVA test reports a statistically insignificant 
interaction, [F (1, 112) = 1.54, p = 0.21].  Although there are differences across the 
means, they fail to achieve significance [M (education*guerrilla) = 0.233; M 
(education*no guerrilla) = 0.300; M (infrastructure*guerrilla) = 0.233; M 
(infrastructure*no guerilla) = 0.500].  
Mayoral Qualifications 
 
The next step is to determine whether H4 and H5 are supported, that is whether 
management quality (mayoral qualifications) positively influences mayoral approval for 
an external agency for it to deal with the municipal problem under two sets of 
conditions.  According to H4, mayoral approval is conditioned upon guerrilla presence 
and the agency’s compatibility with the local need while in H5 mayoral approval is 
conditioned on the nature of the municipal problem and the agency’s compatibility with 
the local need.  Since in the experiment I am unable to manipulate mayoral 
qualifications, I use the mayors’ true educational and experience background, 
information obtained from the survey.  Figure 6.10 summarizes the mayors’ educational 
background.  To test H4 and H5, mayors’ educational and experience are interacted with 
agency’s compatibility, problem nature, and municipal context.  
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As Figure 6.10 shows, the percentage of mayors with university (47.55) and 
master’s degrees (16.7%) exceeds that of mayors with incomplete undergraduate 
program (10%), college degree (10.83%), high school (11.7%), incomplete high school 
(1.7%) and only primary degree (0.845%). Given this, I collapsed the mayoral education 
variable into two categories: university degree (including master’s degree)—coded as 
“1”—and non-university degree— coded as “0”.  The percentage of mayors with low 
levels of education justifies the collapse into two categories.94  In addition, there is no 
systematic variation in mayors’ educational level across countries.  
 
Figure 6.10 Mayors' Educational Level 
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The survey also provides the data for the mayors’ previous years of job-related 
experience in both elected and non-elected public positions.95  I collapsed the mayors’ 
experience into two categories: local experience (number of years worked in the local-
                                                 
94
 Although I would like to create more categories, the number of cases is inadequate to do that because I 
would have to interact each category with the other variables, consuming degrees of freedom.  
 
95
 Time in current position does not count. 
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public sector) and national/state experience (number of years worked either in the state 
and/or national sector).  The two variables are continuous. Figure 6.11 shows the 
distribution of mayors’ job related experience.96  
Statistical Results 
To test the three-way interactive effect as suggested in H4, I interact educational 
background with guerrilla presence, and agency’s compatibility. The same interaction is 
created with local expertise and state/national expertise, guerrilla presence and agency’s 
compatibility.   
 
Figure 6.11 Mayors' Job Related Experience 
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In testing H5, I interact both mayoral educational and experience background 
with agency’s compatibility and the nature of the problem.  On the later, I code “1” 
when the local problem is educational; otherwise, it is “0” (infrastructure problem).  The 
next step is to test the two propositions.  In doing that, I employ logit estimations given 
                                                 
96
 The total percentage adds up to more than 100% because the types of experience are not mutually 
exclusive. That is, a mayor with local experience can also have national and/or state experience. 
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the nature of the dependent variable: “0” or “1” where 1 represents a mayor’s approval 
for the private agency to deal with the local problem.  Table 6.1 presents the logit results 
for the impact of mayoral qualifications, municipal context, nature of the problem, and 
agency compatibility on mayoral approval for an external efficient agency to deal with 
the local need.97    
 H4 receives no support, as none of the coefficients for the interactive terms 
agency compatibility*guerrilla presence*mayoral qualifications reaches significance.  
This suggests that when the agency is compatible with the local need and there is 
guerrilla presence, mayoral qualifications have no impact on the mayoral approval for an 
external agency.  Results, instead, do partially support H5, as the coefficient for the 
interaction term of university degree*problem nature*compatible agency is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  In other words, the interactive effect for when  
mayors have university degree, the external agency’s activity is compatible to the local 
need, and the municipal problem is in the education sector is statistically different from 
the baseline category—mayors without university degree, the agency is incompatible to 
the local need, and the need is in the infrastructural sector.  
                                                 
97
 Given that the Colombian mayors are overrepresented in the sample, I ran the same model after 
including a dummy for Colombia (country). The results, however, do not vary. 
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Table 6.1 Logit Effect of Mayoral Qualifications, Stressful Situation, Nature of 
Municipal Problem and Agency’s Compatibility on Mayors’ Choice to Transfer 
Responsibility to an Efficient, Private Agency 
 
                           
Variables 
Logit Coefficients with Robust SE 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Stressful Situation 
(Guerrilla Presence) 
                               -1.21* 
[-2.45   0.02] 
 
Agency Compatible to the Municipal  
Problem 
 0.72 
[-0.44   1.89] 
Problem Nature (Education) 
 
                                   0.11 
[-1.18   1.40] 
 
University Degree 
 
 
Stressful Situation*Compatible 
Agency*University Degree 
 
-0.65 
[-1.74   0.42] 
 
0.71 
[-1.17   2.60] 
 
Problem Nature*Compatible 
Agency*University Degree 
   2.24** 
[0.267    4.22] 
 
Local Expertise 
 
Stressful Situation*Compatible   
Agency*Local Expertise 
0.02 
[-0.11   0.16] 
 
0.02 
[-0.18   0.23] 
 
Problem Nature*Compatible Agency* 
Local Expertise 
 
-0.18* 
[-0.40   0.03] 
 
 
State/National Expertise 
 
Stressful Situation*Compatible 
Agency*State/Nat. Experience 
0.05 
[-0.08   0.18] 
 
-0.11 
[-0.34   0.11] 
  
Problem Nature*Compatible     
Agency*State/Nat. Experience 
 
Constant 
 
0.021  
[-0.21   0.26] 
 
-0.74 
[-2.49   0.99] 
Number of Observations: 120                        
Wald Chi2: 23.43  
Prob. > chi2 : 0.0243 
Pseudo R2: 0.1732                            
                  *    p: < 0.1 
                  **  p: < 0.05 
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I, however, employ a joint F-test to test whether the coefficients for H4 and H5 
are jointly equal to zero—rather than testing them separately.  The joint F-test reports a 
Chi 2 = 6.68 with a probability of 0.035; therefore, it allows me to reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients jointly are equal to “0.”  Consequently, the joint F-test 
provides support for both hypotheses although the logit results support only H5.  Since 
H5 receives support from both logit and joint F-test results, figure 6.12 illustrates this 
three-way interactive effect by comparing the mean values. 
Regardless of the educational level—with and without a university degree—and 
across both sectors—educational and infrastructure—mayors are more inclined to 
transfer responsibility to an external-efficient agency when its main activity is 
compatible with the local need [(0.65 > 0.2; 0.4 > 0.1); (0.3 > 0.167; 0.3 < 0.333)].98  
Mayors, however, are much more inclined to transfer responsibility when the agency is 
compatible to the local need and this need is in the education sector [(0.65 > 0.3); (0.4 > 
0.3)].  Yet the difference ratio between compatibility and problem nature is much greater 
for the mayors with university degrees than for the mayors without university degrees 
[(0.65/0.3) > (0.4/0.3)]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98
 Except for one case, in which both means are almost equal: in the sector of infrastructure there is almost 
no difference between compatible and incompatible agencies for mayors without university degree (0.333 
– 0.300)    
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Figure 6.12 Interactive Effect between Mayor’s Education, Agency Compatibility 
and Nature of the Problem 
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As suggested before, mayors may not see educational programs as personal or 
politically profitable as infrastructural works. Moreover, to a certain extent, this is in 
tune with the empirical findings from chapter V in which mayors’ education—but 
neither mayors’ local nor state/national experience—has an impact on municipal 
performance.  Under very sensitive conditions, as an experimental analysis is, there is 
support for the dissertation’s previous findings: management quality positively 
influences municipal performance.  
Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I present an experimental analysis, providing a different approach 
to the dissertation’s main question: what explains local governmental performance? In 
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this experiment, however, the subjects are real mayors, and the experiment is conducted 
within their environmental context, thus guaranteeing external validity and leading to 
generalization of the theoretical conclusions rather than generalization of findings 
(Mook 1983).99 
The experiment allows me to manipulate the nature of the problem (issue 
salience) and environmental context to examine an aspect of mayoral performance.  Two 
local issues, education and infrastructure, are employed to assess municipal 
performance. The experiment was carried out at the II Latin American Summit of Local 
Governments, which was held in Cali, Colombia from July 26 to July 29, 2006.  I  
randomly selected one- hundred twenty mayors from 12 Latin American countries to 
participate as subjects in the experiment.  In this experiment, municipal performance is 
assessed as the mayors’ approval to transfer responsibility to an external-efficient agency 
for it to deal with a municipal problem (education or infrastructure) when the agency’s 
activity is compatible to the local problem and under a more difficult municipal context.  
Between-groups ANOVA tests indicate that an agency’s compatibility and 
environmental context have a significant effect on mayoral approval of an external 
agency.  Contrary to the expectations, the municipal context shows opposite direction, as 
mayors are less likely to transfer responsibility to an efficient-external agency under 
                                                 
99
 Mook (1983) argues that  “the distinction between the generality of findings and generality of 
theoretical conclusions” seems to be the prominent confusion, leading to equalize experimental research 
with “prediction of real-life behavior in the real word” (381).  External validity in experimental research, 
to follow Mook, consists in validating the theoretical conclusions, by extending the experiments and 
testing predictions derived from the theoretical points. That is, the generalization lies in the expansion of 
the theoretical conclusions rather than in the findings.  As a result, Mook concludes, the arguments based 
on the deficiency of both subject and settings representativeness might not be founded because they insist 
on generalization of findings rather than on generalization of theoretical conclusions. 
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guerrilla presence. It suggests that under guerrilla presence, mayors prefer to have full 
control of the budget to deal with guerrilla’s demands—which, if opposed to the 
municipal needs, can lead to decreased local performance.   
Between-groups ANOVA test also report that the interaction between the nature 
of the problem and agency’s compatibility has a significant main effect on mayors’ 
approval of an external agency.  Specifically, mayors are much more inclined to transfer 
responsibility to a compatible, external agency to deal with educational than with 
infrastructural issues. 
 In testing the management quality thesis, I present logit estimations on the impact 
of mayoral qualifications—education and experience background—on mayoral approval 
of an external agency.   Findings reveal that mayors’ education—but not their job-related 
experience—interacts with the nature of the problem and the external agency’s 
compatibility to positively influence municipal performance.  There is not a significant, 
independent effect on the nature of the problem on performance. These findings are in 
line with the results from chapter V, which reveal that mayors’ education, but not 
experience, positively affects public finances through increased tax collection and social 
investment. Therefore, even under very sensitive conditions—as an experiment is—
results are in harmony.  
 This chapter has provided the first experimental analysis to investigate the effect 
of management quality on performance in both a comparative perspective and in a 
developing setting.  Much more needs to be done to disclose managers’ impact on 
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governmental performance. By identifying them, local governments will learn what 
improves their performance. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the search for tools that improve governmental performance, worldwide 
scholars and practitioners have promoted the adoption of decentralization. In politically 
decentralized settings, citizens popularly elect their leaders, who are expected to know 
the people’s needs in order to become their first defenders. In fiscally decentralized 
settings, localities are responsible for allocating their resources and revenue collection. 
Finally in administratively decentralized settings, local managers enjoy an autonomy 
which allows them to determine the administrative structure that best fits their needs, 
area, and population. The generalized adoption of decentralization, however, has not led 
to homogenous local governmental performance. This leads us to question what 
determines municipal performance.  
 One vein of scholarship explains governmental performance with variables 
external to the organization, such as the institutional, political, and economic context in 
which it operates. Among institutional factors, scholars suggest that performance is a 
function of electoral competitiveness, type of government (divided, single party, 
minimal winning coalition, single party minority, multiparty minority, etc.), type of 
party system, government ideology, electoral laws, party alternation, electoral cycle, and 
budgetary restrictions. Other scholars, on the other hand, contend that governmental 
performance is a function of political support from upper, intermediate, and lower levels. 
At the municipal level, this translates into having support from the governor (upper), 
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councilmen (intermediate) and citizens (lower). Finally, most of the studies also include 
economic explanations (growth, recessions, productivity, resources, etc.) to understand 
governmental performance.  
 Without denying the potential explanatory power of these arguments, in this 
dissertation I focus on one of the internal—rather than external—factors of  
governmental organization: the manager. Specifically, I propose that managerial quality 
explains municipal performance. In developing settings, the municipal manager is the 
popularly elected mayor, who performs not only the political but also the administrative 
functions. In other words, this mayor performs the functions that the city manager does 
in the U.S. local form of council-manager. Indeed, it is safe to say that this mayor 
equates to the strong US mayoral form of local government.  
 After identifying the mayor as the municipal manager, I operationalized 
managerial quality with the human capital of the mayor. Specifically, I proposed that 
mayoral qualifications, in terms of educational background and job-related experience, 
are positively related to municipal performance.  I justified my proposition with Lynn’s 
(1996) typology of knowledge. According to him, managers are expected to have two 
types of knowledge: scientific and intuitive. While the former is learned at the university 
and workshop level, the latter emanates from experience and mentorship. However, the 
human capital of the mayors may not always contribute to performance; indeed, under 
certain municipal contexts mayoral qualifications may not add to municipal 
performance. Therefore, I also propose that municipal context conditions the influence 
of mayoral qualifications on municipal performance.  
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  I tested my propositions with three empirical analyses. Data for two out of the 
three analyses came from the forty municipalities that constitute the Colombian 
department of Norte de Santander. I selected the Colombian municipalities because of 
their relatively long experience with fiscal (since 1982), political (since 1988), and 
administrative decentralization (since 1989). Moreover, I selected the municipalities of a 
single department for the following reasons. First, they vary in terms of development, 
performance, and mayoral qualifications. Second, their average number (40) allowed me 
to undertake the project given the financial constraints. Third, by focusing on a single 
department (state), I control for variables specific to it, such as the governor’s 
performance and departmental control agencies’ actions. The period under study, from 
2000 to 2005, are years in which the municipalities were  expected to have adjusted to 
the new responsibilities. I conducted field research across these forty municipalities, 
collecting data from six administrative years to generate a unique time series data set to 
test my propositions. In addition to this, I also conducted a survey-experimental analysis 
with 120 mayors from twelve Latin American countries. These mayors were participants 
in the II Latin American Congress of Cities and Local Governments held in Cali, 
Colombia.  
 Chapter IV presented the first empirical test of my propositions. In this chapter, I 
employed two indicators of municipal performance: coverage of municipal education 
(the percentage of those eligible to attend school that were actually registered) and 
identifying the number of beneficiaries of a social program (the SISBEN program). The 
results provided empirical support for the proposition that mayoral qualifications—
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educational background and job-related experience—influence local program 
performance.  These findings are in tune with the works that assess the impact of 
managerial influence in school district performance (Fernández 2005; Meier and 
O’Toole 2002).  However, mayoral qualifications positively influence municipal 
coverage of education but not in identifying the beneficiaries of social spending 
(SISBEN).  The nature of the SISBEN program makes it highly attractive to political 
manipulation and patronage, explaining, in part, the contradictory results.100  As 
expected, the municipal context conditions the positive influence that mayoral 
qualifications have on program performance.  Specifically, the presence of illegal armed 
groups reduces the positive impact that local experience and post-secondary education 
have on program performance.  This research, thus, supports Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill’s 
(2000) claim that effective management is contingent on the environment within which 
managers work.   
From the two mayoral qualifications—educational background and job-related 
experience—education has the greatest influence.  Having any year(s) of post-secondary 
education has substantively the largest effect on improving the level of local education.  
In other words, the more education the mayor has, the more she/he recognizes the 
benefits that education brings and supports, encourages, and supplies the means to 
increase participation in public education.   
                                                 
100
 Porras (2005, 27) notes how the SISBEN is corrupted, “…despite some progress, in the SISBEN 
program there is still too much corruption.  Indeed, the card of the SISBEN is given not to the poorer but 
to the friend of either the mayor or the councilmen” (translated by the author). 
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The mayor’s job related experience also influences local program performance.  
The positive impact that the mayor’s job related experience has on program 
performance, however, is confined to local, non-executive experience, such as having 
been a councilmen, treasurer, secretary of planning, etc.  Contrary to expectations, being 
an ex-mayor has no impact on program performance.  It may be, as Boyne et al. (2005) 
claim, that it takes time to see the impact of management on performance. In other 
words, it matters for long term but not for short performance. Two other explanations are 
also plausible in the Colombian case: non-immediate reelection and the constant change 
of administrative procedures overshadow the benefits of knowledge.  Finally, experience 
at a departmental and/or national level has no influence on local program performance.  
This suggests that the kind of expertise acquired at these levels is not relevant at the 
local level.  Or it could be that this type of experience contributes to other dimensions of 
performance, as Pitts (2004) suggests, managerial quality matters in some dimensions of 
performance but not all. 
From the institutional factors, only two have an impact on program performance.  
The greater the number of oversight agencies, the better the coverage in education. This 
should encourage Colombians to participate more as ombudsmen are concerned about 
people’s apathy in forming oversight agencies.  Contrary to what the electoral 
competitiveness hypothesis suggests, the analysis reports that the greater the electoral 
difference between the winning and second candidate, the better the coverage in 
education.  The non-immediate reelection for mayors may explain this result. 
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Partisanship has no influence on municipal performance. The absence of the 
parties’ clear ideology, the advent of new parties—fifty-nine in the 2005 elections—and 
the lack of party discipline create incentives for a personal rather than party vote.  
Demographic factors—rural and total population—have no impact on education 
coverage.  This is good news for the Colombian municipalities where, on average, 62 
percent of their population inhabits rural areas. 
 Chapter V presented the second empirical test of my propositions: mayoral 
qualifications influence municipal performance and municipal context conditions the 
influence of mayoral qualifications on performance. Specifically, this chapter explored 
the influence of mayoral qualifications on municipal fiscal performance. Fiscal 
performance is measured through four indicators: property tax collection/capital, 
municipal social investment/capital, mayoralty operational costs/capital, and municipal 
expenditures/capital.   
As hypothesized, the results show a robust positive relationship between 
managerial quality—mayoral qualifications—and fiscal performance. Specifically, the 
mayor’s educational level is positively associated with property tax collection and 
municipal social investment. As hypothesized too, the municipal context conditions the 
influence of mayoral qualifications on fiscal performance. That is, the presence of illegal 
armed groups reduces the positive influence that the mayor’s educational background 
has on property tax collection and social investment.  
These findings bring theoretical and practical implications to the public 
management and public finance literatures. Hence, the results suggest that the influences 
  
216 
 
of management quality go beyond the dimension of the programs’ outputs—as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter.  In fact, by demonstrating the positive impact of 
managerial quality on fiscal indicators, we extend its influences to effectiveness.  
Similarly, results also reveal that besides considering political and budgetary institutions, 
attention must be given to the qualifications of the budget makers.  
 None of the political institutional variables assessed in this study seem to be 
clearly related to municipal social investment and property tax collection. The municipal 
budget, on the contrary, is a strong predictor of social investment and expenditures in 
general. In explaining mayoral operational costs, neither mayoral qualifications nor the 
political institutional variables exert influence. This might suggest the workings of 
political favors behind the scenes, given that public appointments are often employed for 
clientelism.  When mayors have greater partisan support at the municipal council, 
mayoral operational costs tend to increase, as the mayor’s proposals easily pass the 
legislature.    
 Chapter V also explored the determinants of municipal expenditures. Results 
reveal that mayoral qualifications are not associated with municipal social investment 
nor with municipal expenditures. I, however, emphasize that expenditures tell us little 
about fiscal performance unless they are associated with service standards—which is not 
done here. Contrary to what the literature in the U.S. suggests, mayors affiliated with the 
Conservative Party tend to spend more than mayors affiliated with any other party.  The 
number of parties represented in the municipal council has a negative impact on 
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expenditures. This might be explained by the difficulty of getting a consensus to approve 
expenditures. The municipal budget is also a predictor of expenditures.   
Chapter VI presented a survey-experimental analysis, providing a different 
approach to this dissertation’s main question: what determines municipal performance? 
From chapter IV, we learned that managerial quality (mayoral qualifications) adds to the 
municipal coverage of education but not to the coverage of SISBEN. This suggests that 
the impact of mayoral qualifications on performance may be conditioned not only by the 
municipal context, but also by the nature of the program. A survey-experimental analysis 
allowed me to manipulate both the municipal context (presence or absence of guerrilla 
groups) and the nature of the municipal problems (education or infrastructure).  I 
conducted the experiment at the II Latin American Summit of Local Governments, which 
was held in Cali, Colombia, from July 26 to July 29, 2006.  I randomly selected as the 
subjects of the experiment 120 participating mayors from twelve Latin American 
countries.  
In the experiment, I operationalized municipal performance using the mayoral 
decision to transfer responsibility to an externally efficient agency, which can deal with 
a municipal problem under two conditions: 1) the external agency’s main activity is 
compatible to the local problem and 2) there is a difficult municipal context—a guerrilla 
presence. The underlying assumption is that under external constraints, such as a 
guerrilla presence, mayors should look for external, efficient agencies—of course, when 
it is allowed and available—to achieve more efficacy and efficiency, as they are 
expected to be free from external interference.  
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The between-groups ANOVA test indicates that when the external agency’s main 
activity is compatible with the municipal need, mayors are more likely to transfer 
responsibility to this agency to allow it to deal with the need. Contrary to expectations, 
when there is a difficult local context (a guerrilla presence), mayors are less likely to 
transfer responsibility to an external efficient agency.  This finding is explained by the 
argument that with a guerrilla presence, mayors prefer to have full control of the budget 
to deal with the guerrilla’s demands. In addition, the within-subjects ANOVA test 
reports that the interaction between the nature of the problem and agency’s compatibility 
to the local need has a statistically significant effect on the mayoral decision. That is, 
mayors are more likely to transfer responsibility to an externally efficient agency, whose 
main activity is compatible to the local need, when the local need is in education rather 
than with infrastructure.  
 To test the impact of managerial quality (mayoral qualifications) on municipal 
performance, I also presented logit estimations on the impact of mayoral 
qualifications—education background and job-related experience—on mayoral decisions 
to transfer responsibility to an externally efficient agency. Findings reveal that 
independently, neither a university degree nor local experience influences the mayoral 
decision to delegate responsibility. However, results show that both the type of the 
municipal problem and the compatibility of the external agency’s main activity moderate 
the impact of the mayors’ university degree on mayoral decisions. That is, when the 
municipal problem is in the educational sector and the agency’s main activity is focused 
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on education, mayors with a university degree are more likely to delegate responsibility 
to this externally efficient agency.  
These results suggest two things: mayors know how to perform with 
infrastructure issues, even under unfavorable external conditions; or mayors place less 
value on infrastructural problems, which explains why they do not transfer responsibility 
to an efficient agency. Indeed, on issues of salience, Gibson and Lehoucq (2003) find 
that mayors place less value on forestry programs than on other developmental 
programs. The type of municipal problem, however, has no significant, independent 
effect on the mayoral decision.  
Implications of the Research 
 
Spanish colonialism determined the social and economic structures in Latin 
America, which led to the pervasive inequalities in the region.  The main way to 
overcome these inequalities is with health and education programs. To implement these 
programs, even under the risk of debt, as Covo (2000, XIII) suggests, there is a need for 
qualified and politically competent public managers. At the Latin American municipal 
level, the public manager is the mayor, who, in turn, implements the programs conducive 
to reducing inequalities.  
By demonstrating the positive relationship between mayoral qualifications 
(education and experience) and municipal education coverage, tax collection, and social 
investment, this research reveals that human capital adds to performance. Much has been 
discussed about the positive impact of human capital; however, its empirical testing has 
been overlooked, mainly in developing settings. This research, therefore, has practical 
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implications. First, by demonstrating the positive impact of mayoral human capital on 
municipal performance, citizens will learn to choose their political leaders based on their 
qualifications rather than on their distribution of private goods. Second, managerial 
human capital seems to trigger the cycle of human development. This is demonstrated by 
the additional influence that mayoral human capital has on municipal education and 
social investment. This research probes and reinforces the virtues of human capital.  
Managers, therefore, should promote human capital as one of the key tools of 
development. This is an issue with implications in an international context, as well as a 
specific context since human capital development is expected to expand and never to 
decrease.  
This research also reveals the amount of influence the mayor can have when 
circumstances permit. By testing a series of theories in terms of predictors of program 
and fiscal performance in conjunction with the qualifications of the mayor, I demonstrate 
the potential impact that the mayor has on municipal performance in a developing 
setting. The results also suggest that mayoral qualifications influence programs 
differently depending on their nature (or type). In some cases, programs seem more 
suitable to governmental control, while others have more success under the direction of 
nonprofit and/or private for-profit organizations (Cohen and Eimicke 1995, XI).   
Contributions 
 
This dissertation contributed to the study of municipal performance from a 
comparative perspective. As Jreisat (2002, 26) posits, “ Progress will most likely depend 
on the ability of comparative research to bring together knowledge of context and 
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insights about operational functioning of organizations in order to produce more relevant 
theory and practice.” Indeed, this research extended the applicability of theories 
developed in the United States to developing contexts. Specifically, I tested the 
generalizabiltity of the managerial quality thesis not only outside of the U.S. context, but 
also outside of the school district by moving it to the municipal level in a developing 
setting.  
I proposed a positive influence between mayoral qualifications and municipal 
performance. By doing this, my research combined two field of study: comparative 
politics and public administration—specifically public management. This research 
brings a new context to public administration, collects an ingenious new data set, and 
blends administration and politics, something that public administration often fails to do.  
Future Research 
 
 My study also calls for more research. Although my study demonstrates the 
positive impact of mayoral qualifications on municipal performance, more specification 
should add to our understanding of governmental performance. For example, future 
works should address the specific effect of a manger’s profession on performance. Does 
being a lawyer add more to performance than being a dentist? Or does coming from the 
private sector add more to performance than coming from the public sector? Likewise, 
does coming from the industrial sector add more than coming from the agricultural 
sector?  
 Political decentralization opens opportunities for everyone, and in settings 
without city managers, mayors come with different professional backgrounds. The 
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impact of the nature of these professional backgrounds on performance will, therefore, 
enlighten us as to what kind of professional knowledge contributes the most to 
performance. Moreover, more comparative research is needed to reveal the similarities 
or differences in mayoral backgrounds across Latin American countries. For instance, 
are there countries whose mayors have certain professions and education? Or does it 
vary among countries?  
 This study has been the first step in testing the influence of managers’ 
qualifications on certain objective indicators of performance. Additional research, 
however, should assess the influence of a manager’s qualifications on citizens’ 
participation, one of the democratic channels that is largely absent in Latin America. 
Finally, additional research should assess the additive and interactive impact of 
municipal employees’ human capital on performance. For example, does the positive 
influence of mayoral qualifications on performance surpass the one derived from the 
staff’s qualifications? 
 This dissertation presented the first empirical undertaking on the influence of 
managerial quality on municipal performance. The study revealed that mayoral 
qualifications—education and job-related experience—do positively contribute to 
municipal performance in terms of delivery of social programs, property tax collection, 
and social investments. This is good news for citizens and managers in developing 
countries. By electing educated and experienced mayors, citizens increase the chances of 
improving their living standards—a worldwide need.  
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